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THE WHITE HOUSE

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Andrews, Maine

Andrews, New Jersey

Alexander

Andrews (TX)

Anthony

Applegate

Barnard

Bailenson

Berauter

Bevill

Boehlert

Borski

Boucher

Brooks

Brown

Bruce

Bustamante

Byron

Campbell, Ben

Campbell, Tom

Cardin

Carper

Clement

Cona

Cooper

Coyne

Dardan

de la Garza

Derrick

Dingell

Dorgan

English

Erdreich

Fish

Gajdanson

Goodling

Green

Guarini

Hall, Tony

Hall, Ralph

Harris

Hatcher

Hayes, J.

Heiner

Hertal

Hoagland

Hochbrueckner

Horton

Hubbard

Huckaby

Hughes

Hutto

J. Miller

Jenkins

Johnson (SD)

Johnson

Johnston (FL)

Jones (GA)

Jones (NC)

Kildoe

Kolter

LaFalce

Lancaster

Laughlin

Lipinski

Lloyd

Lukan

Machtley

Manton

Mazzoli

McGrath

McMillen

McNulty

Moakley

Mollichan

Moralla

Morrison

Natcher

Neal, Richard

Neal, Steve

Nowak

Olin

Ortiz

Patterson-

Payne

Petri

Pickatt

Porter

Price

Pursell

Rahall

Ramstead

Ravensl

Ray

Regula

Richardson

Ridge

Riggs

Rinaldo

Roe

Rose

Roth

Roukema

Rowland

Sangmeister

Schumer

Sensenbrenner

Sharp

Shays

Sisisky

Skaggs

Slattery

Smith, Neal

Smith, Larry

Smith (NJ)

Snowa

Spratt

Staggars

Stallings

Synar

Tallon

Tanner

Tauzin

Thomas

Udall

Valentine

Viscloskey

Volkmer

Walsh

Waxman

Weiss

Whitten

Wilson (TX)

Wolpe

Yatas

Democrat

Andrews (TX)
Andrews* (NJ)
Andrews* (ME)
Aspin
Bacchus*
Barnard
Beilenson
Berman
Bevill
Bilbray
Boucher
Brewster*
Browder
Byron
Campbell
Chapman
Clement
Cooper
Costello
Cox* (IL)
Cramer*
Darden
de la Garza
Derrick
Dicks
Dooley*
Dorgan
Edwards (TX)
Engel
English
Erdreich
Fascell
Geren
Hall
Harris
Hatcher
Hayes
Hefner
Horn*
Hubbard
Huckaby
Hutto
Jefferson*
Jenkins
Johnson (SD)
Jones (NC)
Jones (GA)
Jontz
Kopetski
LaFalce
Lancaster
Lantos
LaRocco
Laughlin

Levine
Lipinski
Lloyd
Long
Luken
Mazzoli
McCurdy
McMillen
McNulty
Montgomery
Moran*
Murtha
Neal, Steve
Olin
Ortiz
Orton*
Pallone
Parker
Patterson
Payne
Penny
Perkins
Peterson* (MN)
Peterson* (FL)
Pickett
Poshard
Ray
Reed
Richardson
Roemer*
Rose
Rostenkowski
Rowland
Sarpalius
Sawyer
Sisisky
Skelton
Slattery
Slaughter
Spratt
Stallings
Stenholm
Swett*
Tallon
Tanner
Tauzin
Taylor
Thomas
Thornton*
Toricelli
Traficant
Valentine
Wilson (TX)

Solanz

Katie Winkeljohn

Bobbie-

FYI

To: Jeff

fu

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 21, 1991

Dear Mr. Stempel,

I saw a copy of your recent letter to the President expressing support for our efforts in the Middle East. Thank you for those kind words of encouragement. In these tough times, it's nice to know that you and the good people of GM are behind the President.

Regards,



John H. Sununu
Chief of Staff

Mr. Robert C. Stempel
Chairman
General Motors Corporation
General Motors Building
3044 West Grand Boulevard
Detroit, Michigan 48202

General Motors Corporation

ROBERT C. STEMPEL
CHAIRMAN

January 17, 1991

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We have watched with pride as you have built a worldwide coalition to deal with events in the Mid-East. With a single purpose, you have advanced the cause for peace through diplomacy for more than five months. Iraq's unprecedented action in the Mid-East has threatened world economic and political stability and could not be allowed to continue. Now, with the extraordinary authorization of both the United States Congress and the United Nations, you have turned to other means to remove the aggressors from Kuwait.

As President, you had to make the final, critical decision with the help of your advisors -- yet by yourself. The support for your decision from Congress and the American people is widespread and unified. I want to assure you that I personally support your leadership efforts and that General Motors is ready to do whatever is feasible to support you and the requirements of our nation's security.

Last evening in your message to the American people, you expressed your prayers for our forces in the Gulf and all the innocent people of all nations in the area. The people of General Motors join you in these prayers and extend them to you as you lead our country forward through this difficult time, bringing new order out of chaos.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. Stempel", with a large, stylized flourish at the end.

Dear Jim:

Thank you for your warm and thoughtful message regarding our response to the events in the Persian Gulf. Receiving such heartfelt words of support means a great deal to me. The United States and the world community have demonstrated a shared resolve on this vital matter, and we remain steadfastly determined that Saddam Hussein's naked aggression and violations of international law will not stand.

Barbara joins me in sending our best wishes. God bless you.

Sincerely,

GEORGE BUSH

Mr. James K. Baker
Chairman of the Board
Chamber of Commerce of the
United States of America
1615 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20062

GB/BH/TL/CH/cjs (1PRESC)

cc: Brandt Hershman, Rm. 93
Jeff Vogt, OPL w/copy of incoming

PRESIDENT TO SIGN

5
J. Green

202 386

CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

JAMES K. BAKER
CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD

January 2, 1991

1615 H STREET, N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20062
202/659-6000

The Honorable George Bush
President of the United States
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

As the year 1990 closes, it is natural to look back and review those events that made a difference in our lives. The one event that stands out above all the others is your action in the Iraqi crisis in an effort to preserve the independence of a tiny nation. Your recognition of the far-reaching effects of this barbarianism, if allowed to go unchecked, illustrates to the world that this nation will not tolerate threats against world peace.

I applaud you for your forthright position. You are, indeed, an outstanding leader.

Sincerely,

Jim Baker

JKB/ms

General Motors Corporation

ROBERT C. STEMPEL
CHAIRMAN

January 17, 1991

**The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500**

Dear Mr. President:

We have watched with pride as you have built a worldwide coalition to deal with events in the Mid-East. With a single purpose, you have advanced the cause for peace through diplomacy for more than five months. Iraq's unprecedented action in the Mid-East has threatened world economic and political stability and could not be allowed to continue. Now, with the extraordinary authorization of both the United States Congress and the United Nations, you have turned to other means to remove the aggressors from Kuwait.

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Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. Stempel", with a large, stylized flourish extending from the end.

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

January 16, 1991

TEXT OF A LETTER AND REPORT FROM THE
PRESIDENT TO THE SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
AND THE PRESIDENT PRO TEMPORE OF THE
SENATE PURSUANT TO SECTION 2(B) OF PUBLIC LAW 102-1

January 16, 1991

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)

Pursuant to section 2(b) of the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (H.J. Res. 77, Public Law 102-1), I have concluded that:

1. the United States has used all appropriate diplomatic and other peaceful means to obtain compliance by Iraq with U.N. Security Council Resolutions 660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, 677, and 678; and
2. that those efforts have not been and would not be successful in obtaining such compliance.

Enclosed is a report that supports my decision.

Sincerely,

GEORGE BUSH

cc: The Honorable Robert H. Michel
 Republican Leader

 The Honorable George J. Mitchell
 Majority Leader

 The Honorable Robert J. Dole
 Republican Leader

Attachment

Report for Use in Connection with Section 2(b) of the
Joint Congressional Resolution Authorizing the Use of
Military Force Against Iraq

The report that follows is a summary of diplomatic and other peaceful means used in an attempt to obtain compliance by Iraq with the twelve UN Security Council resolutions relating to its invasion and occupation of Kuwait. It is not a definitive rendition of these means, because the Administration cannot, of necessity, include at this time all the factual data that would support a complete historical record. This report, therefore, should be considered in light of formal and informal information already provided to the Congress and that which will be provided in the future.

1. Background

For over five and half months, the international community has sought with unprecedented unity to reverse Iraq's brutal and unprovoked aggression against Kuwait. The United States and the vast majority of governments of the world, working together through the United Nations, have been united both in their determination to compel Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait and in their strong preference for doing so through peaceful means. Since August 2, we have sought to build maximum diplomatic and economic pressure against Iraq. Regrettably, Iraq has given no sign whatever that it intends to comply with the will of the international community; nor is there any indication that diplomatic and economic means alone would ever compel Iraq to do so. Instead, Iraq has continued to reject the relevant UN Security Council resolutions and refuses to recognize them.

From the beginning of the Gulf crisis, the United States has consistently pursued four basic objectives: (1) the immediate, complete, and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait; (2) the restoration of the legitimate Government of Kuwait; (3) the protection of U.S. citizens abroad; and (4) the security and stability of a region vital to U.S. national security. In pursuit of these objectives, we have sought and obtained action by the UN Security Council, resulting in twelve separate resolutions that have been fully consistent with U.S. objectives.

The last of these twelve resolutions, UN Security Council Resolution 678 of 29 November 1990, authorizes UN Member States to use "all necessary means" to implement Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions of the Security Council, and to restore international peace and security in the area, unless Iraq fully implements those resolutions on or before January 15, 1991.

The nearly seven week "pause of goodwill" established in UN Security Council Resolution 678 has now passed. Iraq has taken no steps whatever to fulfill these requirements. Iraq has forcefully stated that it considers the Security Council's resolutions invalid and has no intention of complying with them at any time. Iraqi forces remain in occupation of Kuwait and have been substantially reinforced in recent weeks rather than withdrawn. Iraq has strongly and repeatedly reiterated its annexation of Kuwait and stated its determination that Kuwait will remain permanently a part of Iraq. The Iraqi closure of diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait has in no way been rescinded.

In short, the Government of Iraq remains completely intransigent in rejecting the UN Security Council's demands -- despite the exhaustive use by the United States and the United Nations of all appropriate diplomatic, political, and economic measures to persuade or compel Iraq to comply.

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This has been a truly international effort. More than two dozen other countries have sent their own military forces to the Gulf region, including more than 250,000 troops. They have given or pledged substantial funds and other assistance to us for our operations, including over \$8 billion in calendar year 1990 alone. They have taken on the responsibility for assisting those nations that have suffered the most from the effects of international sanctions against Iraq and higher energy prices. As additional costs are incurred during 1991, we will look to our allies to shoulder their fair share of our military expenses and exceptional economic assistance efforts.

2. Diplomatic and Political Actions

The extensive diplomatic and political efforts undertaken by the United States, other countries, regional organizations including the Arab League and the European Community and the United Nations to persuade or compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait have not succeeded. The UN Security Council and General Assembly have overwhelmingly and repeatedly condemned the Iraqi invasion and demanded Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. The Security Council has invoked its extraordinary authority under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, not only to order comprehensive economic sanctions, but to authorize the use of all other means necessary, including the use of force. The Security Council has directed other UN organizations (e.g., the International Atomic Energy Agency) to take appropriate actions toward the same end within their areas of competence, and they have done so where relevant.

The President, the Secretary of State and other U.S. officials have engaged in an exhaustive process of consultation with other governments and international organizations. The Secretary of State alone has, since August 2 of last year, held more than 250 meetings with foreign heads of state, foreign ministers and other high foreign officials. He has traveled over 125,000 miles in the course of these contacts. While this extensive diplomacy has been very successful in maintaining international solidarity in support of our objectives, it has not caused the Government of Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.

Most recently, on January 9, the Secretary of State met at length in Geneva with the Iraqi Foreign Minister, who in six and one-half hours of talks demonstrated no readiness whatever to implement the UN Security Council resolutions. The Iraqi Foreign Minister even refused to receive a diplomatic communication from the President intended for Saddam Hussein. On January 13, the UN Secretary General was rebuffed by Iraq for a second time, in this case in a direct attempt to persuade Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait peacefully. Many other heads of state, foreign ministers and private persons have made similar attempts. In short, the international community has in an unprecedented way directed the full scope and vigor of its political and diplomatic means to produce an Iraqi withdrawal.

These exhaustive efforts have produced not the slightest indication of any intention by Saddam Hussein to meet the demands of the international community for immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait. For our part, the Administration made clear that there could be no reward for aggression lest we undermine prospects for an expanded constructive role for the UN Security Council and for a new, more peaceful world order. Attempts to link resolution of Iraq's aggression against Kuwait with other issues were rejected on the grounds that these issues were unrelated to Iraq's aggression and that such efforts would only serve to divert attention from the immediate challenge posed by Iraq.

3. Economic Sanctions

Since August 2 (in the case of the United States) and August 9 (in the case of the Security Council and the other UN Member States), comprehensive economic sanctions have been imposed on Iraq, prohibiting all trade and financial transactions with Iraq, with the exception of goods for a very limited category of essential humanitarian purposes. These sanctions have since August 25 been backed by an extensive maritime interception effort involving warships of many states, and since September 25 by rigorous controls on air traffic to and from Iraq. The United States and other countries have engaged in tireless efforts during this period to uncover and defeat attempted evasions of these sanctions around the world, whether by direct attempts to pass through the allied interception cordon or by the use of financial and trade intermediaries.

Our efforts have resulted in a very substantial reduction of the volume of trade to and from Iraq, and significant shortages in Iraq's financial resources. The most serious impact on Iraq thus far has been on the financial sector, where hard currency shortages have led Baghdad to take a variety of unusual steps to conserve or obtain foreign exchange. The sanctions have shut off 97% of Iraq's exports and more than 90% of its imports and have prevented Baghdad from reaping the proceeds of higher oil prices or its seizure of Kuwaiti oil fields. The departure of foreign workers and the cutoff of imported industrial inputs has caused problems for a variety of industries.

Notwithstanding the substantial economic impact of sanctions to date, and even if sanctions were to continue to be enforced for an additional six to twelve months, economic hardship alone is highly unlikely to compel Saddam to retreat from Kuwait or cause regime-threatening popular discontent in Iraq. Due to a reduction of domestic consumption, cannibalization of Kuwaiti facilities, smuggling, and use of existing stockpiles, the most vital Iraqi industries do not appear to be threatened. The price of foodstuffs for the Iraqi population has sharply increased and rations have been reduced, but there is still access to sufficient staple foods, and new supplies are being injected from the fall harvest and smuggling.

While we might succeed in substantially reducing the overall Iraqi supply of food and other essential consumer commodities, Saddam Hussein has made clear his willingness to divert such supplies to his military forces, even at the cost of severe deprivation of his civilian population. Even if the international community were prepared to deprive the Iraqi civilian population of food, there is no reason to believe that this would change Saddam Hussein's policies.

The ability of Iraqi armed forces to defend Kuwait and southern Iraq is unlikely to be eroded substantially over the next six to twelve months even if effective sanctions could be maintained. Iraq's infantry and artillery forces probably would not suffer significantly, since Iraq could maintain the relatively simple Soviet-style weaponry of these forces. Low-technology defensive preparations could also be expanded. Iraq's armored and mechanized forces would be degraded somewhat, but Iraq has large stocks of spare parts and other supplies that would ameliorate this effect. Iraqi air forces and air defenses would likely be hit far more severely by continued effective sanctions, but in any case, Iraqi air defense and air forces would play a limited role -- in relation to the ground forces -- with respect to Iraq's ability to hold Kuwait.

more

In short, while sanctions might degrade to some extent the operational readiness of some portion of the Iraqi armed forces, it is clear that Iraq would still retain very large and powerful land and air forces, as well as substantial capability to replace ammunition and other essential replacement items. Delay would also have important military consequences that might make any eventual military action more costly and increase U.S. and coalition casualties. Iraq has already exploited its five-month occupation of Kuwait to increase significantly its ability to resist coalition efforts to restore that country's sovereignty and to increase further its already formidable military capability. Iraq has increased the size of its forces in the Kuwait Theater of Operations by 450,000 personnel and has increased the overall size of its armed forces by mobilizing many thousands of combat veterans and reservists. Additional time has already permitted the Iraqis to extend and reinforce their fortifications along the Saudi border; more time would only make these defenses more formidable. Delay also would give the Iraqis more time to further develop, produce and weaponize weapons of mass destruction, thus making any eventual conflict more destructive and strengthening Iraq's ability to coerce other nations with the threat of mass destruction. Delay may also degrade the readiness of coalition forces.

In short, international sanctions have not caused Iraq to comply with the January 15, 1991 deadline in UN Security Council Resolution 678, or to retreat from its insistence that its annexation of Kuwait is permanent. Even if the world community were able to maintain the current high level of success in sanctions enforcement, these economic results would not produce such compliance.

Further, the longer the sanctions continue, the more likely it is that leaks in the sanctions enforcement system will develop, that intermediaries will devise ways to circumvent sanctions, and that Iraq will find means of using its own resources to fill critical shortfalls. Even more important, if the coalition fails now to carry through on the UN Security Council's demands for immediate Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, there will be strong pressures and temptations on various countries to ease their enforcement of sanctions and to compromise on demands that Iraq meet existing objectives fully and unconditionally.

In summary, diplomatic and economic pressures have not diminished Iraq's intransigence despite five and one-half months of unparalleled international effort, and continued reliance upon them alone could risk achieving the basic objective of bringing about Iraq's complete and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.

#

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

January 16, 1991

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

The Oval Office

9:01 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: Just two hours ago, allied air forces began an attack on military targets in Iraq and Kuwait. These attacks continue as I speak. Ground forces are not engaged.

This conflict started August 2nd when the dictator of Iraq invaded a small and helpless neighbor. Kuwait -- a member of the Arab League and a member of the United Nations -- was crushed; its people brutalized. Five months ago, Saddam Hussein started this cruel war against Kuwait. Tonight, the battle has been joined.

This military action, taken in accord with United Nations resolutions -- and with the consent of the United States Congress -- follows months of constant and virtually endless diplomatic activity on the part of the United Nations, the United States and many, many other countries. Arab leaders sought what became known as an Arab solution -- only to conclude that Saddam Hussein was unwilling to leave Kuwait. Others traveled to Baghdad in a variety of efforts to restore peace and justice. Our Secretary of State, James Baker, held an historic meeting in Geneva -- only to be totally rebuffed. This past weekend, in a last ditch effort, the Secretary General of the United Nations went to the Middle East, with peace in his heart -- his second such mission. And he came back from Baghdad with no progress at all in getting Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait.

Now the 28 countries with forces in the Gulf area, have exhausted all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful resolution, have no choice but to drive Saddam from Kuwait by force. We will not fail.

As I report to you, air attacks are underway against military targets in Iraq. We are determined to knock out Saddam Hussein's nuclear bomb potential. We will also destroy his chemical weapons facilities. Much of Saddam's artillery and tanks will be destroyed. Our operations are designed to best protect the lives of all the coalition forces by targeting Saddam's vast military arsenal. Initial reports from General Schwarzkopf are that our operations are proceeding according to plan.

Our objectives are clear. Saddam Hussein's forces will leave Kuwait. The legitimate government of Kuwait will be restored to its rightful place and Kuwait will once again be free. Iraq will eventually comply with all relevant United Nations resolutions. And then, when peace is restored, it is our hope that Iraq will live as a peaceful and cooperative member of the family of nations, thus, enhancing the Security and stability of the Gulf.

Some may ask, why act now? Why not wait? The answer is clear: The world could wait no longer. Sanctions, though having some effect, showed no signs of accomplishing their objective. Sanctions were tried for well over five months, and we and our allies concluded that sanctions alone would not force Saddam from Kuwait.

While the world waited, Saddam Hussein systematically

MORE

raped, pillaged and plundered a tiny nation, no threat to his own. He subjected the people of Kuwait to unspeakable atrocities -- and among those maimed and murdered, innocent children.

While the world waited, Saddam sought to add to the chemical weapons arsenal he now possesses an infinitely more dangerous weapon of mass destruction -- a nuclear weapon.

And while the world waited, while the world talked peace and withdrawal, Saddam Hussein dug in and moved massive forces into Kuwait.

While the world waited, while Saddam stalled, more damage was being done to the fragile economies of the Third World, the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe, to the entire world including to our own economy.

The United States, together with the United Nations, exhausted every means at our disposal to bring this crisis to a peaceful end. However, Saddam clearly felt that by stalling and threatening and defying the United Nations he could weaken the forces arrayed against him.

While the world waited, Saddam Hussein met every overture of peace with open contempt. While the world prayed for peace, Saddam prepared for war.

I had hoped that when the United States Congress, in historic debate, took its resolute action, Saddam would realize he could not prevail and would move out of Kuwait in accord with the United Nations resolutions. He did not do that. Instead, he remained intransigent, certain that time was on his side.

Saddam was warned over and over again to comply with the will of the United Nations. Leave Kuwait or be driven out. Saddam has arrogantly rejected all warnings. Instead he tried to make this a dispute between Iraq and the United States of America.

Well, he failed. Tonight, 28 nations -- countries from five continents: Europe and Asia, Africa and the Arab League -- have forces in the Gulf area standing shoulder to shoulder against Saddam Hussein. These countries had hoped the use of force could be avoided. Regrettably, we now believe that only force will make him leave.

Prior to ordering our forces into battle, I instructed our military commanders to take every necessary step to prevail as quickly as possible and with the greatest degree of protection possible for American and allied servicemen and women. I've told the American people before that this will not be another Vietnam. And I repeat this here tonight. Our troops will have the best possible support in the entire world, and they will not be asked to fight with one hand tied behind their back.

I'm hopeful that this fighting will not go on for long, and that casualties will be held to an absolute minimum.

This is an historic moment. We have, in this past year made great progress in ending the long era of conflict and Cold War. We have before us the opportunity to forge, for ourselves and for future generations, a new world order -- a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jungle, governs the conduct of nations.

When we are successful, and we will be, we have a real chance at this new world order -- an order in which a credible United Nations can use its peacekeeping role to fulfill the promise and vision of the U.N.'s founders.

We have no argument with the people of Iraq -- indeed, for the innocents caught in this conflict, I pray for their safety.

Our goal is not the conquest of Iraq -- it is the

liberation of Kuwait. It is my hope that somehow the Iraqi people can, even now, convince their dictator that he must lay down his arms, leave Kuwait, and let Iraq itself rejoin the family of peace-loving nations.

Thomas Paine wrote many years ago: "These are the times that try men's souls." Those well-known words are so very true today. But even as planes of the multinational forces attack Iraq, I prefer to think of peace, not war. I am convinced not only that we will prevail, but that out of the horror of combat will come the recognition that no nation can stand against a world united. No nation will be permitted to brutally assault its neighbor.

No president can easily commit our sons and daughters to war. They are the nation's finest. Ours is an all volunteer force -- magnificently trained, highly motivated. The troops know why they're there. And listen to what they say, for they've said it better than any president or prime minister ever could.

Listen to "Hollywood" Huddleston, Marine Lance Corporal. He says, "Let's free these people so we can go home and be free again." He's right. The terrible crimes and tortures committed by Saddam's henchmen against the innocent people of Kuwait are an affront to mankind and a challenge to the freedom of all.

Listen to one of our great officers out there, Marine Lieutenant General Walter Boomer. He said, "There are things worth fighting for. A world in which brutality and lawlessness are allowed to go unchecked isn't the kind of world we're going to want to live in."

Listen to Master Sergeant J.P. Kendall of the 82nd Airborne: "We're here for more than just the price of a gallon of gas. What we're doing is going to chart the future of the world for the next hundred years. It's better to deal with this guy now than five years from now."


And finally, we should all sit up and listen to Jackie Jones, an Army Lieutenant, when she says, "If we let him get away with this, who knows what's going to be next?"

I have called upon "Hollywood" and Walter and J.P. and Jackie and all their courageous comrades in arms to do what must be done. Tonight, America and the world are deeply grateful to them and to their families. And let me say to everyone listening or watching tonight: when the troops we've sent in finish their work, I am determined to bring them home as soon as possible.

Tonight, as our forces fight, they and their families are in our prayers. May God bless each and every one of them, and the coalition forces at our side in the Gulf -- and may He continue to bless our nation, the United States of America.

END

9:15 P.M. EST



*Bob
K-415*

Patricia S. Harrison
Partner

E. Bruce Harrison Company, Inc.
Suite 300
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December 13, 1990

The President
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Despite the challenges presented by the new Hitler in the Middle East, Americans are heartened by your leadership and strength of purpose. The remarkable consensus demonstrated by the condemnation of Iraq by the United Nations is a direct result of your coalition building efforts in times of peace.

Your resolve resulted in the release of the hundreds of men, women and children terrorized and held hostage by Saddam. It seems to me that your statement on November 30 and again on December 3 is clear and undebatable:

"We seek Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait; we seek the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government; we seek the release of all hostages and the free functioning of all embassies; and we seek the stability and security of this critical region of the world."

Appeasement, as history teaches over and over again, works only for tyrants. Clearly the Congress must understand that debate on the undebatable undermines the ideals of peace, democracy and freedom and places these ideals in a hostage situation to a never ending legion of Saddam Husseins.

We applaud your leadership and our prayers are with you.

Respectfully yours,

Pat Harrison
President
National Women's Economic Alliance Foundation

SUE McLAUGHLIN

Below is the
distribution for this
letter.

- Jon

BERMAN AND COMPANY

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January 10, 1991

Mr. Hal W. Smith
President
CHI-CHI'S
10200 Linn Station Road
Louisville, Kentucky 40232

Dear Hal:

Thanks for the quick and positive response on co-signing a "Persian Gulf" letter to the President.

The time was very short for responses and although you and twelve of our other clients responded, there was still an insufficient number of company presidents/chairmen from various other industries to publish a letter with the needed impact.

Nonetheless by a copy of this communication, I have conveyed your willingness and commitment to publicly support the President.

Sincerely,



cc: The Honorable Bobbie Greene Kilberg
Deputy Assistant to the President

Mr. Richard Rivera
President & CEO
TGI FRIDAY'S

RBB:sm

Mr. Hal W. Smith
President
CHI-CHI'S

Mr. Jack W. Goodall, Jr.
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January 9, 1991

Wayne H. Valis, Esq.
Valis Associates
1747 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Wayne:

Enclosed please find a letter which Bob Horn, Prof. Don Wallace, and I have drafted for the signature of attorneys who support the President's actions in the Persian Gulf.


Although there has been little time to solicit signatures, the response has been overwhelming. In fact, I have sent out almost 100 faxes to attorneys who have conceptionally agreed to add their names and specifically agreed to circulate the list among their colleagues.

I am confident, that I, alone, could literally add 100 names a day for weeks. However, due to the time constraints and because I do not want to add the name of anyone who has not seen the letter, the number of signatures lags far behind the enthusiasm of the attorneys I have called. Nevertheless, I anticipate that 100-200 lawyers will authorize us to add their names by tomorrow. Not a bad showing for a very limited solicitation.

I have told the recipients of the letters that we need their authorization by close of business Thursday. Accordingly, I will have a formal list for you immediately after that time. The attached is a representative sampling of our signatures.

I feel very strongly about this project and I appreciate your asking me to help.

Very truly yours,



Bruce D. Goodman

BDG00630

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1. Bruce D. Goodman
2. Robert Horn
3. Arthur Rothkopf
4. John W. Barnum
5. Robert E. Freer
6. Wayne Vance
7. Paul L. Friedman
8. Ralph F. Scalera
9. Richard P. Taylor
10. James H. Burnley, IV.
11. Roger A. Clark
12. Eugene Rossides

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 10, 1991

MEMORANDUM TO PUBLIC AFFAIRS DIRECTORS

FROM: KRISTEN GEAR *KG*
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: PERSIAN GULF

Enclosed for your use and distribution are three statements on the Persian Gulf situation. First, a transcript of the video President Bush sent to the community of nations united against Iraqi aggression. Second, Secretary Baker's statement and press conference from Geneva yesterday. And third, President Bush's statement and press conference from the White House yesterday.

I hope this information will be helpful, and do not hesitate to call our office at 456-2483 if you have any questions.

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

January 8, 1991

MESSAGE BY THE PRESIDENT
TO THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS UNITED AGAINST IRAQI AGGRESSION

THE PRESIDENT: More than five months ago, in the early morning hours of August 2nd, Iraqi forces rolled south and the rape of Kuwait began. That unprovoked invasion was more than an attack on Kuwait, more than the brutal occupation of a tiny nation that posed no threat to its large and powerful neighbor. It was an assault on the very notion of international order.

My purpose in speaking to you, the people of countries united against this assault, is to share with you my view of the aims and objectives that must guide us in the challenging days ahead.

From the center of the crisis in the Middle East, to people and countries on every continent, to the families with loved ones held hostage, to the many millions sure to suffer at the hands of one man with a stranglehold on the world's economic lifeline, Iraq's aggression has caused untold suffering, hardship and uncertainty.

In the more than five months since August 2nd, Iraqi troops have carried out a systematic campaign of terror on the people of Kuwait -- unspeakable atrocities against men and women, and among the maimed and murdered, even innocent children.

In the more than five months since August 2nd, Iraq's action has imposed economic strains on nations large and small; among them some of the world's newest democracies at the very moment they are most vulnerable. And yet, Iraq's aggression did not go unchallenged.

In the five months since August 2nd, the world has witnessed the emergence of an unprecedented coalition against aggression. In the United Nations, Iraq's outlaw act has met a chorus of condemnation in 12 resolutions with the overwhelming support of the Security Council. At this moment, forces from 27 nations -- rich and poor, Arab and Muslim, European, Asian, African and American -- stand side by side in the Gulf, determined that Saddam's aggression will not stand.

We're now entering the most critical period of this crisis. For the past five months, Saddam has held the world and the norms of civilized conduct in contempt. In the next few days, Iraq arrives at a deadline that spells the limit of the civilized world's patience.

Let me be clear about the upcoming deadline. January 15 is not a "date certain" for the onset of armed conflict; it is a deadline for Saddam Hussein to choose, to choose peace over war.

The purpose of declaring this deadline was to give Saddam fair warning: Withdraw from Kuwait, without condition and without delay, or -- at any time on or after that date -- face a coalition ready and willing to employ "all means necessary" to enforce the will of the United Nations.

Every one of us, each day of this crisis, has held out hope for a peaceful solution. Even now, as the deadline draws near, we continue to seek a way to end this crisis without further

MORE

conflict. And that is why, back on November 30, I offered to have Secretary Baker travel to Baghdad to meet with Saddam Hussein. And that is why, even after Saddam failed to respond, failed to find time to meet on any of the 15 days we put forward, I invited Iraq's Foreign Minister to meet with Secretary Baker in Geneva on January 9th.

In Geneva, we will be guided by the will of the world community -- expressed in those 12 U.N. resolutions I mentioned a moment ago. I didn't send Secretary Baker to Geneva to compromise or to offer concessions. This meeting offers Saddam Hussein a chance -- possibly the final chance -- before the U.N. deadline to resolve by peaceful means the crisis that he has created.

Saddam may seek to split the coalition, to exploit our sincere desire for peace, to secure for himself the spoils of war. He will fail -- just as he has failed for more than five months.

I know that pressures are now building to provide Saddam some means of saving face, or to accept a withdrawal that is less than unconditional. The danger in this course should be clear to all. The price of peace now on Saddam's terms will be paid many times over in greater sacrifice and suffering. Saddam's power will only grow, along with his appetite for more conquest. The next conflict will find him stronger still -- perhaps in possession even of nuclear weapons and far more difficult to defeat. And that is why we simply cannot accept anything less than full compliance with the United Nations dictates: Iraq's complete and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.

I began by saying that Iraq's action was more than an attack on one nation -- it is an assault on us all, on the international order we all share. We who have witnessed in this past year an end to the long years of cold war and conflict. We who have seen so much positive change, stand now at a critical moment, one that will shape the world we live in for years, even decades, to come.

The key now in meeting this challenge is for this remarkable coalition to remain steadfast and strong. If we remain in the days ahead nations united against aggression, we will turn back not only the actions of an ambitious dictator, we will, as partners, step forward toward a world of peace.

Thank you, and may God bless all of you.

END

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman
Geneva, Switzerland

For Immediate Release

January 9, 1991

PRESS CONFERENCE

BY

SECRETARY OF STATE JAMES A. BAKER, III

Intercontinental Hotel
Geneva, Switzerland
Wednesday, January 9, 1991

SECRETARY BAKER: Ladies and Gentlemen, I have just given President Bush a full report of our meeting today. I told him that Minister Aziz and I had completed a serious and extended diplomatic conversation in an effort to find a political solution to the crisis in the Gulf. I met with Minister Aziz today not to negotiate, as we have made clear we would not do--that is, negotiate backwards from United Nations Security Council resolutions--but I met with him today to communicate. And communicate means listening as well as talking. And we did that, both of us.

The message that I conveyed from President Bush and our coalition partners was that Iraq must either comply with the will of the international community and withdraw peacefully from Kuwait, or be expelled by force.

Regrettably, ladies and gentlemen, I heard nothing today that, in over six hours, I heard nothing that suggested to me any Iraqi flexibility whatsoever on complying with the United Nations Security Council resolutions.

There have been too many Iraqi miscalculations. The Iraqi government miscalculated the international response to the invasion of Kuwait, expecting the world community to stand idly by while Iraqi forces systematically pillaged a peaceful neighbor. It miscalculated the response, I think, to the barbaric policy of holding thousands of foreign hostages, thinking that somehow, cynically doling them out a few at a time would somehow win political advantage. And it miscalculated that it could divide the international community and gain something thereby from its aggression.

So let us hope that Iraq does not miscalculate again. The Iraqi leadership must have no doubt that the 28 nations which have deployed forces to the Gulf in support of the United Nations have both the power and the will to evict Iraq from Kuwait. If it should choose--and the choice is Iraq's--if it should choose to continue its brutal occupation of Kuwait, Iraq will be choosing a military confrontation which it cannot win and which will have devastating consequences for Iraq.

I made these points with Minister Aziz, not to threaten but to inform. And I did so with no sense of satisfaction, for we genuinely desire a peaceful outcome. And as both President Bush and I have said on many occasions, the people of the United States have no quarrel with the people of Iraq. I simply wanted to leave as little room as possible for yet another tragic miscalculation by the Iraqi leadership.

And I would suggest to you, ladies and gentlemen, that this is still a confrontation that Iraq can avoid. The path of peace remains open, and that path is laid out very clearly in 12 United Nations Security Council resolutions adopted over a period of over five months. But now the choice lies with the Iraqi leadership. The choice really is theirs to make. And let us all hope that that leadership will have the wisdom to choose the path of peace.

Q: What do your allies plan to do next to bring this message home?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, you say what do the allies plan to do next? I think it's important for everyone to note that this is a coalition. This is not Iraq versus the United States. This is Iraq versus the international community. This happens to have been the first time that we've had an opportunity to find agreement on meeting, U.S. and Iraq. So I don't know what the next steps are, Jim. I do know this, that time is running on, as I said a day or so ago. After five months and 12 United Nations Security Council resolutions, it seems to me that it is almost evident that the time for talk is running out. It's time for Iraq to act, and to act quickly by getting out of Kuwait.

But this is a coalition, and we are seeking to implement solemn resolutions of the United Nations. And so perhaps there may be a way that the Secretary-General of the United Nations could use his good offices here, in the remaining six or so days that we have left.

I will say that -- I have already mentioned that I didn't hear anything that to me demonstrated flexibility. Nor did I hear any new proposals. But I would like to take note of the fact that the Minister did restate their proposal that the United States pick a day for him to come to the United States, and Iraq pick a day for me to go to Baghdad. Those of you who have been traveling with us know what our answer is to that. We have given it over the past four or five days, and I gave it to the Minister tonight. We offered 15 separate days for a visit to Baghdad. The President of the United States made the proposal for face-to-face discussions. We are glad that Iraq accepted this one because we did have six hours, during which we could make our position known to them and they could make their position known to us.

But as far as next steps are concerned, it seems to me that, because we are talking about a coalition and we are talking about implementing resolutions of the United Nations, that perhaps there could be--I don't know what the position of the government of Iraq would be on this--but perhaps there would be some room for us to seek the use of the good offices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Q: Mr. Secretary, did the Iraqi Foreign Minister reiterate his demands for what he calls justice and fairness for the Palestinians? And was there any wavering in the U.S. position, as you may have expressed it to him, that the two issues are not related, are not linked?

SECRETARY BAKER: No, there was -- he expressed his position. There was no change in our position, which is that the two issues are not linked. I did make the point that I don't think many people believe that Iraq invaded Kuwait in order to help the Palestinians. And if they did, it was another miscalculation because it hadn't helped the Palestinians. I think most people believe that Iraq invaded Kuwait for Iraq's own aggrandizement. And I think most people realize that Iraq is trying to use the Palestinian issue to shield its aggression against Kuwait, which, in my view at least, remains an obstacle to broader peace in the region rather than a catalyst for achieving that broader peace.

And I made the point, as well, that rewarding Iraq's aggression with a link to the Arab-Israeli peace process would really send a terrible signal, not only to genuine peacemakers in the region but also to other would-be aggressors at what we think is a defining moment in history.

Q: Mr. Secretary, are you willing--is the United States willing--to talk again to Iraq before the January 15 deadline? And did you discuss with the President the possibility that you may still go to Baghdad?

SECRETARY BAKER: I had already discussed that with President Bush, and I had already told you what our view was, and the President himself, I think, said there will be no trip to Baghdad. The proposal which he originally made was in effect rejected by Iraq. We offered 15 separate days. They continued to insist upon only one, the 12th of January, which we think was and still is an obvious effort to avoid the deadline of January 15. And we are not interested in that. We think this deadline is real, and our coalition partners think the deadline is real. I reported fully to the President, of course.

Q: Could you run through for us -- You spoke for six hours. Could you give us a sense of how the discussions evolved over those six hours: what did you begin with, what did he counter with, why did you feel it necessary after two hours to call the President?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, we broke for lunch. And I think this meeting is sufficiently important that I should call the President. And so I did, just as I did as soon as we were finished.

I began by saying that I was here not to negotiate but to communicate, as I've just told you. That I was here for a serious dialogue in an effort to find a political and peaceful solution, but that they should not expect that we would be prepared to walk backwards from U.N. Security Council resolutions, that the terms of those resolutions had already been set. And I told the Minister I wanted to handle the meeting in whatever way he wanted, and I gave him the choice and he chose for me to go first, just as I gave him the choice as well as to how to report to you, and he suggested that I come down here first.

So that's how we got where we are here tonight. But let me say that I talked to him about how we saw the situation, about the history of the Security Council resolutions, about what I thought could happen in the event of observance of those resolutions, and what I feared would happen in the event of Iraq's non-observance of those resolutions. He then presented the position of the government of Iraq, and he will be down here in a few moments and he can -- now we can't run through six hours of dialogue here, or nobody else will get to ask any questions.

Q: How detailed were you about the extent of force that would be used against Iraq if it does not comply with the U.N. resolutions by January 15?

SECRETARY BAKER: I didn't get into things that would properly be in the realm of operational security matters. I hope I effectively made the case with respect to what, at least, our opinion was of the 28-nation multinational force that is there in the Gulf.

Q: Mr. Secretary, is the United States interested in any sort of phased withdrawal, be it one supervised by the United Nations? And if this withdrawal begins by January 15, will the United States guarantee there will be no military attack on Iraq?

SECRETARY BAKER: Let me say--I should have said this in answer to Tom's question--I assured the Minister that if they implement the United Nations resolutions and if they withdraw from Kuwait and permit the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait, that I could assure him that there would be no military action by the United States. And that I felt that there would, under those circumstances, be no military action by any other elements of the international coalition.

On the first question, the United Nations resolutions speak for themselves. We are not here -- After all, we are part of an international coalition. We are part of 28 countries--even more countries that have been helping financially and economically--and it is not up to us to walk backwards from solemn resolutions of the United Nations.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you have said in the past that you would seek approval for the use of force at the highest levels. Are you now at that stage in the process in which you will be seeking the use of force from other governments?

SECRETARY BAKER: No, but the clock is ticking on, and I made that point to the Minister today. As far as we are concerned, we have not taken -- the President of the United States, who alone in our executive branch, under our system, can make that decision, has not taken that decision. And I am not aware that any other governments have.

Q: Mr. Secretary, in the remaining six days before the U.N. deadline, would you welcome an initiative by some other European allies, or even Arab countries such as Algeria, that would perhaps include sending a European foreign minister to Baghdad to seek a peaceful resolution?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, this is an international coalition--let me say it one more time. And therefore, as I have just indicated to you, it's an international coalition seeking to implement solemn resolutions of the world's peacekeeping and security body. And therefore, there might, it seems to me, be some useful purpose served by perhaps the Secretary-General's good offices.

But I said last night and I have said for months, we welcome any and all diplomatic efforts to solve this crisis peacefully and politically. We want it solved peacefully and politically. I am disappointed, of course, that we did not receive any indications today whatsoever of any flexibility in the position of Iraq.

So we would welcome any and all diplomatic efforts. We do think if they are efforts by members of the international coalition, that the message should be uniform, as it has been for five months, and it should not be a mixed message. But we want a peaceful and political solution.

Q: Mr. Secretary, can you tell us -- you keep saying you saw no indication of flexibility. Did the Foreign Minister actually tell you that Iraq intends to keep Kuwait and will not withdraw from Kuwait?

SECRETARY BAKER: He did not make that statement, but he did not indicate that there was any chance that they would withdraw. But I did not see, frankly, any flexibility in their position. You can ask him questions when he gets down here.

Q: Mr. Secretary, did you discuss in answer to any of the discussion about the problems raised elsewhere in the Middle East, by the Iraqi Foreign Minister--did you discuss the efforts the United States has made in the past to seek Arab-Israeli peace, to persuade Iraq that the United States was serious--genuinely interested in resolving those problems?

SECRETARY BAKER: Yes, we went through a good bit of the history of the personal efforts that I made for 14 months to bring about a dialogue between Palestinians and Israelis. We went through the experience of the United States in bringing about the Camp David Accords and in bringing about peace between Israel and Egypt. We had a full discussion of that issue, a complete discussion of it.

I want to make it clear that I made it very clear throughout that there would be no linkage here of that issue to Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait. And we would not agree, as a condition of their withdrawing, to any subsequent specific steps to be taken with respect to that. But we did have -- they brought it up and we had a very full discussion.

Q: What was your answer?

SECRETARY BAKER: We disagree. We frankly disagree with respect to that, as I think you know. And I have already told you why I think linkage is a bad idea. I think that it will not tend to promote peace in the region. It will tend to be read as a reward for aggressors and it would jeopardize future peace in the region.

Q: Mr. Secretary, what did you tell the Foreign Minister about the willingness of the American people to go to war and the impact, the political pressure, on the President's decision-making?

SECRETARY BAKER: I said don't miscalculate the resolve of the American people, who are very slow to anger, but who believe strongly in principle, and who believe that we should not reward aggression, and that big countries with powerful military machines should not be permitted to invade, occupy and brutalize their peaceful neighbors.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you've told us what you didn't hear. You didn't hear any flexibility and you told us that there was quite a bit of discussion of history. Could you tell us what you did hear--did you hear justifications from the Foreign Minister? Did you hear a repeat of what they've been saying in public for some time?

SECRETARY BAKER: I heard some things that I quite frankly found very hard to believe, but I'll let him go into the detail here. But I heard, for instance, that their action in invading Kuwait was defensive in nature, that they were being threatened by Kuwait. And I will tell you the same thing I told the Minister, which is, I find it very hard to believe that any nation in the world will believe that.

Q: Mr. Secretary, even though you did spend six hours here today talking to Foreign Minister Aziz, in the past five and a half months you haven't had much contact with Iraq. What's to prevent the historians of this conflict from concluding that there was a failure of diplomacy here--we slid toward war without trying?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, there've been a lot of conversations with the leadership of Iraq, all to no avail. The Secretary-General's already had one failed mission. There have been any number of Arab efforts to solve this crisis, all to no avail. There have been efforts by others, other Western governments. The Soviet Union has tried very hard; they've had

meetings. We have now had a meeting. And so, you know, people can write whatever they decide they might want to write. But the truth of the matter is, we have been very--I think, the international coalition--very responsible and measured in our approach to this. We have not, as some might suggest, gone off half-cocked. We have gone through the United Nations, patiently, working for consensus within the Security Council. And it is only after five and a half months and the passage of 12 Security Council resolutions that we find ourselves at the point of use of force.

So I think there's been more diplomacy exercised in this crisis than in almost any that I can think of. And the one thing I would ask you all not to do is to equate diplomacy and appeasement. We made that mistake in the Thirties. At least for our part, we don't intend to make it again.

Q: In a sense, two questions: did the Foreign Minister suggest Iraq might withdraw from Kuwait if there were linkage as, let us say, the French have suggested, or others have suggested? And if he did, is linkage, the principle of linkage, and insistence on that principle, a reason for the loss of lots of lives?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I don't think he said that explicitly. I think perhaps it was implicit in his comments. But he'll be here, and you can ask him. But it's more than just the principle of linkage, as I understand their position. There would have to be agreement to conferences and that sort of thing, that get you beyond just the simple fact of linkage.

Q: Mr. Secretary, did Minister Aziz make a specific proposal under which Iraq would get out of Kuwait, however unacceptable it was to you--was there a specific proposal?

SECRETARY BAKER: No, there was no specific proposal. He restated the positions that Iraq has stated publicly in the past. He defended their action in invading and occupying Kuwait. He explained how he feels that was justified. And again, he'll be down here and you can ask him yourself.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you made it clear that you were not going to Baghdad. But did you and the Foreign Minister talk about future diplomatic contacts at your level between the United States and Iraq, or did this one six-and-a-half-hour meeting represent the completion of diplomatic initiatives by the United States?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, we will maintain our diplomatic contacts through our charge in Baghdad until the twelfth of January. I asked for and received the personal assurance of the Minister that Joe Wilson and the four other Americans in our embassy there will be permitted to leave Baghdad on January 12, and will not be restrained from so doing.

Q: Mr. Secretary, your mood, if I may say, seems pretty somber at this point. Can you kind of describe your state of mind and your mood after what has occurred today?

SECRETARY BAKER: Somber. You've got it.

Q: Are you advising evacuation?

SECRETARY BAKER: I am not saying that. I am telling you that we had asked for and received assurances for our remaining five diplomatic personnel to leave on the 12th of January, which is a date that you all know is very close to the January 15 deadline and happens to be the date that Iraq has been insisting on for three weeks for the meeting.

Q: What about other Americans, Sir?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, I think most all Americans are out of Iraq. All that want to leave are gone, as far as I know.

Q: Mr. Secretary, can you tell us now about the letter from President Bush? Was it in fact in Arabic? What was the tone of it? Did it contain graphic military scenarios intended to intimidate?

SECRETARY BAKER: I regret to inform you that the Minister chose not to receive the letter from President Bush. He read it, very slowly and very carefully, but he would not accept it. Nor would the Iraqi embassy in Washington accept an Arabic courtesy translation. You will have to ask the Minister why he did not accept the letter. My own opinion, for what it's worth--and it's only an opinion--was that he came here only authorized to accept a letter that walked away from the United Nations resolutions, which is something that we cannot, and of course, will not do.

Q: Have you discussed the possibility of convening the United Nations again to discuss the Gulf crisis? You know that President Mitterrand has proposed that most probably a new discussion is possible, it might be helpful. Have you discussed this eventuality with the Iraqi Minister?

SECRETARY BAKER: No, it did not come up in my meeting today with the Iraqi Minister. I did speak to that question and to that issue a day or so ago, and I believe that President Bush has spoken to it as well. I don't know what an additional Security Council meeting at this stage could do. Because what we are talking about here is faithful implementation of resolutions of the Council, the last one of which says that if Iraq does not withdraw by midnight on January 15, force can be used to effect that withdrawal. We have had 12 resolutions of the United Nations Security Council...

Q: But what President Mitterrand is suggesting...

SECRETARY BAKER: I can't answer your question. I would refer you to President Mitterrand. But I have just said that perhaps there would be some utility in trying to use the good offices of the Secretary General.

Q: Do you have any reason to believe there is any way to avoid a war as of right now?

SECRETARY BAKER: Yes, I hope there is. There has been no decision taken for that eventuality. And I would simply refer you to my opening statement, where I made the point that I hope we do not have yet one more miscalculation by the government of Iraq. I would also refer you to the statements which President Bush and I and other members of the coalition have made over the course of the last several days or weeks, and which I repeated today to the Minister--not in a threatening way, but simply so that he would know where our head is, and how we feel and what we think. And that is, that this January 15 deadline in our minds, is real. Iraq can choose to believe that or not, but it is real in our minds and in the minds of our coalition partners. We hope that they will believe that we think it's real, and that they will act to implement the solemn resolutions of the United Nations.

Q: Mr. Secretary, would you regret that you would have still liked to go, even on the 12th, and meet, instead of Mr. Tariz, Saddam himself? Still a difference of three days.

SECRETARY BAKER: The 12th -- We've said for the last three weeks, the 12th of January was unacceptable to us because it is just an effort to avoid the deadline. It's obvious that's why the 12th was originally suggested. We have said for a long time that date is unacceptable to us. It remains unacceptable to us.

Q: Mr. Secretary, did you spell out your vision of what the Gulf would look like if they withdrew peacefully? In other words, some of the restrictions that you have talked about that must be imposed upon Iraq, even if they did withdraw. Did you lay that plan out for him in some way?

SECRETARY BAKER: Yes, I did in my original presentation this morning. I don't have time to go through all of that with you now, but that falls right in the category of the assurance that there would not be military force used against Iraq by the United States if they withdrew from Kuwait and permitted the restoration of the legitimate government of Kuwait.

Q: Did you talk about the nuclear weapons, the chemical weapons, the size of the Iraqi military--things that are a concern to many in the Western coalition, beyond the occupation of Kuwait?

SECRETARY BAKER: We had a full discussion of questions about weapons of mass destruction. I pointed out the interest of the United States, as we have expressed before, in addressing that issue and addressing that subject. And we talked about the presence, the multinational presence there, and the fact that President Bush has said that we do not desire nor want a permanent military ground presence in the Middle East--I mean in the Gulf. That we want to see our troops come home just as fast as the security situation will allow. Those are the kinds of things that we discussed, as you might expect.

Q: Mr. Secretary, could you please just describe to us the point at which the meeting broke off--why and how did it happen? Was it that you finished it off? Did Mr. Aziz finish off, or was there just nothing to talk about anymore? Please describe that.

SECRETARY BAKER: Well, it was simply a case, I think, that after over six hours of discussion we both had pretty well made the points that we had come to make, and that was it. I don't believe that there was anything left unsaid. He said everything I think he came to say, and I had said everything that I had come to say. I think frankly it lasted longer than many of you might have anticipated at the beginning.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you mentioned that you are going to pull back the American diplomats. Were you also asking Iraqi diplomats to leave the United States on January the 12th?

SECRETARY BAKER: No, we will ask the Iraqi government to draw down their diplomatic presence in the United States on the 12th. But as I indicated to the Minister, we would be willing to permit the presence of a small diplomatic contingent in Washington.

Q: Mr. Secretary, do you feel that if you would have accepted the fact of the linkage, there could have been a proposition of Iraq retiring from Kuwait?

SECRETARY BAKER. I don't know. Why don't you ask the Minister that, because when you say "accepted linkage," I'm not at all sure exactly what you mean. Do you mean if we had indicated a willingness to go to an international conference to handle the question in the Middle East? Ask him the question. It would be very interesting.

You know what our position has been for a long time. It would set an extraordinarily unfortunate precedent, we think, and would not in the long run contribute to peace in the region, but would contribute to instability because aggressors would be seen to be rewarded for their aggression. Something we simply cannot consider.

Q: Mr. Secretary, was there any single issue on which the difference between the United States and Iraq was narrow during this six and a half hours?

SECRETARY BAKER: Well let me say that I think that the discussion, as I have already indicated, was a serious one. I think that the tone of it was as good as you could expect under the circumstances. We weren't pounding the table and shouting at each other. It was a very reasoned, and I think, responsible discussion by two diplomats who really would like to find a peaceful and political solution to this problem. But I've already said to you, I did not detect flexibility in the position of Iraq, as they have stated it over the past several days.

Again, I invite you to my opening statement. We still have six days. I just hope that they will think about this meeting, that they will focus on it, that when Foreign Minister Aziz gets back and reports to his President, that perhaps there could be some change in their position. But there cannot be a negotiation here, because the terms of the United Nations Security Council resolutions were worked out in the debate in the United Nations. And the international coalition is bound to those resolutions.

One last question.

Q: Mr. Secretary, would you be willing to meet Saddam somewhere else apart from Baghdad if you...?

SECRETARY BAKER: That was not discussed. It has never been proposed by Iraq. The Iraqi proposal, as you know, for some weeks has been "we pick a date for Baker to come to Baghdad, you pick a date for Aziz to come to Washington, and we'll work it that way." That's been out there for a long long time. There's never been any suggestion of the other.

Thank you.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

January 9, 1990

PRESS CONFERENCE BY THE PRESIDENT

The Briefing Room

3:55 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: I have a brief opening statement and then I will take a few questions.

I have spoken with Secretary of State Jim Baker, who reported to me on his nearly seven hours of conversation with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. Secretary Baker made it clear that he discerned no evidence whatsoever that Iraq was willing to comply with the international community's demand to withdraw from Kuwait and comply with the United Nations resolutions.

Secretary Baker also reported to me that the Iraqi Foreign Minister rejected my letter to Saddam Hussein -- refused to carry this letter and give it to the President of Iraq. The Iraqi Ambassador here in Washington did the same thing. This is but one more example that the Iraqi government is not interested in direct communications designed to settle the Persian Gulf situation.

The record shows that whether the diplomacy is initiated by the United States, the United Nations, the Arab League or the European Community, the results are the same, unfortunately. The conclusion is clear: Saddam Hussein continues to reject a diplomatic solution.

I sent Secretary Jim Baker to Geneva not to negotiate, but to communicate. And I wanted Iraqi leaders to know just how determined we are that the Iraqi forces leave Kuwait without condition or further delay. Secretary Baker made clear that by its full compliance with the 12 relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, Iraq would gain the opportunity to rejoin the international community. And he also made clear how much Iraq stands to lose if it does not comply.

Let me emphasize that I have not given up on a peaceful outcome -- it's not too late. I've just been on the phone, subsequent to the Baker press conference, with King Fahd, with President Mitterrand -- to whom I've talked twice today -- Prime Minister Mulroney and others are contacting other coalition partners to keep the matter under lively discussion. It isn't too late. But now, as it's been before, the choice of peace or war is really Saddam Hussein's to make.

And now I'd be glad to take a few questions.

Q Mr. President, you said in an interview last month that you believe in your gut that Saddam Hussein would withdraw from Kuwait by January 15th. After the failure of this meeting today, what does your gut tell you about that? And in your gut, do you believe that there's going to be war or peace?

THE PRESIDENT: I can't misrepresent this to the American people. I am discouraged. I watched much of the Aziz press conference, and there was no discussion of withdrawal from Kuwait. The United Nations resolutions are about the aggression against Kuwait. They're about the invasion of Kuwait, about the liquidation of a lot of the people in Kuwait, about the restoration of the legitimate government to Kuwait. And here we were listening to a

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45-minute press conference after the Secretary of State of the United States had six hours worth of meetings over there, and there was not one single sentence that has to relate to their willingness to get out of Kuwait.

And so, Terry, I'd have to say I certainly am not encouraged by that, but I'm not going to give up. And I told this to our coalition partners -- and I'll be talking to more of them when I finish here -- we've got to keep trying. But this was a total stiff arm. This was a total rebuff.

Q Let me follow up on that. Let me follow up. Have you decided in your mind to go to war if he's not out of there by the 15th?

THE PRESIDENT: I have not made up my decision on what and when to do. I am more determined than ever that the United Nations resolutions including 678 is implemented fully.

Yes, Helen?

Q Mr. President, Aziz made a pledge that he would not make the first attack. Would you match that? And also, what's wrong with a Middle East conference if it could avoid a bloody war?

THE PRESIDENT: No, I wouldn't make it. And we oppose linkage. The coalition opposes linkage. And the argument with Saddam Hussein is about Kuwait. It is about the invasion of Kuwait, the liquidation of a member of the United Nations, a member of the Arab League. And it has long been determined by not just the Security Council, but by the entire United Nations that this is about Kuwait. And that is the point that was missing from his explanations here today. And so there will be no linkage on these items. And that's been the firm position of all of the allies, those with forces there, and, indeed, of the United Nations -- the General Assembly.

Q So you feel free to attack?

THE PRESIDENT: -- so when he talked about his allies there, I don't know who stood up at the General Assembly of the United Nations and stood against the resolution that so overwhelmingly passed condemning Iraq. So there will be no linkage, put it that way.

Q Mr. President?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes, Brit.

Q Tariq Aziz, on the subject of the letter, suggested that it was rude in its use of language and somehow inappropriate to a diplomatic communication. I wonder, sir, if you are willing to release the letter, now that it has been -- it's run its course, apparently? And if, whether you are or not, would you characterize it for us and tell us what it said?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, let me first describe why I wanted to send a letter. It has been alleged, fairly or unfairly, that those around Saddam Hussein refuse to bring him bad news or refuse to tell it to him straight. And so I made the determination that I would write a letter that would explain as clearly and forcefully as I could exactly what the situation is that he faces. The letter was not rude. The letter was direct. And the letter did exactly what I think is necessary at this stage.

But to refuse to even pass a letter along seems to me to be just one more manifestation of the stonewalling that has taken place. We gave him 15 dates for the Secretary of State to meet with him. And he's off meeting with Mr. A and Mr. B and Mr. C and has no time for that.

So the letter was proper -- I've been around the diplomatic track for a long time -- the letter was proper, it was

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direct, and it was what I think would have been helpful to him to show him the resolve of the rest of the world -- certainly of the coalition.

In terms of releasing it, Brit, I haven't given much thought to that. It was written as a letter to him. But let me think about it. I might be willing to do it; I might not. I just don't know. If I thought it would help get the message out to him in an indirect way maybe it makes some sense, although we've been saying essentially the same thing over and over again that was in the letter.

Q Well, Mr. President, was the refusal by the Ambassador here to even accept the letter -- was that prior to or simultaneous with the refusal of Tariq Aziz? I mean, is it your impression --

THE PRESIDENT: I think it was after he had made that -- I think it was after the letter had been rejected at the table there in Geneva. Just one more effort to try to get this direct communication to him. I'm not sure on that, but I believe that's correct.

Q Mr. President, there are reports that you are considering a call-up of up to a million reservists to reinforce the forces that are serving in the Persian Gulf. What can you tell us about that?

THE PRESIDENT: I can tell you nobody has ever suggested that to me.

Q Is there any reserve call-up being contemplated at this point?

THE PRESIDENT: I'll tell you what I'll do. I'll ask the Secretary of Defense to respond to that question when I get finished here.

Q Can you tell us what your attitude now is about the use of force resolution that you asked for yesterday with the Congress?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I had a good meeting with certain members of Congress. I've talked to all four leaders this afternoon -- Senator Mitchell, Senator Dole, Speaker Foley, Congressman Michel -- I talked to him in person here. And I'm not sure where it stands. We are -- I am anxious to see and would certainly welcome a resolution that says we are going to implement the United Nations resolutions to a tee.

I don't think it's too late to send a consolidated signal to Saddam Hussein. And I think that would be a consolidated signal. I think it would be helpful still. I've told the congressmen back in December, as I think I told everyone in this room, that I would have welcomed a resolution back then, provided it would send this solid signal. But if it can do it today, I would welcome it.

So I don't know exactly where it stands, but I know that there is a good feeling up there. I think people see that the American people are supportive of the policy of this country. I think they see that we have tried the diplomatic track. I hope they know that I am as committed to peace as anyone. But I hope they also know that I am firmly determined to see that this aggression not stand. And I think they're backing me in that.

So maybe that ingredient, which hasn't always been quite as clear as it is now, will help as this debate, proper debate, goes forward in the Congress.

Q Do you think you need such a resolution? And if you lose it, would you be bound by that?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think I need it. I think

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Secretary Cheney expressed it very well the other day. There are different opinions on either side of this question, but Saddam Hussein should be under no question on this -- I feel that I have the authority to fully implement the United Nations resolutions.

Q And the question of being bound -- the second part of that?

THE PRESIDENT: I still feel that I have the constitutional authority -- many attorneys having so advised me.

Q Sir, I want to ask you about Francois Mitterrand. But Wyatt's question opens up a whole area. Let me just ask you, you talk about you don't want this to be another Vietnam.

THE PRESIDENT: It won't be another Vietnam.

Q If the Congress of the United States refuses to give you a resolution that -- refuses to even give you a Gulf of Tonkin-type resolution, how can you go to war?

THE PRESIDENT: I don't think they're going to refuse.

Q Okay. Let me ask you about Francois Mitterrand. You say the --

THE PRESIDENT: There have been 200 -- I'll just repeat for the record that there have been a lot of uses of force in our history and very few declarations of war. But I have tried. I have done more consultation with the Congress than any other president. Some of these Democratic members have told me that. And I have tried to reach out to them in various ways, and I will continue to do it, because I want to see a solid front here as we stand up against this aggressor.

Q Let me ask you about that solid front --

THE PRESIDENT: And I think it enhances the peace. I really believe, John, that he is living under a delusion. I think he doesn't think that force will be used against him. I think he's misinterpreted the debate. I also think he's under a delusion about what would happen if a conflagration breaks out. I believe that firmly, and I've had many, many people whom I respect tell me that. So I would hope that what we're talking about here would dissuade him from that.

This is a follow-up.

Q You've said that the coalition is united against any linkage on the Palestinian question. You've talked to Francois Mitterrand twice today. But in public he says he is for this international peace conference, and he seems to have no objection at all if Saddam Hussein wants to use that as a fig leaf to pull out of Kuwait. You do have an objection. Mitterrand also says that apparently the European Community foreign ministers are going to meet with Aziz apparently in Algiers. What if they go in there and say, well, we have no objection to an international peace conference on the Mideast?

THE PRESIDENT: The foreign ministers of the EC have been very solid, and so has President Francois Mitterrand, that there will be no linkage. So you're asking me a hypothetical question that I won't have to answer because he's not going to do that.

Q He said today he disagrees with you on the international peace --

THE PRESIDENT: The French government and the United States government over the years have had some differences on how the best way to bring peace to the Middle East is. We had a very active initiative underway by Jim Baker. But that doesn't have anything to do with the invasion of Kuwait. And Francois Mitterrand knows that

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it doesn't have to do with the invasion of Kuwait and the aggression against Kuwait. And I know he knows this. And he's been very forthright about it.

But, yes, he's very frank in saying countries have a different approach to how you solve another very important problem. And we've never -- I would simply refer you back to what I've said on that subject. I think you were with us over in the joint press conference with President Gorbachev when I addressed myself to this. But I am going to avoid linkage.

I listened to that Aziz meeting, and all he tried to do is obfuscate, to confuse, to make everybody think this had to do with the West Bank, for example. And it doesn't. It has to do with the aggression against Kuwait -- the invasion of Kuwait, the brutalizing of the people in Kuwait. And it has to do with a new world order. And that world order is only going to be enhanced if this newly-activated peacekeeping function of the United Nations proves to be effective. That is the only way the new world order will be enhanced.

Q You say that Saddam Hussein doesn't understand yet. Why not a meeting face to face? Why refuse any meeting face to face?

THE PRESIDENT: Because he's had every opportunity. And he keeps -- we finally said this is the last step. We tried 15 dates in Baghdad. We tried to set up these meetings. And now we tried this one, and there wasn't one single reason to make me think that another meeting between the United States and Saddam Hussein would do -- and the Iraqis would do any good at all. If I felt it would, fine. But it will not.

I talked to the Secretary General of the United Nations today, and there is a chance that he might undertake such a mission. Certainly we'd have no objection. There's one other reason -- and I cite that because this is not Iraq against the United States. It is Iraq against the rest of the world. It is the United Nations that passed 12 resolutions, not the United States. It is the General Assembly of the United Nations -- a 100-plus countries standing solidly against the dictator. And therefore, it doesn't need to be a bilateral negotiation here. We tried that. And we were stiff-armed by an intransigent foreign secretary.

And so the answer is, if diplomacy can be effective now, let's keep it in the context in which these resolutions were passed. And I would hope that maybe it would have an effect, but I'd have to level with the American people, nothing I saw today -- nothing -- leads me to believe that this man is going to be reasonable. So back to Terry's question, I'm less -- I have less of a feeling that he'll come around. But we ought to keep trying. We ought to keep trying right down to the wire.

Q You've repeated the "keep trying." You've cited the Secretary General of the United Nations. Secretary of State Baker cited him three times. What exactly could his mission be if there is no alternative to what Secretary Baker --

THE PRESIDENT: I'm not sure. Maybe the whole -- what would a mission of Jim Baker have been? It might have been to convince the man that he is up against an immovable force. He's up against something that is not going to yield. He is up against a situation under which there will be no compromise; and there will be none. But because, you see, Ann, I go back to my point, I don't think he has felt this up until now -- on both points. I don't think he's felt that force will be used against him and I think he has felt that if it were, he'd prevail. He's wrong on both counts.

Q Mr. President, there have been reports that Saddam believes that if it comes to war, even if he's driven out of Kuwait militarily, he can survive in power. Is he wrong?

THE PRESIDENT: I think he's wrong on all of his

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assumptions about what would happen if it came to war -- God forbid.

In the middle, and back here. And then we've got three more, and then I've got to go. These -- Ellen.

Q Would he be killed, Mr. President? Would he be killed if it came to war?

THE PRESIDENT: I'm not going to answer that. I don't know the answer to that question.

Q Mr. President, you seem to have ruled out further diplomacy as a --

THE PRESIDENT: No, you missed what I said, ma'am -- Ellen, about the Secretary General, possibly. The EC has tried -- I'll get back to you. Let me finish this one train of thought and then I'll come to your question -- the EC has tried, and, indeed, we see Aziz say, no, he wouldn't meet with the foreign ministers. You've seen President Chadli Bendjedid of Algeria to try.

I told the congressmen, I want to see us go the last step for peace. I want to use everything at my power to encourage people to try. And, indeed, there have been. Arab League has tried. Over and over again, people have tried. And they run up against the same answer. I remember the speculation that came out here in our papers in this country about a visit by a French delegate that was going over there. The hopes were raised. Nothing happened. So I just had to argue with the premise because there has been a lot diplomacy and there may be more.

Now, excuse me for interrupting you.

Q Sir, you seem to be very skeptical that further diplomacy would work. And yet you've said here today that you haven't given up on a peaceful solution. I wonder where it is you find this hope for a peaceful solution?

THE PRESIDENT: I'm not sure I have great hope for it. But I think when human life is at stake, you go the extra mile for peace. And that's what we have tried to do. And I will continue to think of reasons -- I told President Mitterrand, I said, look, if you think of a new approach, or I do, please, let's one or the other get on the phone and try. But we remain determined that these resolutions are going to be complied with. I am very concerned that sanctions -- I know sanctions alone aren't going to get this job done. And so we're pushing here, and that's what the Baker meeting with Aziz was about. I'm not going to give up, though.

Karen.

Q A lot of people, in looking at the situation, on the outside will say, there must be more than this. There must be some back-channel diplomacy. There must be something going on. You can't be rushing headlong into war this way. Can you tell us that there is nothing, that it is what appear to be getting -- that Saddam isn't going to move and we're going to war?

THE PRESIDENT: I'm not going to use that phrase. I am going to say, if Saddam doesn't move, we are going to fully implement Resolution 678. And it will be fully complied with.

But I wish I could tell you I'm more hopeful. There is no back channel. We've tried it directly. I've had to level, and properly so, with our coalition partners as to what I'm doing, and they've leveled with us -- leveled with the United Nations Security Council members who are not involved in the coalition with force; for example, the Soviets. A lot of avenues have been tried. But I can't tell you that there's any hidden agenda out there, secret negotiations -- there is not. And it wouldn't be right for us to be off telling you one thing openly here and then going around behind the corner with some secret channel. So I would like to say if

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there's any feeling that that's happening, it isn't happening.

Q So the entire hope for peace then rests on Saddam backing off from his --

THE PRESIDENT: And it has since August 2nd -- exactly. Because this aggression is not going to stand. And there's an awful lot at stake in terms of the new world order that it doesn't stand. And there's a lot at stake in terms of a lot of human life in Kuwait that it doesn't stand. And there's a lot at stake in terms of how the coalition looks at this that it doesn't stand. So it won't.

Q Mr. President, you said that when you first proposed high-level talks between Iraq and the United States that it was because you were convinced the message had not gotten through, had not gotten across. Are you now convinced that the message had gotten across?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I did listen carefully to Mr. Aziz, who I thought spoke quite well. I didn't agree with what he was trying to do, obviously, to confuse the issue by refusing to discuss the point at hand, which is the invasion of Kuwait, but I thought he did it well. (Laughter.) I thought he kind of sent a signal that they do understand what's up against them, but I still don't believe that they think the world coalition will use force against them. I may be wrong, but that's what I think in here. And I also still believe, as I said earlier, that he somehow has this feeling that he will prevail or that he will prolong. This will not be that. I've heard some wild predictions on this horrible human equation that might be involved if force were used, and I would say I don't agree with some who are arguing the loudest because it's putting the worst case out in terms of loss of human life; I must say that. I don't know. I think Aziz understands it, but I'm not sure that Saddam Hussein does.

Q If I could follow, Mr. President --

THE PRESIDENT: A follow-up question. I'm sorry, I'm going to have one more, and then Charles -- I told him, and then I'm leaving. Thank you very much, though.

Q When you were listening to Foreign Secretary Aziz, did you get any kind of particular feelings of anger or --

THE PRESIDENT: No, I didn't. I thought it was a very rational presentation, but wrong. I must say, I thought his style was good. From talking to Jim Baker, I thought he -- I mean, when I talked to Jim, he said, look, the man presented his case. Clearly, we didn't agree with it. I thought he was quite complimentary of the way the Secretary of State did it. So the atmospherics, I think, were all right, but he doesn't have it. He doesn't understand it. At least from what he said, he doesn't. Because this is not about some other question of linkage. This is about the invasion and the aggression about Kuwait -- the dismantling of Kuwait, the brutality about Kuwait. So I didn't get a sense of security from listening to that. But I will say that I thought that he presented his views in a reasoned -- reasonable way. He had a tough agenda. He had some tough talking points there. He works for a tough man.

Q What exactly are you trying to convey here to Saddam Hussein on what he does have to lose? Is it the decimation of his society? Is it the liquidation of his military? Is it losing his own power? Can you be specific on that?

THE PRESIDENT: I can't be more specific, but I can be -- that he will get out of Kuwait, and he will get out of Kuwait entirely, and he will get out of Kuwait without concession. That, I think, is the underlying part of the message.

Q Mr. President, a question on Israel. Tariq Aziz was emphatic that if Iraq is attacked, Israel will be attacked. What are your obligations to Israel? Are you prepared to fight a war

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throughout the Middle East?

THE PRESIDENT: That is too hypothetical a question for me to answer. We are prepared to do what we need to do to implicate -- to fully implement 678. And I would think that he'd think long and hard before he started yet another war. There is one war on -- that's his war against Kuwait. That's his aggression against Kuwait. And I don't think he wants to start another one. So I'm not going to buy into that hypothesis that the United States would obviously feel that that was a most provocative act, most provocative.

Q If I may, I don't believe it was a hypothetical question. The question was, what are your obligations to Israel?

THE PRESIDENT: We have friends all over the world. We have friends in this coalition. And I'm determined that the United States will fill our obligations there. Clearly, if a friend in that area was attacked, wantonly attacked for no cause whatsoever, not only the United States, but I think many people around the world would view that as a flagrant provocation. And I'll leave it stand right there.

Thank you all very much. Thank you.

Q Secretary Cheney --

SECRETARY CHENEY: The question as on possible additional reserve call-up authority. Under the authority that we're currently using, I'm authorized by a delegation of the President to use up to -- to call up to 200,000 reservists for up to 180 days. That authority for some of those reservists who have been called begins to expire in February. And so what we currently have in the works is a provision that would use a different provision of the statute to allow us to keep reservists on active service for as long as two years and to call under that provision up to one million additional reservists. We have no intention of calling one million reservists, but that's the provision that's available for me to be able to extend those people in critical skills whose services are now being utilized and whom we would like to keep for the period of times that we don't have to release them immediately back to the reserve status.

Thank you all very much.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

4:25 P.M. EST

WAYNE H. VALIS

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Jan 10, 1991

Jeff Vogt
W.H.
Wash, DC

Dear Jeff:

130 Business Leaders
signed one list.

174 Lawyers, repre-
senting over 100 law
firms signed the other.

Copies enclosed of
the letters sent to
every House & Senate
Member.

Best,
Wayne

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL

TO: LANE KIRKLAND, PRESIDENT, AFL-CIO

DATE: JANUARY 10, 1991

THROUGH: DAVID DEMAREST, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR COMMUNICATIONS

RECOMMENDED BY: BOBBIE KILBERG, DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE
PRESIDENT, FOR PUBLIC LIAISON
JEFF VOGT, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, PUBLIC LIAISON

PURPOSE: To discuss with Lane Kirkland the level of
labor's support for our Gulf policy.

BACKGROUND: The AFL-CIO generally supported Operation
Desert Shield in early August but has been
publicly silent since.

Bobbie Kilberg has had private discussions with Tom Donahue, Secretary-Treasurer for the AFL-CIO, and Bob Georgine, President of the Building and Construction Trades, about whether Lane Kirkland and other labor leaders would be receptive to coming to the White House to discuss the Gulf with you. Bob Georgine was generally nervous about this idea. Tom Donahue indicated that Kirkland said he is personally supportive of our actions in the Gulf and is always willing to be available to you. He did not, however, want to make it a "public exercise" because he was concerned that would activate those of his member unions who are opposed to our posture.

Of the AFL-CIO member unions, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association have been vocally supportive of the Administration's initiative in the Gulf.

Porter
Nick
McClure
Boyd
Gov

Went to
Gardner &
these guys
1/10
SB

BACKGROUND: (continued)

There are other AFL-CIO unions who are not supportive of Administration policy (please see Washington Post ad attached but note that this is only 8 of the 31 union members of the AFL-CIO Executive Council).

The Defense Committee of the AFL-CIO Executive Council is meeting at the end of this week and next week, and Gulf policy is on its agenda. Tom Donahue indicated that Kirkland wanted to avoid any statement from that committee or the Executive Council until the Council's February meeting in Florida. Given the internal disagreement within the AFL-CIO about the Gulf, Kirkland felt that was the best way he could be helpful.

According to Donahue, it was Kirkland's intent not to be involved on the Hill in any votes on Congressional Resolutions and not to have his member unions involved. However, the Washington Post ad would indicate that some unions are going off on their own. Congressman Solarz suggested yesterday that Kirkland would like to hear from you.

TOPICS FOR
DISCUSSION:

1. The need for U.S. solidarity in the face of Iraqi aggression.
2. The importance of passage of the bipartisan Congressional Resolution supporting implementation of the U.N. Security Council Resolutions.
3. Encourage the AFL-CIO's support of the bipartisan Congressional Resolution.

DATE OF
SUBMISSION:

January 10, 1991.

TELEPHONE:

Office: 202-637-5231
Home: (through White House operator)

ACTION:

cc: Governor Sununu

An open letter to President Bush:

Let the Sanctions Work

Dear President Bush:

We write to you as the Presidents of organizations representing proud and patriotic working people. Because it is working Americans who constitute a high proportion of U.S. military forces, reserves and potential draftees, our members and their spouses, sons and daughters are many among the Operation Desert Shield troops.

We are gravely concerned about the prospect of war in the Persian Gulf and the possibility of a permanent U.S. military presence in the Middle East. We are also concerned that any military action and resulting casualties will be borne largely by American troops.

We yield to no one in our condemnation of Saddam Hussein's reckless invasion of Kuwait and join the world community in insisting on Iraq's immediate withdrawal. At the same time, we believe the economic sanctions—the strongest ever levied against a country in peacetime—must be given a chance to work. Because we support our troops, we emphatically oppose the initiation of offensive military action by the United States at this time.

We urge you to let the sanctions work to achieve the maximum pressure on Iraq before any further blood is shed in this conflict.

Morton Bahr, President
Communications Workers of America

Owen Bieber, President
United Auto Workers

William H. Bywater, President
International Union of Electronic Workers

Keith Geiger, President
National Education Association

James R. Herman, President
International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union

George J. Kourpias, President
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers

Joseph M. Misbrener, President
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers

Jack Sheinkman, President
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union

John J. Sweeney, President
Service Employees International Union

**The Business Roundtable**

Drew Lewis
Chairman

James T. Lynn
Cochairman

James D. Robinson III
Cochairman

January 10, 1991

The Honorable Thomas S. Foley
Speaker of the House
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker,

The chief executives of the Business Roundtable believe that the resolution of talks between Secretary Baker and Iraq's foreign minister yesterday makes it all the more important that Americans speak to Saddam Hussein with one voice.

In this hour of international uncertainty, we believe it is critical that the United States show its firm resolve to stand up to aggression. Moreover, it is vital for the United States, having mobilized the international community behind a policy of unprecedented unanimity, not to back away from the policy expressed in United Nations Resolution 678. Strong resolve behind such resolutions may well help persuade Saddam Hussein to find a peaceful solution to this crisis.


Therefore, we are urging Members of Congress to support the bipartisan resolution introduced today by Representatives Fascell, Michel and others.

We do this with great concern for the terrible nature of war, and the potential this holds for grave harm to come to the brave U.S. forces at the front lines -- including, in some cases, our own employees and their family members.

But we do this with firm belief that the United States stands for justice, and that its leadership, not only in the Middle East but around the world, would be harmed were the United States Congress not to support the President and speak with one voice at this time.

For this reason, we urge you and all members of Congress to support the bipartisan resolution.

Very truly yours,


Drew Lewis

New York
200 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10166
(212) 682-6370 FAX (212) 682-0194

William L. Lurie
President

Richard W. Anthony
Executive Director-Public Information

Richard F. Kibben
Executive Director-Construction

Washington
1615 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 872-1260 FAX (202) 466-3509

Samuel L. Maury
Executive Director

**The Business Roundtable**

Drew Lewis
Chairman

James T. Lynn
Cochairman

James D. Robinson III
Cochairman

New York
200 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10166
(212) 682-6370 FAX (212) 682-0194

William L. Lurie
President

Richard W. Anthony
Executive Director-Public Information

Richard F. Kibben
Executive Director-Construction

Washington
1615 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 872-1280 FAX (202) 486-3509

Samuel L. Maury
Executive Director

January 10, 1990

Honorable Robert H. Michel
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Michel,

The chief executives of the Business Roundtable believe that the resolution of talks between Secretary Baker and Iraq's foreign minister yesterday makes it all the more important that Americans speak to Saddam Hussein with one voice.

In this hour of international uncertainty, we believe it is critical that the United States show its firm resolve to stand up to aggression. Moreover, it is vital for the United States, having mobilized the international community behind a policy of unprecedented unanimity, not to back away from the policy expressed in United Nations Resolution 678. Strong resolve behind such resolutions may well help persuade Saddam Hussein to find a peaceful solution to this crisis.


Therefore, we are urging Members of Congress to support the bipartisan resolution introduced today by Representatives Fascell, yourself and others.

We do this with great concern for the terrible nature of war, and the potential this holds for grave harm to come to the brave U.S. forces at the front lines -- including, in some cases, our own employees and their family members.

But we do this with firm belief that the United States stands for justice, and that its leadership, not only in the Middle East but around the world, would be harmed were the United States Congress not to support the President and speak with one voice at this time.

For this reason, we urge you and all members of Congress to support the bipartisan resolution.

Very truly yours,


Drew Lewis

Letter went
to all members
in the House

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

**THE BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE URGES CONGRESS TO SUPPORT BIPARTISAN
RESOLUTION ON USE OF FORCE AGAINST IRAQ**

Washington, D.C. -- January 10, 1990 -- In a letter delivered today to the Speaker and to the Republican Leader of the House of Representatives, Business Roundtable Chairman Drew Lewis urged support for President Bush's policy in the Gulf. The letter specifically urged support for the bipartisan resolution introduced by Representatives Fascell, Michel and others which would empower the President to use military force, if necessary, in order to get Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait.

Excerpts from the letter follow:

"The chief executives of The Business Roundtable believe that the resolution of talks between Secretary Baker and Iraq's foreign minister yesterday makes it all the more important that Americans speak to Saddam Hussein with one voice.

"In this hour of international uncertainty, we believe it is critical that the United States show its firm resolve to stand up to aggression. Moreover, it is vital for the United States, having mobilized the international community behind a policy of unprecedented unanimity, not to back away from the policy expressed in United Nations Resolution 678. Strong resolve behind such resolutions may well help persuade Saddam Hussein to find a peaceful solution to this crisis.

"Therefore, we are urging Members of Congress to support the bipartisan resolution introduced today by Representatives Fascell, Michel and others.

"We do this with great concern for the terrible nature of war, and the potential this holds for grave harm to come to the brave U.S. forces at the front lines -- including, in some cases, our own employees and their family members.

"But we do this with firm belief that the United States stands for justice, and that its leadership, not only in the Middle East

but around the world, would be harmed were the United States Congress not to support the President and speak with one voice at this time.

"For this reason, we urge you and all members of Congress to support the bipartisan resolution."

The Business Roundtable is an association of 200 major corporations whose chief executive officers examine public issues and develop positions which seek to reflect sound economic and social policy.

###

Contact: Dick Anthony, 212-682-6370

January 10, 1991

President George Bush
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We, the undersigned attorneys-at-law, wish to express our support, in the strongest terms, for your responsible and courageous action in the Persian Gulf. We are unequivocally united behind you in your determination to halt and reverse the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait consistent with the United Nations resolution. Your success in forming a coalition of the nations of the world in opposing the aggressive posture of Saddam Hussein is precedent-setting. It begins a structure of peace following the Cold War era.

The events that led to World War II proved that aggression unchecked merely encourages further aggression. Saddam Hussein's heinous international blackmail is not only a threat to the international community, but also to America's security. The illegality of the Iraqi invasion is underscored by the ruthlessness of Saddam Hussein's campaign of terror against the people of Kuwait. Appeasement in the form of delay will only prolong the horrors of occupation, including murder, torture, imprisonment and looting, that have been reported from Kuwait on almost a daily basis.

We firmly support your leadership and are convinced that we represent a majority of our colleagues in the legal profession and, indeed, a majority of the American people as well. Sadly, we do understand the implications of the use of force; however, we are united behind you and are prepared to support America's use of all appropriate means necessary to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait.

We pledge our support and commend your determination to exercise every effort to achieve peace and stability in the Persian Gulf and in the Middle East.

Sincerely,

Bruce D. Goodman
Robert J. Horn
Jim Burnley

Contact: Bruce Goodman
(202) 775-7169

Charles Ablard
John Austin
Sheila C. Bair
John W. Barnum
John H.C. Barron, Jr.
Michael J. Bartlett
Walter Bates
Peter L. Baumbusch
George Beall
Bruce A. Beam
Glen A. Bellinger
Arthur Lee Bentley, III.
Jerome K. Blask
Thomas Hale Boggs, Jr.
Gary Born
Edmund C. Brickfield
Jon A. Brilliant
Raymond J. Briscuso, Jr.
Edward Brown
E. Edward Bruce
Christopher H. Buckley, Jr.
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Tracey Dinese
Mark S. Dreux
G. Richard Dunnells
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Saad S. El-Fishawy
Lewis A. Engman
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Baruch A. Fellner
Andrea Fischer
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Antonio R. Franco
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Paul L. Friedman
Roger P. Furey
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Gerald E. Gilbert
Nicholas D. Giordano
Robert Glaser
Allen B. Green
David A. Hartquist
Edward Hayes, Jr.
Laurence F. Henneberger
Michael Hoffman
James H. Hulme
John Irving
R. Christian Johnson
Neil B. Kabatchnick
Craig M. Kabatchnick
Donald Kaufman
Roger Kephart
William J. Kilberg
Elizabeth Kluger
Conrad N. Koch
Harvey Koch
James A. Koerner
Andrew Kulick
Stephen Kurzman
Nick Laird
James Laurenson
Dennis J. Lehr
Morris I. Leibman
Gerard Leval
Seth Levine
Timothy Lockhart
Coralyn G. Mann
Nancy Manougian
Bruce Markowitz
Margot Bester Markowitz
April McClain-Delaney
Robert McDowell
Donald C. McLean
Mary Martha McNamara
Laurence G. Meyer
Laurie L. Michel
Warren L. Miller
John A. Mintz
Luke Mitti
Joseph Mitti
Joseph A. Morris
R. Crawford Morris
Scott Muller
L. Manning Muntzing
Karen L. Neal
Nancy Nord
Edward P. Nordberg, Jr.
Kevin P. O'Brien
Gerald E. Oberst
Deanna Tanner Okun
Theodore B. Olson

Stephen F. Ornstein
George J. Pantos
Martha Priddy Patterson
Donald H. Pearlman
Tim L. Peckinpaugh
Vincent A. Pepper
Matthew S. Perlman
Jeffry L. Perlman
Matthew S. Perlman
Howard Pyle, III.
Patrick M. Rahe
John Reinartz
R. Randall Ricardo
Timothy A. Riedel
Gregory Romano
Eugene P. Rossides
Arthur J. Rothkopf
Robert Ruggeri
Thomas Salley, III.
Eric A. Von Salzen
Ralph F. Scalera
Richard D. Siegel
Mark E. Solomons
Steven M. Sprenger

Robert F. Stankey
Benjamin Stanziale
Allan R. Swendiman
Daniel J. Swillinger
Richard P. Taylor
Joseph R. Thornton
Kenneth P. Troccoli
James U. Troup
Albert W. Turnbull
Wayne Vance
David J. Vandermeulen
James William Walker
Donald Wallace, Jr.
George D. Webster
Eric R. Weiss
Arnold R. Westerman
Alexander W. Whitaker
Beth Whitmore
Richard K. Willard
Ronald J. Wiltsie, II.
Susan Wing
Hugh F. Young, Jr.
Lynne K. Zusman

January 10, 1991

The Honorable Brock Adams
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Adams:

We, the undersigned, have sent the enclosed letter to President Bush pledging support for his courageous action in the Persian Gulf. We believe it is important for all Americans to unite behind the pursuit of justice and the President's efforts to halt aggression in Kuwait. We applaud the President's efforts to create an historic international coalition against Iraqi aggression and we urge the Congress to join the President in helping to create a new, post-Cold War structure for peace.

We believe that letting aggression go unchecked merely encourages more aggression. Saddam Hussein's campaign of terror, including murder, torture, imprisonment and looting has been condemned by the world community. We believe the various United Nations Resolutions must be fully carried out.

We hope you will join the President in making the Iraqi regime understand that Americans are united behind the President's leadership and are prepared to use the necessary means to expel their troops from Kuwait and to establish stability in the Gulf.

Thank you for considering our views on this vital issue.

Sincerely,

The Undersigned
(see enclosed list)

ALBERTINE ENTERPRISES, Inc.

1250 - 24th St. N.W., Suite 600

Washington, DC 20037

Telephone: (202) 466-0561

Fax: (202) 466-3079

91 JAN 10 P5:11

FACSIMILE COVER LETTER

TRANSMITTED TO:

NAME: Bobbie Kilberg + Mollie Osborne

FIRM: White House

CITY: Washington

FROM: Tim Albertine

TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES (INCLUDING COVER LETTER): 2

DATE TRANSMITTED: Jan 10, 1991

IF YOU DO NOT RECEIVE ALL THE PAGES IN GOOD CONDITION, PLEASE
CALL (202) 466-0561.

Vince Robison, Association Development Corp
and Albertine Enterprises paid for this
AD. Vince is located in Oklahoma City, Ok.
Thanks

ROLL CALL

THE NEWSPAPER OF CAPITOL HILL

Insertion Order Schedule

Advertiser

Jack Albertine (Albertine Enterprises)

1250 24th Street NW

Suite 600

Washington, DC 20037

Fax: (202) 466-3079


Billing Instructions:

Issue Date	Ad Size	Cost
Janaury 14, 1991	Full Page	\$4,475.00
* Check and Insertion order must be received by 01/11/91 by 12:00 Noon.		

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Cancellations made after Tuesday at 5 p.m. for Monday publication or after Monday at 5 p.m. for Thursday publication will be billed at the contracted rate whether or not an ad is run.

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Signature for Advertiser
President
1-10-91
date

Tracey L. Rogers
Roll Call Account Executive
01/10/91
date

10/1/90

TO:
JEFF
VOGT
FR: GOLINO

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

BUSINESS GROUP EXECUTIVES SUPPORT PRESIDENT ON GULF

Washington, D.C., January 10, 1991 -- The top executives of xx Washington-based business organizations today issued a statement of support for U.S. efforts to "halt aggression in Kuwait."

"We agree that letting aggression go unchecked, merely encourages more aggression, " the letter (attached) said.

"Saddam Hussein's reprehensible efforts at international economic blackmail are a threat to the international community and to America's national security," the letter continued.

"Iraq's illegal invasion also damages the world economy, particularly those developing nations around the globe."

Speaking for those who signed the letter, National Association of Manufacturers

Association of Manufacturers President Jerry Jasinowski said, "We must not forget that people around the world are already paying a price for Saddam's ^{suffering} actions, and in some cases, the needless ^{from brutal} hardship of higher prices for basic necessities and increased ^{economic strains on the fledgling democracies as} ~~austerity is already serious~~ ^{as well as}. We feel very strongly, as we wrote here, that 'the Iraqi regime should understand that Americans are united' and that the United States is fully prepared to 'use the means necessary to expel their troops from Kuwait.'"

"U.S. companies and their employees share the interest of their counterparts everywhere in preserving a world where basic standards of living can be maintained, where economies can establish stable relationships with each other and trade can

benefit everyone," Jasinowski said. "Saddam Hussein had damaged this life-supporting fabric of mutual benefit with naked aggression. He has jeopardized Iraq's own economy while spreading uncertainty to economies around the globe. We support the international efforts to restore Kuwait.

We ^{applaud} ~~support~~ the President's leadership in ^{helping to} ~~assemble~~ this historic coalition to fight ~~Saddam's~~ aggression & to build a new world order that will keep the place for ^{our} generations to come.

Denmy - 637-3099

To: Jeff

Document No. _____

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 1/7/90 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: COB TODAY

SUBJECT: PROPOSED EXECUTIVE ORDER ENTITLED "NATIONAL SECURITY INDUSTRIAL RESPONSIVENESS"

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MCCLURE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
SUNUNU	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	NEWMAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
SCOWCROFT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	PORTER	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DARMAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ROGICH	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CARD	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	UNTERMAYER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CICCONI	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	BOSKIN	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DEMAREST	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	CLERK	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
FITZWATER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
GRAY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HAGIN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HOLIDAY	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>		<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS:

Please forward your comments/recommendations directly to my office no later than COB TODAY, Monday, January 7, Thank you.

RESPONSE:

BK:
FYI from DD

NC
AD

James W. Cicconi
Assistant to the President
and Deputy to the Chief of Staff
Ext. 2702



THE DIRECTOR

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503
91 JAN 27 AM 10:19

December 21, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Richard G. Darman
Director

SUBJECT: Proposed Executive Order Entitled "National Security Industrial Responsiveness"

SUMMARY: This memorandum forwards for your consideration a proposed Executive order that was prepared by the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The proposed order would delegate Presidential authorities of the Selective Service Act and other statutes to certain agencies to require that priority be given to orders for defense needs.

The Chairman of the Policy Coordinating Committee on Emergency Preparedness/Mobilization Planning believes that this order is critical to meeting the demands of Operation Desert Shield.

BACKGROUND: The non-permanent provisions of the Defense Production Act expired on October 20, 1990. As a result, there is no delegated authority to require priority performance of orders for defense needs. To remedy this, the proposed order would delegate Presidential authorities of the Selective Service Act ("Act") and other statutes to ensure prompt delivery of products to meet national security needs.

The proposed order would permit Government agencies to place orders and require priority performance of the orders. Among other delegations, the order would delegate the President's authority under the Act to place orders for prompt delivery of articles or materials to: (a) the Secretary of Agriculture for all food resources, (b) the Secretary of Energy for all forms of energy, (c) the Secretary of Transportation for all forms of civil transportation, and (d) the Secretary of Commerce for all articles and materials, including construction materials.

The delegated authorities could be exercised only after the Secretary of Defense determines that prompt delivery of the articles for the exclusive use of the armed forces is in the interest of national security.

RECOMMENDATION: We join Defense, NSC, and FEMA in recommending that you sign the proposed Executive order.

None of the affected agencies objects to the proposed Executive order, except for an objection by the Department of Transportation to one provision, section 104(c). This section requires that if an agency head disagrees with a request by the Secretary of Defense for a priority order, the agency head shall, within ten days of the request, refer the issue to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, who shall ensure resolution of the issue.

The Department of Transportation objects to the provision on the grounds that it fails to provide for situations in which adverse impacts on the economy would not be evident during the ten-day period. The response of Defense, NSC, and FEMA is that nothing in the order prevents an agency head at any time from apprising the NSC of any adverse impact on the economy resulting from an order. Defense, NSC and FEMA believe that the ten-day limit is essential to compel the agencies to bring issues concerning an order to the NSC for expeditious resolution. We join Defense, NSC, and FEMA in recommending that the ten-day limit be retained.

Attachments



U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Legal Counsel

Office of the
Assistant Attorney General

Washington, D.C. 20530

January 4, 1991

The President,

The White House.

My dear Mr. President:

I am herewith transmitting a proposed Executive Order entitled "National Security Industrial Responsiveness." This proposed Executive Order was submitted by the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The Office of Management and Budget, with the approval of the Director, forwarded it to this Department for review of its form and legality.

The proposed Executive Order is approved with respect to its form and legality.

Respectfully,

J. Michael Luttig
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel



U.S. Department of Justice

Office of Legal Counsel

Office of the
Assistant Attorney General

Washington, D.C. 20530

January 4, 1991


MEMORANDUM

Re: Proposed Executive Order Entitled "National
Security Industrial Responsiveness"

The attached proposed Executive Order was submitted by the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The Office of Management and Budget, with the approval of the Director, forwarded it to this Department for review with respect to its form and legality.

The proposed Order will delegate Presidential authorities under the Selective Service Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 468, under 10 U.S.C. §§ 4501, 9501, and under 50 U.S.C. § 82, to place priority orders for articles, products, ships, or materials, including war materials, required to meet national defense needs. Before departments may exercise the authority under 50 U.S.C. app. § 468, the Order will require the designated Secretary to determine that prompt delivery of articles or materials exclusively for the use of the armed forces of the United States, or of the Atomic Energy Commission, is in the interest of national security. The Order will also require the President to make statutorily mandated findings under the other delegations before departments may exercise these authorities. Finally, the Order will continue in effect all rules, regulations, determinations, and delegations made pursuant to the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, which implement or are supported by any law or by any of the authorities delegated pursuant to this Order.

The proposed Order is approved with respect to its form and legality.


J. Michael Luttig
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

December 21, 1990

Honorable Dick Thornburgh
Attorney General
Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

Enclosed, in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order No. 11030, as amended, is a proposed Executive order that was prepared by the Federal Emergency Management Agency. The proposed order would delegate Presidential authorities of the Selective Service Act and other statutes to certain agencies to prioritize orders for defense needs.

The non-permanent provisions of the Defense Production Act expired on October 20, 1990. As a result, there is no delegated authority to prioritize defense needs. The United States must have the capability to rapidly mobilize its resources to meet national security requirements. Therefore, the proposed order would delegate Presidential authorities of the Selective Service Act ("Act") and other statutes to ensure prompt delivery of articles, products and materials to meet national security needs.

The proposed order would permit Government agencies to place orders and require priority performance of the orders. Among other delegations, the order would delegate the President's authority under the Act to place orders for prompt delivery of articles or materials to: (a) the Secretary of Agriculture for all food resources, (b) the Secretary of Energy for all forms of energy, (c) the Secretary of Transportation for all forms of civil transportation, and (d) the Secretary of Commerce for all articles and materials, including construction materials.

The delegated authorities could be exercised only after the Secretary of Defense determines that prompt delivery of the articles or materials for the exclusive use of the armed forces is in the interest of the national security.

The Chairman of the Policy Coordinating Committee on Emergency Preparedness/Mobilization Planning believes that this order is critical to meeting the demands of Operation Desert Shield.

Your staff may direct any questions concerning this proposed Executive order to Mr. Mac Reed of this office (202-395-5600).

This proposed Executive order has the approval of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read "Robert G. Damus". The signature is fluid and cursive, with the first name "Robert" and last name "Damus" clearly legible.

Robert G. Damus
Acting General Counsel

Enclosures

DEMOCRATS AND REPUBLICANS

Alexander
 Andrews (TX)
 Anthony
 Applegate
 Barnard
 Bailenson
 Bereuter
 Bevill
 Boehlert
 Borski
 Boucher
 Brooks
 Brown
 Bruce
 Bustamante
 Byron
 Campbell
 Campbell
 Cardin
 Carper
 Chandler
 Clement
 Conte
 Cooper
 Coughlin
 Coyne
 Darden
 de la Garza
 Derrick
 Dingell
 Dorgan
 English
 Erdreich
 Fish
 Gajdanson
 Goodling
 Grandy
 Green
 Guarini
 Hall, Tony
 Hall, Ralph
 Harris
 Hatcher
 Hayes, J.
 Hefner
 Henry
 Hartal
 Hoagland
 Hochbrueckner
 Horton

Hoyer
 Hubbard
 Huckaby
 Hughes
 Hutto
 J. Miller
 Jenkins
 Johnson (SD)
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 Johnston (FL)
 Jones (GA)
 Jones (NC)
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 Neal, Richard
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 Sangmeister
 Scheuer
 Schulze
 Schumer
 Sensenbrenner
 Sharp
 Shays
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 Skaggs
 Slattery
 Smith, Neal
 Smith, Larry
 Smith (NJ)
 Snowe
 Spratt
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 Synar
 Tallon
 Tanner
 Tauzin
 Thomas
 Udall
 Upton
 Valentine
 Viscloskey
 Volkmer
 Walsh
 Waxman
 Weiss
 Whitten
 Williams
 Wilson (TX)
 Wolpe
 Yates

833-9265

January 3, 1991

Dear Friend,

President Bush met with us on Wednesday, December 20 to review the situation in the Persian Gulf and to ask for our support. He said he thinks Saddam Hussein has "not gotten the message" and is basing Iraqi actions on the belief that America is divided and will not support the President on decisive steps in the Gulf. President Bush believes Saddam Hussein gives great weight to the American dissenters and voices in the Congress that oppose any military action.

The President believes only a show of strength can be effective. As a result, we, the undersigned, have prepared the attached letter to President Bush and are looking for additional signatories. We want to send Saddam Hussein the real message.

We urge you to sign this letter if at all possible. This is not a fundraising appeal. Please sign and return the enclosed release form as soon as possible.

Your affiliation will be listed "for identification purposes only" and will not bind your organization in any way.

This letter will be released to the press, sent to every member of the House and Senate, and circulated widely within the business and political communities.

Thank you for your courtesy and cooperation. We look forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely,

Red Cavaney
American Paper Institute

Jerry Jasinowski
National Assoc. of Manufacturers

Dave Parker
The Aluminum Association

Dirk Van Dongen
National Association of
Wholesaler-Distributors

Wayne H. Valis
Valis Associates

January 10, 1991

President George Bush
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We, the undersigned, pledge support for your courageous action in the Persian Gulf. We believe it is vitally important for all Americans to unite behind your pursuit of justice and your plan to halt aggression in Kuwait. Your work in creating an historic international coalition against Iraqi aggression is an important first step in creating a new, post-Cold War structure for peace.

We agree that letting aggression go unchecked, merely encourages more aggression. Saddam Hussein's reprehensible efforts at international economic blackmail are a threat to the international community and to America's national security. Iraq's illegal invasion also damages the world economy, particularly those developing nations around the globe.

Saddam Hussein's campaign of terror, including murder, torture, imprisonment and looting, has been condemned by the world community. We believe the various United Nations Resolutions must be fully carried out. The Iraqi regime should understand that Americans are united behind your leadership and are prepared to use the necessary means to expel their troops from Kuwait and to establish stability in the Gulf.

We urge you to continue your efforts toward peace and stability in the Gulf and we pledge our support to you.

Sincerely,

(affiliations listed for identification purposes only)

Red Cavaney
American Paper Institute

Jerry Jasinowski
National Assoc. of Manufacturers

Dave Parker
The Aluminum Association

Dirk Van Dongen
National Assoc. of
Wholesaler-Distributors

Wayne H. Valis
Valis Associates

Paul C. Abenante
American Bakers Association

Jack Albertine
Albertine Enterprises, Inc.

E. T. "Bill" Altman
Hardwood Plywood Manufacturers Association

Wendy Baer
International Hardwood Products Association

A. William Bailey
Independent Insurance Agents of America

Joe M. Baker
Association of Wall & Ceiling Industries

William Ball
National Soft Drink Association

John Bauer
Basic Industries Coalition

James C. Barr
National Milk Producers Federation

J. Carter Beese, Jr.
Alex, Brown & Sons, Inc.

Judy Black
International Council of Shopping Centers

Steven H. Blackwell
Management Consulting Services

John R. Block
National-American Wholesale Grocers' Association

Lawrence W. Bory
American Consulting Engineers Council

G. Stewart Boswell
American Apparel Manufacturers Association

Joseph W. Bow
Foodservice and Packaging Institute

J. Patrick Boyle
American Meat Institute

Glenn E. Braswell
Flexible Packaging Association

James N. Burroughs
National Propane Gas Association

James H. Carrington
Seasonair, Inc.

Brian E. Cartier
National Shorthand Reporters Association

Henry C. Cashew
Dickstein, Shapiro & Morin

Anna C. Chennault
TAC International

W. Dewey Clower
National Association of Truck Stop Operators

Kent W. Colton
National Association of Home Builders

James D. Cope
Nonprescription Drug Manufacturers Association

Derrick Crandall
American Recreation Coalition

John P. Cregan
U.S. Business and Industrial Council

Richard C. Creighton
American Cement Alliance

E. J. Criscuoli, Jr.
American Society for Industrial Security

John M. Damgard
Futures Industry Association

Regis Delmontagne
National Printing Equipment & Supply Association

Gary W. Donnelly
National Lumber & Building Material Dealers Association

John A. Doyle
National Association of Rehabilitation Facilities

Stephen Driesler
National Association of Realtors

R. Hartley Edes
Insulation Contractors Association of America

William Farrell
American Hardware Manufacturers Association

Don Fuqua
Aerospace Industries Association

Walter E. Galantry, Jr.
National Association of Brick Distributors

John Paul Galles
National Small Business United

Kristine Garland
Composite Can & Tube Institute

Joseph G. Gerard
American Furniture Manufacturers Association

Brian W. Gill
Master Printers of America

John M. Grau
National Electrical Contractors Association, Inc.

Malvern J. Gross, Jr.
National Aeronautic Association

Paul T. Haluza
Motor & Equipment Manufacturers Association

Charles E. Hawkins
Associated Builders and Contractors

John T. Healy
National Wooden Pallet & Container Association

Steven B. Hellem
United States Advanced Ceramics Association

Fred H. Holt
Animal Health Institute

Hal W. Howes
Aerojet

Walter C. Hunt
Institute of Certified Business Counselors

Charles C. Irions
American Movers Conference

Philip J. James
National Glass Association

Frank L. Jensen, Jr.
Helicopter Association International

Carl T. Johnson
Compressed Gas Association

John A. Knebel
American Mining Congress

Tom Kuhn
Edison Electric Institute

Richard L. Lawson
National Coal Association

Richard L. Leshner
U.S. Chamber of Commerce

Jim Mack
National Machine Tool Builders Association

John M. Martin
Dairy & Food Industries Supply Association

M. Richard Melliand
Melliand Associates

Albert W. Moore
NMTBA--The Association for Manufacturing Technology

Allen Moore
National Solid Wastes Management Association

Robert M. Moore
International Banana Association, Inc.

William C. Morrison
Meat Importers Council of America, Inc.

Russell N. Mosher
American Boiler Manufacturers Association

L. Manning Muntzing
Doub, Muntzing & Glasgow

Philip Nowers
Association of Reproduction Materials Manufacturers, Inc.

Paul T. O'Day
American Fiber Manufacturers Association

Tom O'Day
Alliance of American Insurers

Robert D. Pavey
National Venture Capital Association

Gus Pede
Oakton, VA

James C. Pennington
National Association for Uniformed Services

J. Wm. Peterson
Construction Industry Manufacturers Association

Gilbert G. Pollock
American Amusement Machine Association

Thomas W. Power
Foodservice and Lodging Institute

Carlyle C. Ring, Jr.
Atlantic Research Corp.

Robert A. Roland
Chemical Manufacturers Association

Ray Roper
Printing Industries of America

Robert M. Reeves
Institute of Shortening & Edible Oils

Samuel R. Sacco
National Association of Temporary Services

Ronald A. Sarasin
National Beer Wholesalers Association

John Thomas Sheehan
Sheehan Associates, Inc.

Hal Shoup
American Association of Advertising Agencies

David Stahl
Urban Land Institute

E. P. Stansbury
Composite Can & Tube Institute

Bud Stiles
Independent Bakers Association

Chris Stinebert
American Subcontractors Association

Robert Strawn
Recreation Vehicle Dealers Association

R. William Taylor
American Society of Association Executives

Larry Thomas
Society of the Plastic Industry

C. Richard Titus
Kitchen Cabinet Manufacturers Association

Kenneth R. Tobin
National Aggregates Association

George Troutman
Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.

Joseph Volpe, Jr.
The Parsons Corporation

Richard S. Ward
ITT Corporation

John C. Whitaker
Union Camp Corporation

George D. Webster
Webster, Chamberlain & Bean

Steven A. Wechsler
National Realty Committee

Frank E. Wilcher, Jr.
Industrial Safety Equipment Association

Laurence D. Wiseman
American Forest Council

Bob Woodson
National Center for Neighborhood Enterprise



UNION PACIFIC CORPORATION
Suite 450 West
555 Thirteenth Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004
Phone: (202) 662-0100
Fax: (202) 662-0199

DATE:

1-9-91

DELIVER TO:

Jeff Vogt

FROM:

Kip Hawley

COMMENTS:

FYI. I'll keep you posted.

NUMBER OF PAGES:

2

(INCLUDING COVER)

91 JAN 9 P2:19



The Business Roundtable

Drew Lewis
Chairman

James T. Lynn
Cochairman

James D. Robinson III
Cochairman

New York
200 Park Avenue
New York, New York 10166
(212) 682-6370 FAX (212) 682-0194

William L. Lurie
President

Richard W. Anthony
Executive Director-Public Information

Richard F. Kibben
Executive Director-Construction

Washington
1615 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 872-1290 FAX (202) 466-3509

Samuel L. Maury
Executive Director

January 9, 1991

TO PLANNING COMMITTEE MEMBERS

The Congress will be debating issues related to US involvement in the Gulf this week and I wanted your advice as to whether we should support the President on this issue as The Business Roundtable.

It is my personal opinion that we should take the initiative and urge Congress to support the U.N. resolutions. I think that it is very important to U.S. credibility and gets to the core issue of the President's ability to lead the country in a period of international instability -- not only in the Gulf.

As a Planning Committee Member, should the Roundtable make a statement in support of Congressional action along the lines of the U.N. Resolution and do you think I should poll the Policy Committee to ask their individual opinions on this issue?

Please respond by fax (215-861-3395) or phone call (215-861-3333) by 5 p.m. today (January 9).

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Akers
Johnson
Hudner

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Barbara Kilberg
Room 128

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

January 9, 1991

EXECUTIVE ORDER

- - - - -

NATIONAL SECURITY INDUSTRIAL RESPONSIVENESS

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including 50 U.S.C. App. 468, 10 U.S.C. 4501 and 9501, and 50 U.S.C. 82, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 101. Policy. The United States must have the capability to rapidly mobilize its resources in the interest of national security. Therefore, to achieve prompt delivery of articles, products, and materials to meet national security requirements, the Government may place orders and require priority performance of these orders.

Sec. 102. Delegation of Authority under 50 U.S.C. App. 468.

(a) Subject to paragraph (b) of this section, the authorities vested in the President, under 50 U.S.C. App. 468, with respect to the placing of orders for prompt delivery of articles or materials, except for the taking authority under 50 U.S.C. App. 468(c), are hereby delegated to:

- (1) the Secretary of Agriculture with respect to all food resources;
- (2) the Secretary of Energy with respect to all forms of energy;
- (3) the Secretary of Transportation with respect to all forms of civil transportation; and
- (4) the Secretary of Commerce with respect to all other articles and materials, including construction materials.

(b) The authorities delegated by paragraph (a) of this section shall be exercised only after:

- (1) a determination by the Secretary of Defense that prompt delivery of the articles or materials for the exclusive use of the armed forces of the United States is in the interest of national security, or
- (2) a determination by the Secretary of Energy that the prompt delivery of the articles or materials for the Department of Energy's atomic energy programs is in the interest of national security.

(c) All determinations of the type described in paragraph (b) of this section and all delegations -- made prior to the effective date of this order under the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, and under its implementing rules and regulations -- shall be continued in effect, including but not limited to approved programs listed under the Defense Priorities and Allocations System (15 CFR Part 700).

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(OVER)

Sec. 103. Delegation of Authority under 10 U.S.C. 4501 and 9501, and 50 U.S.C. 82.

(a) Subject to paragraph (b) of this section, the authorities vested in the President under 10 U.S.C. 4501 and 9501 with respect to the placing of orders for necessary products or materials, and under 50 U.S.C. 82 with respect to the placing of orders for ships or war materials, except for the taking authority vested in the President by these acts, are hereby delegated to:

- (1) the Secretary of Agriculture with respect to all food resources;
- (2) the Secretary of Energy with respect to all forms of energy;
- (3) the Secretary of Transportation with respect to all forms of civil transportation; and
- (4) the Secretary of Commerce with respect to all other products and materials, including construction materials.

(b) The authorities delegated in paragraph (a) of this section may be exercised only after the President has made the statutorily required determination.

Sec. 104. Implementation. (a) The authorities delegated under sections 102 and 103 of this order shall include the power to redelegate such authorities, and the power of successive redelegation of such authorities, to departments and agencies, officers, and employees of the Government. The authorities delegated in this order may be implemented by regulations promulgated and administered by the Secretaries of Agriculture, Defense, Energy, Transportation, and Commerce, and the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, as appropriate.

(b) All departments and agencies delegated authority under this order are hereby directed to amend their rules and regulations as necessary to reflect the new authorities delegated herein that are to be relied upon to carry out their functions. To the extent authorized by law, including 50 U.S.C. App. 486, 10 U.S.C. 4501 and 9501, and 50 U.S.C. 82, all rules and regulations issued under the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, with respect to the placing of priority orders for articles, products, ships, and materials, including war materials, shall be deemed, where appropriate, to implement the authorities delegated by sections 102 and 103 of this order, and shall remain in effect until amended or revoked by the respective Secretary. All orders, regulations, and other forms of administrative actions purported to have been issued, taken, or continued in effect pursuant to the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended, shall, until amended or revoked by the respective Secretaries or the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, as appropriate, remain in full force and effect, to the extent supported by any law or any authority delegated to the respective Secretary or the Director pursuant to this order.

(c) Upon the request of the Secretary of Defense with respect to particular articles, products, or materials that are determined to be needed to meet national security requirements, any other official receiving a delegation of authority under this Executive order to place orders or to enforce precedence of

more

such orders, shall exercise such authority within 10 calendar days of the receipt of the request; provided, that if the head of any department or agency having delegated responsibilities hereunder disagrees with a request of the Secretary of Defense, such department or agency head shall, within 10 calendar days from the receipt of the request, refer the issue to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, who shall ensure expeditious resolution of the issue.

(d) Proposed department and agency regulations and procedures to implement the delegated authority under this order, and any new determinations made under sections 102(b)(1) or (2), shall be coordinated by the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency with all appropriate departments and agencies.

Sec. 105. Judicial Review. This order is intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch and is not intended to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the United States, its agencies, its officers, or any person.

GEORGE BUSH

THE WHITE HOUSE,
January 8, 1991

#

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
02. Memo	From Bobbie Kilberg & Jeff Vogt to Lane Kirkland RE: Recommended telephone call to Lane Kirkland (2 pp.)	01/10/91	P-5	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Public Liaison, Office of
Series: Vogt, Jeff
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Operation Desert Shield [2]

Open on Expiration of PRA
(Document Follows)
By 76 (NLGB) on 7.14.05

Date Closed: 11/2/2004	OA/ID Number: 07149-018
FOIA/SYS Case #: 1998-0099-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #: 2005-0097-S	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL

TO: LANE KIRKLAND, PRESIDENT, AFL-CIO

DATE: JANUARY 10, 1991

THROUGH: DAVID DEMAREST, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR COMMUNICATIONS

RECOMMENDED BY: BOBBIE KILBERG, DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE
PRESIDENT, FOR PUBLIC LIAISON
JEFF VOGT, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, PUBLIC LIAISON

PURPOSE: To discuss with Lane Kirkland the level of
labor's support for our Gulf policy.

BACKGROUND: The AFL-CIO generally supported Operation
Desert Shield in early August but has been
publicly silent since.

Bobbie Kilberg has had private discussions with Tom Donahue, Secretary-Treasurer for the AFL-CIO, and Bob Georgine, President of the Building and Construction Trades, about whether Lane Kirkland and other labor leaders would be receptive to coming to the White House to discuss the Gulf with you. Bob Georgine was generally nervous about this idea. Tom Donahue indicated that Kirkland said he is personally supportive of our actions in the Gulf and is always willing to be available to you. He did not, however, want to make it a "public exercise" because he was concerned that would activate those of his member unions who are opposed to our posture.

Of the AFL-CIO member unions, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association have been vocally supportive of the Administration's initiative in the Gulf.

BACKGROUND: (continued)

There are other AFL-CIO unions who are not supportive of Administration policy (please see Washington Post ad attached but note that this is only 8 of the 31 union members of the AFL-CIO Executive Council).

The Defense Committee of the AFL-CIO Executive Council is meeting at the end of this week and next week, and Gulf policy is on its agenda. Tom Donahue indicated that Kirkland wanted to avoid any statement from that committee or the Executive Council until the Council's February meeting in Florida. Given the internal disagreement within the AFL-CIO about the Gulf, Kirkland felt that was the best way he could be helpful.

According to Donahue, it was Kirkland's intent not to be involved on the Hill in any votes on Congressional Resolutions and not to have his member unions involved. However, the Washington Post ad would indicate that some unions are going off on their own. Congressman Solarz suggested yesterday that Kirkland would like to hear from you.

TOPICS FOR
DISCUSSION:

1. The need for U.S. solidarity in the face of Iraqi aggression.
2. The importance of passage of the bipartisan Congressional Resolution supporting implementation of the U.N. Security Council Resolutions.
3. Encourage the AFL-CIO's support of the bipartisan Congressional Resolution.

DATE OF
SUBMISSION:

January 10, 1991.

TELEPHONE:

Office: 202-637-5231
Home: (through White House operator)

ACTION:

cc: Governor Sununu

An open letter to President Bush:

Let the Sanctions Work

Dear President Bush:

We write to you as the Presidents of organizations representing proud and patriotic working people. Because it is working Americans who constitute a high proportion of U.S. military forces, reserves and potential draftees, our members and their spouses, sons and daughters are many among the Operation Desert Shield troops.

We are gravely concerned about the prospect of war in the Persian Gulf and the possibility of a permanent U.S. military presence in the Middle East. We are also concerned that any military action and resulting casualties will be borne largely by American troops.

We yield to no one in our condemnation of Saddam Hussein's reckless invasion of Kuwait and join the world community in insisting on Iraq's immediate withdrawal. At the same time, we believe the economic sanctions—the strongest ever levied against a country in peacetime—must be given a chance to work. Because we support our troops, we emphatically oppose the initiation of offensive military action by the United States at this time.

We urge you to let the sanctions work to achieve the maximum pressure on Iraq before any further blood is shed in this conflict.

Morton Bahr, President
Communications Workers of America

Owen Bieber, President
United Auto Workers

William H. Bywater, President
International Union of Electronic Workers

Keith Geiger, President
National Education Association

James R. Herman, President
International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union

George J. Kourpias, President
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers

Joseph M. Misbrener, President
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers

Jack Sheinkman, President
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union

John J. Sweeney, President
Service Employees International Union

D R A F T

President George Bush
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:


We, the undersigned, are attorneys and wish to express our support for your action in the Persian Gulf in the strongest terms. Our concern is that the American people understand that justice requires that the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait be halted. Your work in coalescing the nations of the world in opposing the aggressive posture of Saddam Hussein is precedent-setting and ensures that new world order following the cold period will be governed by the rule of law.

The events that led up to World War II proved unequivocally that aggression unchecked merely encourages more aggression. Saddam Hussein's reprehensible efforts at international blackmail are not only a threat to the international community, but also to America's security as well. The illegality of the Iraqi invasion is underscored by the ruthlessness of Saddam Hussein's campaign of terror against the people of Kuwait. Appeasement in the form of delay will only prolong the horrors of occupation, including murder, torture, imprisonment and looting, that have been reported from Kuwait on almost a daily basis. International law requires that the United Nations Resolutions are fully carried out. We firmly support your leadership and believe that the undersigned represent a majority of our colleagues in the legal profession and a majority of the American people as well. Sadly we do understand the implications of the use of force; however, we are united behind your leadership and are prepared to support America's use of every possible means necessary to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait.

We urge you to continue your efforts toward peace and stability in the Persian Gulf and pledge our support to you in this effort.

Sincerely,

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL SHEET

NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING COVER _____

DATE _____

TO Jim Smith

FAX NUMBER 318-234-8671

OFFICE NUMBER _____

COMMENTS _____

FROM J. Vogt

OFFICE NUMBER _____

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

January 8, 1991

MESSAGE BY THE PRESIDENT
TO THE COMMUNITY OF NATIONS UNITED AGAINST IRAQI AGGRESSION

THE PRESIDENT: More than five months ago, in the early morning hours of August 2nd, Iraqi forces rolled south and the rape of Kuwait began. That unprovoked invasion was more than an attack on Kuwait, more than the brutal occupation of a tiny nation that posed no threat to its large and powerful neighbor. It was an assault on the very notion of international order.

My purpose in speaking to you, the people of countries united against this assault, is to share with you my view of the aims and objectives that must guide us in the challenging days ahead.

From the center of the crisis in the Middle East, to people and countries on every continent, to the families with loved ones held hostage, to the many millions sure to suffer at the hands of one man with a stranglehold on the world's economic lifeline, Iraq's aggression has caused untold suffering, hardship and uncertainty.

In the more than five months since August 2nd, Iraqi troops have carried out a systematic campaign of terror on the people of Kuwait -- unspeakable atrocities against men and women, and among the maimed and murdered, even innocent children.

In the more than five months since August 2nd, Iraq's action has imposed economic strains on nations large and small; among them some of the world's newest democracies at the very moment they are most vulnerable. And yet, Iraq's aggression did not go unchallenged.

In the five months since August 2nd, the world has witnessed the emergence of an unprecedented coalition against aggression. In the United Nations, Iraq's outlaw act has met a chorus of condemnation in 12 resolutions with the overwhelming support of the Security Council. At this moment, forces from 27 nations -- rich and poor, Arab and Muslim, European, Asian, African and American -- stand side by side in the Gulf, determined that Saddam's aggression will not stand.

We're now entering the most critical period of this crisis. For the past five months, Saddam has held the world and the norms of civilized conduct in contempt. In the next few days, Iraq arrives at a deadline that spells the limit of the civilized world's patience.

Let me be clear about the upcoming deadline. January 15 is not a "date certain" for the onset of armed conflict; it is a deadline for Saddam Hussein to choose, to choose peace over war.

The purpose of declaring this deadline was to give Saddam fair warning: Withdraw from Kuwait, without condition and without delay, or -- at any time on or after that date -- face a coalition ready and willing to employ "all means necessary" to enforce the will of the United Nations.

Every one of us, each day of this crisis, has held out hope for a peaceful solution. Even now, as the deadline draws near, we continue to seek a way to end this crisis without further

MORE

conflict. And that is why, back on November 30, I offered to have Secretary Baker travel to Baghdad to meet with Saddam Hussein. And that is why, even after Saddam failed to respond, failed to find time to meet on any of the 15 days we put forward, I invited Iraq's Foreign Minister to meet with Secretary Baker in Geneva on January 9th.

In Geneva, we will be guided by the will of the world community -- expressed in those 12 U.N. resolutions I mentioned a moment ago. I didn't send Secretary Baker to Geneva to compromise or to offer concessions. This meeting offers Saddam Hussein a chance -- possibly the final chance -- before the U.N. deadline to resolve by peaceful means the crisis that he has created.

Saddam may seek to split the coalition, to exploit our sincere desire for peace, to secure for himself the spoils of war. He will fail -- just as he has failed for more than five months.

I know that pressures are now building to provide Saddam some means of saving face, or to accept a withdrawal that is less than unconditional. The danger in this course should be clear to all. The price of peace now on Saddam's terms will be paid many times over in greater sacrifice and suffering. Saddam's power will only grow, along with his appetite for more conquest. The next conflict will find him stronger still -- perhaps in possession even of nuclear weapons and far more difficult to defeat. And that is why we simply cannot accept anything less than full compliance with the United Nations dictates: Iraq's complete and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.

I began by saying that Iraq's action was more than an attack on one nation -- it is an assault on us all, on the international order we all share. We who have witnessed in this past year an end to the long years of cold war and conflict. We who have seen so much positive change, stand now at a critical moment, one that will shape the world we live in for years, even decades, to come.

The key now in meeting this challenge is for this remarkable coalition to remain steadfast and strong. If we remain in the days ahead nations united against aggression, we will turn back not only the actions of an ambitious dictator, we will, as partners, step forward toward a world of peace.

Thank you, and may God bless all of you.

END

January 10, 1991

President George Bush
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We, the undersigned, pledge support for your courageous action in the Persian Gulf. We believe it is vitally important for all Americans to unite behind your pursuit of justice and your plan to halt aggression in Kuwait. Your work in creating an historic international coalition against Iraqi aggression is an important first step in creating a new, post-Cold War structure for peace.

We agree that letting aggression go unchecked, merely encourages more aggression. Saddam Hussein's reprehensible efforts at international economic blackmail are a threat to the international community and to America's national security. Iraq's illegal invasion also damages the world economy, particularly those developing nations around the globe.

Saddam Hussein's campaign of terror, including murder, torture, imprisonment and looting, has been condemned by the world community. We believe the various United Nations Resolutions must be fully carried out. The Iraqi regime should understand that Americans are united behind your leadership and are prepared to use the necessary means to expel their troops from Kuwait and to establish stability in the Gulf.

We urge you to continue your efforts toward peace and stability in the Gulf and we pledge our support to you.

Sincerely,

(affiliations listed for identification purposes only)

Red Cavaney
American Paper Institute

Jerry Jasinowski
National Assoc. of Manufacturers

Dave Parker
The Aluminum Association

Dirk Van Dongen
National Assoc. of
Wholesaler-Distributors

Wayne H. Valis
Valis Associates

Paul C. Abenante
American Bakers Association

A. William Bailey
Independent Insurance Agents of America

Joe M. Baker
Association of Wall & Ceiling Industries

William Ball
National Soft Drink Association

James C. Barr
National Milk Producers Federation

Judy Black
International Council of Shopping Centers

Steven H. Blackwell
Management Consulting Services

John R. Block
National-American Wholesale Grocers' Association

Stuart Boswell
American Apparel Manufacturers Association

James N. Burroughs
National Propane Gas Association

Kent W. Colton
National Association of Home Builders

Regis Delmontagne
National Printing Equipment & Supply Association

John A. Doyle
National Association of Rehabilitation Facilities

Stephen Driesler
National Association of Realtors

William Farrell
American Hardware Manufacturers Association

Don Fuqua
Aerospace Industries Association

John Paul Galles
National Small Business United

Joseph G. Gerard
American Furniture Manufacturers Association

Brian W. Gill
Master Printers of America

Charles E. Hawkins
Associated Builders and Contractors

Charles C. Irions
American Movers Conference

Tom Kuhn
Edison Electric Institute

Richard L. Lawson
National Coal Association

Jim Mack
National Machine Tool Builders Association

Allen Moore
National Solid Wastes Management Association

David Stahl
Urban Land Institute

Hal Shoup
American Association of Advertising Agencies

Larry Thomas
Society of the Plastic Industry

George D. Webster
Webster, Chamberlain & Bean

January 3, 1991

Dear Friend,

President Bush met with us on Wednesday, December 20 to review the situation in the Persian Gulf and to ask for our support. He said he thinks Saddam Hussein has "not gotten the message" and is basing Iraqi actions on the belief that America is divided and will not support the President on decisive steps in the Gulf. President Bush believes Saddam Hussein gives great weight to the American dissenters and voices in the Congress that oppose any military action.

The President believes only a show of strength can be effective. As a result, we, the undersigned, have prepared the attached letter to President Bush and are looking for additional signatories. We want to send Saddam Hussein the real message.

We urge you to sign this letter if at all possible. This is not a fundraising appeal. Please sign and return the enclosed release form as soon as possible.

Your affiliation will be listed "for identification purposes only" and will not bind your organization in any way.

This letter will be released to the press, sent to every member of the House and Senate, and circulated widely within the business and political communities.

Thank you for your courtesy and cooperation. We look forward to hearing from you at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely,

Red Cavaney
American Paper Institute

Jerry Jasinowski
National Assoc. of Manufacturers

Dave Parker
The Aluminum Association

Dirk Van Dongen
National Association of
Wholesaler-Distributors

Wayne H. Valis
Valis Associates

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH BUSINESS ASSOCIATION EXECUTIVES
TO DISCUSS OPERATION DESERT SHIELD

DATE: DECEMBER 19, 1990
TIME: 10:45 A.M.
LOCATION: THE ROOSEVELT ROOM

THROUGH: DAVID DEMAREST, ASSISTANT TO THE
PRESIDENT FOR COMMUNICATIONS

FROM: BOBBIE KILBERG, DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO
THE PRESIDENT FOR PUBLIC LIAISON

I. PURPOSE:

To reinforce your Gulf policy objectives with the business association community and to specifically encourage their active grassroots support.

II. BACKGROUND:

Many associations and their memberships are helping with Operation Desert Shield already. Jack Block, President of the National Association of Wholesale Grocers, states that his members are sending non-perishable food items to the soldiers.

The National Association of Broadcasters is supplying the forces with transistor radio sets to ensure that all armed forces personnel are able to listen to the Armed Forces Network. Some of the association leaders have pledged to write op-ed pieces in support of the Administration's effort and are anxious to help in other ways.

This provides a good opportunity to share your convictions regarding Operation Desert Shield and to personally appeal to a key group of association leaders for increased grassroots support for the Administration's Gulf policy. You will join the meeting already in progress, where Richard Haass will be briefing the group on the latest developments in the Gulf.

III. PARTICIPANTS:

The President

Richard Haass

Approximately 28 business association leaders (see list attached).

IV. PRESS PLAN:

Closed press.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS:

The President arrives the Roosevelt Room.

The President makes brief remarks.

The President participates in general discussion.

The President departs.

Talking points provided by NSC.

ATTENDEES FOR OPERATION DESERT SHIELD MEETING
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 19, 1990; 10:00 A.M., THE ROOSEVELT ROOM

Ball, William, President
National Soft Drink Association

Batts, Lana, Vice President
American Trucking Association

Beatty, Bert, Exec. Vice President
Associated General Contractors

Black, Judy, Vice President
International Council of Shopping Centers

Block, John R., President
National Assoc. of Wholesale Grocers

Cavaney, Red, President
American Paper Institute, Inc.

Clower, Dewey, President
National Association of Truck Stop Operators

Colton, Kent, Exec. Vice President
National Assoc. of Home Builders

Cullen, David, Vice President
National Federation of Independent Business

DiBona, Charles, President
American Petroleum Institute

Fuqua, Don, President
Aerospace Industries Assoc.

Galles, John, Executive Vice President
National Small Business United

Gerard, Joe, President
American Furniture Manufacturers Assoc.

Gorman, Mark, Senior Director, Gov't Affairs
National Restaurant Association

Hawkins, Charlie, Vice President
Associated Builders and Contractors

Hawley, Kip, Vice President,
Union Pacific

Irby, Rick, Vice President
American Gas Association

Iverson, Richard, President
American Electronics Association

Jasinowski, Jerry, President
National Association of Manufacturers

Lawson, Dick, President
National Coal Association

Maury, Sam, Executive Director
The Business Roundtable

May, James, Executive Vice President
National Association of Broadcasters

Mitler, Milt, Vice President
U.S. Chamber of Commerce

Parker, David, President
Aluminum Association

Perlman, Martin, President
National Association of Home Builders

Rogstad, Barry, President
American Business Conference

Satagaj, John, President
Small Business Legislative Council

Valis, Wayne, President
Valis Associates

Van Dongen, Dirk, President
NAWD

Watkins, Stephen, President
Association of Wall & Ceilings Institute

Withdrawal/Redaction Sheet

(George Bush Library)

Document No. and Type	Subject/Title of Document	Date	Restriction	Class.
03. List	Attendees for Association Desert Shield Meeting on 12/19/90 (3 pp.)	n.d.	(b)(6)	

Collection:

Record Group: Bush Presidential Records
Office: Public Liaison, Office of
Series: Vogt, Jeff
Subseries:
WHORM Cat.:
File Location: Operation Desert Shield [2]

Date Closed: 11/2/2004	OA/ID Number: 07149-018
FOIA/SYS Case #: 1998-0099-F	Appeal Case #:
Re-review Case #: 2005-0097-S	Appeal Disposition:
P-2/P-5 Review Case #:	Disposition Date:
AR Case #:	MR Case #:
AR Disposition:	MR Disposition:
AR Disposition Date:	MR Disposition Date:

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

P-1 National Security Classified Information [(a)(1) of the PRA]
P-2 Relating to the appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA]
P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA]
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA]
P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]
P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

PRM. Removed as a personal record misfile.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

(b)(1) National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
(b)(2) Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
(b)(3) Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
(b)(4) Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
(b)(6) Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
(b)(7) Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
(b)(8) Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
(b)(9) Release would disclose geological or geophysical information

DOOR

DOOR


Richard Haass



Kip Hawley

Wayne Valis

~~Will~~ Ball




Kent Colton

Lana Batts

SAM

DAVID Cullen


MARKY



Milt Miller

Bert

Beatty




Mark Gorman

Jim May

Red

Cavaney



Dewey Clower

John Gallee

Dirk


John Satagaj

VAN DONGEN



Stephen Watkins

MARTIN PERLMAN



Charlie Hawkins

DON RUGHA

Barry Rogstad



Charles D. Bona


The Roosevelt Room

Judy Black




Dave


Parker




Jerry Jasinowski




The President



John Block




Dick Lawson



Dick Iverson

Joe Gerard



Governor

Sununu

Hawkins

Iverson

Rogstad

Watkins

Watkins

DOOR

DOOR

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ATTENDEES FOR OPERATION DESERT SHIELD MEETING
WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 19, 1990; 10:00 A.M., THE ROOSEVELT ROOM

- 1 ✓ Ball, William, President
National Soft Drink Association
- 3 ✓ Beatty, Bert, Exec. Vice President
Associated General Contractors
- 4 ✓ Black, Judy, Vice President — (MS.)
International Council of Shopping Centers
- 5 ✓ Block, John R., President
National Assoc. of Wholesale Grocers
- 6 ✓ Cavaney, Red, President
American Paper Institute, Inc.
- 7 ✓ Clower, Dewey, President
National Association of Truck Stop Operators
- 8 ✓ Colton, Kent, Exec. Vice President
National Assoc. of Home Builders
- 9 ✓ Cullen, David, Vice President
National Federation of Independent Business
- 10 ✓ DiBona, Charles, President
American Petroleum Institute
- ~~Fritts, Edward, President
National Assoc. of Broadcasters~~
- 11 ✓ Fuqua, Don, President
Aerospace Industries Assoc.
- 12 ✓ Galles, John, Executive Vice President
National Small Business United
- 13 ✓ Gerard, Joe, President
American Furniture Manufacturers Assoc.
- 14 ✓ Gorman, Mark, Senior Director, Gov't Affairs
National Restaurant Association
- 15 ✓ Hawkins, Charlie, Vice President
Associated Builders and Contractors
- 16 ✓ Hawley, Kip, Vice President,
Union Pacific

Add: (MS.)
2 ✓ Batts, LANA, VP - AIA

The President

Richard Haass

Governor Sununu

- 17 ✓ Iverson, Richard, President
American Electronics Association
- 18 ✓ Jasinowski, Jerry, President
National Association of Manufacturers
- 19 ✓ Lawson, Dick, President
National Coal Association
- 20 ✓ Maury, Sam, Executive Director
The Business Roundtable
- 21 ✓ May, James, ~~President~~ *E.V.P., Gov't Relations*
National Association of Broadcasters
- 22 ✓ Mitler, Milt, Vice President
U.S. Chamber of Commerce
- 23 ✓ Parker, David, President
Aluminum Association
- 24 ✓ Perlman, Martin, President
National Association of Home Builders
- 25 ✓ Rogstad, Barry, President
American Business Conference
- 26 ✓ Satagaj, John, President
Small Business Legislative Council
- 27 ✓ Valis, Wayne, President
Valis Associates
- 28 ✓ Van Dongen, Dirk, President
NAWD
- 29 ✓ Watkins, Stephen, President
Association of Wall & Ceilings Institute

THE NEW YORK TIMES, SUNDAY, JANUARY 6, 1991

By Richard Nixon

IT IS time for some straight talk about why 400,000 young Americans spent Christmas in the deserts of Saudi Arabia and why in less than two weeks the U.S. may be once again at war.

We must first be clear about what the conflict is not about.

If we must resort to military force to drive Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, it will not be a war about democracy. While our goal is to restore Kuwait's legitimate Government, it is hypocritical to suggest that we hope to bring democracy to Kuwait. Except for Israel, there are no democracies in the Mideast, and there will be none in the foreseeable future. The Emir of Kuwait is among the world's more benevolent dictators, but once he is back in his palace in Kuwait City, he will still be a dictator.

Nor is intervention justified because Saddam Hussein is a cruel leader. President Bush has been criticized for equating him with Hitler. Whether he is that bad is irrelevant. He is bad enough. His soldiers are murdering, torturing and raping defenseless Kuwaitis and pillaging their country. He violated international law by using chemical weapons against Iran and the Kurds.

But if our policy were to punish cruel leaders, we would not be allied with Syria's President Hafez al-Assad. He ordered the massacre of 20,000 innocent people in the city of Hama in his own country, has supported international terrorism and presided over an army that has committed brutal atrocities in Lebanon. Both Syria and Iraq threaten our interests, but today Iraq poses a profoundly greater threat.

Those who fault President Bush for enlisting President Assad's support should remember Winston Churchill's classic rejoinder to those who criticized him for supporting Stalin after Hitler invaded the Soviet Union during World War II: "If Hitler invaded Hell, I think I would find a kind word to say about the Devil in the House of Commons."

We are in the Persian Gulf for two major reasons.

Richard Nixon, the former President, is author most recently of "In the Arena."

Why

U.S. policy is right in the gulf.

First, Saddam Hussein has unlimited ambitions to dominate one of the most important strategic areas in the world. When Senator Bob Dole said we were in the gulf for oil and Secretary of State James Baker said we were there for jobs, they were criticized for justifying our actions on purely selfish grounds. We should not apologize for defending our vital economic interests.

Had we not intervened, an international outlaw would today control more than 40 percent of the world's oil. While, by stringent energy conservation, the U.S. might be able to get along without oil from the Gulf, Western Europe and Japan could not. What happens to the economies of other great industrial nations directly affects the economy of the U.S. We cannot allow Mr. Hussein to blackmail us and our allies into accepting his aggressive goals by giving him a choke hold on our oil lifeline.

Because he has oil, he has the means to acquire the weapons he needs for aggression against his neighbors, eventually including nuclear weapons. If he succeeds in Kuwait, he will attack others, and he will use whatever weapons he has to achieve his goals. If we do not stop him now, we will have to stop him later, when the cost in young American lives will be infinitely greater.

There is an even more important long-term reason for rolling back Iraq's aggression. We cannot be sure, as many believe and hope, that we are entering into a new, post-cold-war era where armed aggression will no longer be an instrument of national policy. But we can be sure that if Saddam Hussein profits from aggression, other potential aggressors in the world will be tempted to wage war against their neighbors.

If we succeed in getting Mr. Hussein out of Kuwait in accordance with the U.N. resolution and in eliminating his capacity to wage war

— which must be our goal if he refuses to get out peacefully and forces us to act militarily — we will have the opportunity to deal elsewhere without sending American forces. The world will take seriously



Some critics argue that we should continue sanctions for as long as 18 months before resorting to force. They contend that even if sanctions do not work, Mr. Hussein will be so weakened that we will suffer fewer casualties if war does come.

They are wrong on three counts. First, while the Iraqi people suffer the effects of the sanctions, President Hussein will direct his resources so that the Iraqi military will not. Second, while the sanctions will weaken Iraq, they will weaken us even more, because of the political difficulty of holding our alliance together abroad and maintaining support for our troop commitment at home. Finally, the most the critics can claim is that it is possible that sanctions might work. It is certain that military force will work. The stakes are too high to risk failure.

Other critics believe diplomacy will eventually convince Saddam Hussein that he should get out of Kuwait. But neither diplomacy nor sanctions has a chance unless he knows that if he does not get out of Kuwait peacefully, the American people and our allies will be united in support of driving him out militarily.

Should Secretary Baker's meeting with the Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, fail to produce an agreement that complies unconditionally with the U.N. resolution, we must remember that when dealing with an insatiable aggressor a bad peace is worse than war because it will inevitably lead to a bigger war.

If we must go to war, it will not be just a war about oil. It will not be a war about a tyrant's cruelty. It will not be a war about democracy. It will be a war about peace — not just peace in our time, but peace for our children and grandchildren in the years ahead.

If Saddam Hussein gains in any way from our unprecedented commitment of economic, diplomatic and military power, other aggressors will be encouraged to wage war against their neighbors and peace will be in jeopardy everywhere in the world.

GERALD B. SOLOMON

MEMBER OF CONGRESS
14TH DISTRICT, NEW YORK
ROOM 2200 RAYBURN BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 225-6614

SASLANTY COLLARD
SARATOGA SPRINGS, NY 12056
(518) 587-0000

HOUSE TAVERN FORUM ON AMERICAN
PROCESSES OF WAR AND
ARMING IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

cc: RJP

ALLEN COMPTON
HOUSE TAVERN FORUM ON
EDUCATION AND THE FUTURE
ASSISTANT CLERK WHIP

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

January 5, 1991

The Honorable Robert H. Michel
Republican Leader
H-232 Capitol
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Bob:

I just learned today from Majority Whip Bill Gray that the Rules Committee will be convened next Thursday, January 10, to consider a rule for a Persian Gulf Resolution.

As you know I will be leaving tomorrow with Bill and other Members on a congressional delegation trip to Saudi Arabia and we will now be returning on Thursday morning. I have therefore conveyed a request to Chairman Moakley that the meeting not be held until Thursday afternoon.

My guess is that the Democrats will present a simple House resolution or a concurrent resolution expressing the sense of the House or of Congress that the President not commit U.S. military forces to armed conflict without prior authorization by Congress. A joint resolution would obviously be subject to presidential veto which they could not override.

I would further suspect that the rule they will seek will be a completely closed rule, providing for its consideration either in the House or in the Committee of the Whole, with ample debate time (e.g., six hours), equally divided between the parties, but with no opportunity for amendment. They will point to the amount of debate time as their idea of fairness.

Moreover, to completely restrict any opportunity for alternatives, the rule will order the previous question on the resolution to final passage without intervening motion. What this language means is that: (a) there is no opportunity to defeat the previous question and thereby open the resolution to further debate and amendment; and (b) that there would be no opportunity to recommit, either with or without instructions.

While clause 4(b) of House Rule XI says that the Rules Committee cannot deny a motion to recommit as provided by clause 4 of rule XVI, the latter rule only guarantees a motion to recommit "after the previous question shall have been ordered on the passage of a bill or joint resolution." In other words, the guarantee does not apply to simple or concurrent resolutions.

DISTRICT OFFICES

800 Columbus Turnpike
East Greenwich, NY 12061
518-417-2700

P.O. Box 71
Rushmore, NY 12072
518-278-2800

418 Warren Street
Hudson, NY 12534
518-528-0181

21 Bay Street
Albany, NY 12201
518-793-3001

Page 2.

What all this comes down to is that if the Republicans and others wish to make an alternative in order, either a rumored Solars proposal endorsing the U.N. resolution in addition to requiring prior congressional consent, or a Republican substitute, it would be necessary to defeat the previous question on the rule and offer a substitute rule making such alternative(s) in order.

While Foley might be inclined to make in order one substitute by the minority (though not likely by a Member of his own party), he would probably be persuaded not to on grounds that if the alternative contains a reference to the U.N. resolution and it is then defeated, it would send the signal to Saddam that the U.S. Congress had repudiated the U.N. resolution, and he can dig-in and tough it out.

Obviously this is very high stakes international poker and we should be very cautious about jumping on an alternative that could backfire big time. Moreover, it might be wise to complain about the closed process without forcing a vote on an alternative in the event that the President may later wish a closed rule on a U.N. type authorization from Congress. Nobody would want a conditional authorization of war, and such an authorization could be loaded down with conditions if opened to amendment.

I would therefore strongly urge that the Republican leadership work very closely with the White House on our strategy before making any public pronouncements. I would also request that you keep my chief of staff, Don Wolfensberger, currently informed on developments as I will be checking in with him periodically from abroad.

Sincerely yours,

GERALD S. SOLOMON
Member of Congress

cc.: Republican Leadership
GBS:drw

P.2

JAN 02 '91 10:37 BRT-NY
500 WEST MAIN STREET
P.O. Box 1438
LEWISBURG, PA 17033
TEL: 717/438-1438
FAX: 717/438-5021

David A. Jones
Chairman of the Roundtable
Chief Executive Officer

December 28, 1990

Human

Mr. Drew Lewis
Chairman, The Business Roundtable
Union Pacific Corporation
Martin Tower
Eighth and Eaton Avenues
Bethlehem, PA 18018

Dear Drew:

I wanted you to see in advance the letter I am sending to you and fellow Roundtable members, in response to your letter of December 20, 1990.

Please call me if you have any comments.

Sincere best wishes for a happy New Year.

Sincerely,



David A. Jones

DAJ:dws

cc: William L. Lurie

December 28, 1990

Human

Mr. Drew Lewis, Chairman
The Business Roundtable
200 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10166

All Members of The Business Roundtable

RE: PRESIDENT BUSH/PERSIAN GULF

Dear Drew and Fellow Members:

I received Drew's letter of December 20, 1990 by fax on December 21. I agree that we should all seek to help the President. However, like the former secretaries of defense and joint chiefs of staff who have testified, along with Senator Nunn and, I expect, a majority of Congress, I believe that President Bush needs our help to summon the patience and steadfastness to give diplomacy and his remarkably effective embargo a chance to work.

Moreover, President Bush needs to hear from each of us, and from our employees, that adherence to Constitutional requirements for Congressional debate and prior approval is the most fundamental issue in this crisis. The clear purpose of our founding fathers in requiring Congressional approval before starting a war, is specifically and precisely to prevent a well-intended president from acting impulsively and unilaterally. Acting in the absence of such mandate is a potentially impeachable offense, and we who are his friends and supporters should counsel him that it is his duty to uphold the Constitution, and that open public and Congressional debate on an issue of this magnitude is a sign of strength, not weakness.

Although Mrs. Jones and I have a son (a Marine) who has been on the front lines since mid-August, we applaud President Bush's masterful leadership in protecting Saudi Arabia and the Emirates, thus assuring our and global oil supplies. His mobilization of world opinion against Iraqi aggression and his organization of perhaps the most successful peacetime embargo ever, are entirely praiseworthy. The embargo has prevented Saddam Hussein from selling either his or Kuwaiti oil (costing him at least \$1.5 billion per month), and is estimated to have reduced Iraq's exports by 97 percent and imports by at least 90 percent. With hard currency reserves shrinking, Iraq's meager imports are sure to fall, as smugglers are unlikely to sell on credit.

Attached is a letter from the December 4, 1990 New York Times which quite succinctly summarizes the reasons for staying with the embargo.

The Chairman and All Members of The Business Roundtable

Page 2

December 28, 1990

Human

Turning to the four points emphasized by President Bush on December 19, it should be noted:

• The U.N. resolutions, our protection of Saudi Arabia and the Emirates and successful embargo constitute a clear victory for international law. However, it is grossly unfair that most of the money and fighting men come from America, although our proportion of oil imported from the Middle East is relatively modest.

• The second point, that Saddam Hussein is a brutal bully, is undoubtedly true. Sadly, brutality abounds, and if the world wishes to punish it, the world should participate proportionately.


• His third point, about chemical and nuclear weapons, although an afterthought, has been an effective scare tactic with the American public. The Soviet Union has possessed such capabilities for more than 40 years, but our policy of patience and steadfastness proved successful, chiefly because those weapons are suicide weapons which can be used only once. If Saddam Hussein attacks our troops with such weapons, his nation, sadly, will be obliterated, but that is no reason to inflict massive casualties on the enslaved Iraqi people simply because such weapons might be used.

• Probably all agree that stability in the Persian Gulf is desirable, but impossible to achieve, unless the Israeli/Palestinian conflict is resolved. As Secretary Schlesinger and others have noted, the humiliation of Iraq will create its own set of problems and uncertainties.

The entire nation was relieved when President Bush offered to receive Iraq's foreign minister, and to send Secretary Baker to visit Saddam Hussein, between December 15 and January 15. Then, when Saddam Hussein chose an advantageous date within those suggested, President Bush rescinded the invitation. This act, coupled with the President's seeming reluctance to adhere to Constitutional principles, creates the unfortunate impression that a bunker mentality has overtaken The White House and its staff.

I urge you and your employees to join me in encouraging the President to call for Congressional debate and concurrence, renewed diplomatic initiatives and, if war is declared, to insist that our allies contribute their proportionate share of fighting men.

Yours very truly,



David A. Jones

rb

cc: President Bush
Members of Congress

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SP-LB0DS

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

DECEMBER 20, 1990

TO: KATHY SUPER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

THROUGH: DAVID DEMAREST, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
COMMUNICATIONS

FROM: BOBBIE KILBERG^{zk}, DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
FOR PUBLIC LIAISON
JEFFREY VOGT^{gm}, ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, PUBLIC LIAISON

REQUEST: For the President to meet with key labor leaders
to discuss the Administration's Gulf Policy.

PURPOSE: To reinforce the objectives of Operation Desert
Shield and ask for strong and vocal support from
labor community leaders.

BACKGROUND: In concert with other key group meetings to
generate additional support for Operation Desert
Shield, the labor community is capable of offering
a good network of grassroots support for
Administration policy. The Marine Engineers
Beneficial Association (MEBA) and the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters unions have
been very supportive of Operation Desert Shield.

A briefing on the Gulf situation by an appropriate
Administration official, followed by a statement
and a strong appeal for support from the
President, could help to generate visible labor
support.

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION: None.

DATE AND TIME: Week of January 7, 1991.

DURATION: 20 minutes.

LOCATION: The Roosevelt Room.

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Governor Sununu
General Scowcroft or Richard Haass
Approximately 25 leaders from the labor community.

OUTLINE OF
EVENT:

THE WHITE HOUSE

The President arrives Roosevelt Room.
The President makes brief remarks.
The President appeals to the labor officials for
their support of the Administration's Gulf
Policy.
The President departs.

REMARKS
REQUIRED:

Talking points.

MEDIA
COVERAGE:

Wires.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MEETING WITH BUSINESS ASSOCIATION EXECUTIVES
TO DISCUSS OPERATION DESERT SHIELD

DATE: DECEMBER 19, 1990

TIME: 10:45 A.M.

LOCATION: THE ROOSEVELT ROOM

THROUGH: DAVID DEMAREST, ASSISTANT TO THE
PRESIDENT FOR COMMUNICATIONS

FROM: BOBBIE KILBERG, DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO
THE PRESIDENT FOR PUBLIC LIAISON

I. PURPOSE:

To reinforce your Gulf policy objectives with the business association community and to specifically encourage their active grassroots support.

II. BACKGROUND:

Many associations and their memberships are helping with Operation Desert Shield already. Jack Block, President of the National Association of Wholesale Grocers, states that his members are sending non-perishable food items to the soldiers.

The National Association of Broadcasters is supplying the forces with transistor radio sets to ensure that all armed forces personnel are able to listen to the Armed Forces Network. Some of the association leaders have pledged to write op-ed pieces in support of the Administration's effort and are anxious to help in other ways.

This provides a good opportunity to share your convictions regarding Operation Desert Shield and to personally appeal to a key group of association leaders for increased grassroots support for the Administration's Gulf policy.

III. PARTICIPANTS:

The President

Richard Haass

Approximately 28 business association leaders (see list attached).

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

file Iraq

George Bush

It is now more than 15 weeks since Iraqi tanks, with little warning and even less mercy, rolled across the once tranquil border dividing Iraq from its neighbor Kuwait. Within three days, 100,000 Iraqi troops controlled the streets of Kuwait City and massed at the borders of Kuwait's neighbor Saudi Arabia. A second invasion, or at the very least, military intimidation, appeared imminent.

Iraq's occupation of Kuwait has been a nightmare. Hundreds of thousands of Kuwaiti men, women and children have been driven from their country; Saddam has brought in tens of thousands of Iraqis and other foreigners to resettle Kuwait in their place. Homes, buildings and factories have been looted. Babies have been torn from incubators; children shot in front of their parents. Disappearances and graphic accounts of torture are widespread.

Iraq's leader Saddam Hussein has not been content with violence against Kuwaitis. Thousands of foreigners are being denied the freedom to leave, in violation of the most basic norms of civilized conduct. Embassies and diplomatic residences are being violated, and their diplomatic personnel are being starved out.

The response of the international community to this cruelty has been immediate and unwavering. The United Nations Security Council has passed ten resolutions condemning Iraq's invasion and occupation, rejecting its annexation of Kuwait, and calling upon Saddam to allow all who wish to leave to do so. To back up these calls for action, the international community has put into place mandatory and comprehensive economic sanctions designed to ensure that Iraq reverses, and does not benefit from, its aggression. I am proud to say that the United States played a key role in building the coalition of nations that has forged this response; American leadership remains a positive and constructive force in this changing world.

Now, as I write this column, more than 200,000 men and women wearing the uniforms of the U.S. armed forces stand guard on the sand and along the shores of the Arabian peninsula, together with the armed forces of more than 25 other countries. Over the next few months, they will be joined by thousands of additional troops from America and other nations.

But why are we there? Why should we be there?

First, the world must not reward aggression. Iraq's invasion and occupation of Kuwait is not just a case of petty aggression. We stand now at a singular moment. The civilized world is now in the process of fashioning the rules that will govern the new world order beginning to emerge in the aftermath of the Cold War. The history of this century shows clearly that rewarding aggression encourages more aggression. If the world looks the other way in this first crisis of the Post Cold War era, other would-be Saddams will conclude, correctly, that aggression pays. We must either be prepared to respond now or face a much greater set of challenges down the road.

Second, our national security is at stake. Can the world afford to allow Saddam Hussein a stranglehold around the world's economic lifeline? That is exactly what would happen if we failed. Armed with thousands of tanks and aircraft, not to mention chemical, biological and perhaps even nuclear weapons, Saddam would dominate the Gulf and the bulk of the world's petroleum reserves. Even now, without an actual shortage of oil, Saddam's aggression has almost doubled oil prices, causing serious problems here at home and throughout the world. Fledgling democracies are at particular risk; the poorest nations are hit hardest. The potential for much greater suffering is real. We cannot allow any tyrant to practice economic blackmail. Energy security is national security, and we must be prepared to act accordingly.

Last, innocent lives are at stake. I want to see a world in which Americans and others can live free from fear. The cynical use of innocent civilians, be it as bargaining chips or as pawns to deter attack, is an affront to civilized behavior. This blackmail will not succeed. At the same time, our citizens and our diplomats must be free.

Many, understandably, counsel prolonged patience. Yet, it is grim reality that with each passing day the consequences of Saddam's aggression grow. Remember, Saddam has not hesitated to use his most terrible weapons -- not merely in time of war, but against his own people. The fact that Saddam is actively developing the most sophisticated weapons of mass destruction known to man -- nuclear and biological weapons -- is ominous indeed. Those who are in hiding or inside our embassy in Kuwait risk capture or surrender. As I write this, Saddam Hussein has callously refused to comply with the UN Resolution that calls for the replenishment of foreign embassies. The potential cost in human lives of what would be needed to break Saddam's grip on Kuwait mounts as do the global economic costs of his aggression.

Our goals have not changed since I first outlined them to the American people last August. First, the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Second, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government. Third, security and stability for the Gulf -- an important national interest of the United States since the time of Harry Truman. And fourth, the protection of American citizens abroad.

Let me make one more thing clear. As I work to realize these goals, I will use every means at my disposal to reach a peaceful solution. We will continue the effective implementation of the United Nations sanctions. There already has been enough violence, suffering and sacrifice.

Lasting and meaningful peace must be founded upon principle. Iraq cannot be rewarded for its blatant aggression. Kuwait must be sovereign; its territory intact. The hostages must be set free. Iraq can never again be in a position to threaten the survival of its neighbors or our vital interests.

With unity and determination, and yes, patience, I am confident that these objectives are within our reach. When we succeed, we will have returned a country to its people. We will have demonstrated that aggression will not be tolerated. We will have invigorated a United Nations that contributes as its founders dreamed. We will have established principles for acceptable international conduct and the means to enforce them. In short, we will have taken a major step toward a community of nations bound by a common commitment to peace and restraint. This is something Americans and peace-loving peoples have long sought. Out of this difficult time of testing, we have the extraordinary opportunity to make this dream a reality.

COMMITTEE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE GULF

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

TONY COELHO

We are today releasing a statement on American policy in the Gulf on behalf of a distinguished group of Americans. We make this statement to contribute to the public debate that is now underway. We welcome that debate.

It is both a tribute to and a demonstration of the strength of American democracy. We share the consensus throughout American society that Saddam Hussein's aggression is a threat to our national interest and to international security and must be stopped.

Further, we believe that the goals of the international coalition now mobilized against Saddam Hussein should include the removal of his weapons of mass destruction -- chemical, biological and nuclear.

COMMITTEE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE GULF

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

FRANK C. CARLUCCI

I want to call your attention to the diversity of the members whose names you have received. The Committee includes people from both political parties and from very different backgrounds. Members of this Committee have taken different positions on other questions of foreign policy, but on this we are agreed.

READ THE NAMES OF SIGNERS

I think you will agree this is an impressive list. I want to remind you that the Committee is still in formation and we will be releasing additional names.

COMMITTEE FOR PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE GULF

2300 M STREET, N.W., SUITE 600
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20037
202 293-1525 PHONE
202 293-8965 FAX

MEMBERS

Honorable Kenneth L. Adelman	Former Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Professor Fouad Ajami	Director, Middle East Studies, Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies
Professor Graham Allison	Douglas Dillon Professor, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University
Honorable Howard H. Baker, Jr.	Former U.S. Senator (R-TN) and former White House Chief of Staff
Honorable Frank C. Carlucci	Former U.S. Secretary of Defense
Sol C. Chaikin	President Emeritus, International Ladies Garment Workers Union
Honorable Tony Coelho	Former Majority Whip, U.S. House of Representatives (D-CA)
Honorable James R. Jones	Chairman, American Stock Exchange, former White House Chief of Staff and former U.S. Congressman (D-OK)
John T. Joyce	President, International Union of Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen
Ambassador Max Kampelman	Former Head of U.S. Delegation to the Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms with the Soviet Union
Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick	Former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations

Honorable Tom Lantos	U.S. House of Representatives (D-CA)
Admiral Robert L.J. Long	Former Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Forces
Honorable Richard G. Lugar	U.S. Senate (R-IN)
Honorable John McCain	U.S. Senate (R-AZ)
Honorable Dave McCurdy	U.S. House of Representatives (D-OK)
Honorable John P. Murtha	U.S. House of Representatives (D-PA)
Honorable Stephen J. Solarz	U.S. House of Representatives (D-NY)
Honorable Robert G. Torricelli	U.S. House of Representatives (D-NJ)
General John W. Vogt	Former Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Air Forces, European Air Forces and former Director, Joint Staff, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
Honorable Pete Wilson	Governor-elect of California and former U.S. Senator (R-CA)

CO-DIRECTORS

Ann F. Lewis	Former Political Director, Democratic National Committee
Honorable Richard Perle	Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense

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WHY WE ARE IN THE GULF

Iraq's invasion and annexation of Kuwait, backed by chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, represents the first real crisis of the post cold war era.

How this crisis is resolved will shape the structure of the post cold war world. Will it be a world where aggression is once again a routine method for the resolution of disputes between countries? Or will it be a world where considerations of justice and international law prevail over brute force and naked aggression?

If the coalition arrayed against Iraq's aggression succeeds, the institutions of international order and law will emerge greatly strengthened. Others tempted to emulate Saddam Hussein would be deterred by the lesson of his defeat. A stabilizing balance of power in the Gulf would become a real possibility.

Saddam Hussein has now launched two wars in less than a decade. Determined to dominate the entire Middle East, there can be little doubt that more will follow unless he is stopped now.

If Saddam Hussein were to prevail, he would emerge as the dominant leader of the Arab world. Through conquest and intimidation, he would gain control or significant influence over half the world's proven oil reserves. With his hands on the world's economic jugular, he would threaten the security and well-being of all nations. He would surely use this power to accelerate his drive for nuclear weapons.

A triumph by Saddam Hussein in Kuwait would undermine moderate Arab regimes, precipitating the overthrow of those governments courageous enough to oppose him, and their replacement by regimes in sympathy not only with his ends, but his means as well. It would eliminate whatever chance there may be in this century for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. It would ignite a race throughout the region to acquire weapons comparable to Iraq's. It would set the stage for another Arab-Israeli war.

President Bush has made Iraq's unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait our principle objective. We believe that we must also find ways to remove Saddam Hussein's capacity to wage aggression, which now includes chemical and biological weapons and may soon include nuclear weapons as well.

A STRATEGY TO SECURE THE PEACE

President Bush has marshalled a broadly-based international coalition that has given unprecedented support to U.N. mandated sanctions against Iraq. Moreover, for the first time since the end of the Second World War, the superpowers are working together to

contain aggression through the United Nations in the way that the founders of the world organization had hoped. If the world had responded in this way over fifty years ago when Italy invaded Ethiopia, when Japan attacked Manchuria, and when Hitler occupied the Rhineland, perhaps the horrors of World War II could have been avoided.

We believe that:

-- The United Nations is right to reject an outcome which leaves Saddam Hussein in control of Kuwaiti territory, resources, or assets, for this would reward aggression and set an intolerably dangerous precedent.

-- Only a combination of effective economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation and a convincing threat to use force should it prove necessary, offers a real hope that the use of force can be avoided.

-- Even if Saddam Hussein agrees to withdraw from Kuwait, the threat posed by his weapons of mass destruction requires that they be verifiably dismantled--or, if necessary, destroyed.

-- A military solution would regrettably result in casualties; but ruling out the use of force would eventually be even more costly. If Iraqi aggression cannot be reversed through other means, the coalition whose military might has been assembled in the Gulf will have no alternative but to use force.

-- A decision to use force must be made only after consultation with the Congress and in the knowledge that the international community has consistently, through a series of U.N. resolutions and in other ways, supported the coalition opposing Iraq's aggression. Many countries have sent forces to the Gulf. If force must be used, we will not be alone.

-- If the American people debate and understand the vital issues at stake, then Americans will value and support a policy of determination and action.

We take one additional lesson from history: public and congressional support is essential to successful foreign policy. Our national leadership, from both political parties and from all walks of life, must explain and debate U.S. interests and involvement in this crisis with clarity and candor.

It is in the belief that we can, and must succeed in this endeavor that we have joined in this statement, and we ask our fellow Americans to join with us.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

DECEMBER 4, 1990

TO: GOVERNOR SUNUNU

FROM: BOBBIE KILBERG *BK*
JEFF VOGT *JV*.

REQUEST: For the President to meet with key business association leaders to discuss the Administration's Gulf Policy.

PURPOSE: To reinforce the objectives of Operation Desert Shield and ask for strong and vocal support from the leaders of key associations and their grass roots memberships.

BACKGROUND: In concert with other key group meetings to generate additional support for Operation Desert Shield, the business association community is capable of offering a good network of grassroots support for Administration policy.

A briefing on the Gulf situation by an appropriate Administration official, followed by a statement and a strong appeal for support from the President, could help to generate increased activity among association membership. A non-specific policy message should be promoted among this group, namely, "support the President and his actions in the Gulf." This is the message we wish them to convey to their respective memberships.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: None.

DATE AND TIME: Week of December 10.

DURATION: 10 minutes.

LOCATION: The Roosevelt Room.

PARTICIPANTS: The President
Governor Sununu
General Scowcroft or Richard Haass
Approximately 25 leaders from the association community.

OUTLINE OF
EVENT:

The President arrives Roosevelt Room.
The President makes brief remarks.
The President appeals to association leaders for
their support of the Administration's Gulf
Policy.
The President departs.

REMARKS
REQUIRED:

Talking points.

MEDIA
COVERAGE:

Wires.

cc: David Demarest



American Resort &
Residential Development
Association®

1220 L Street, N.W., 5th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20005
(202) 371-6700
(202) 289-8544 (Fax)

#492

November 20, 1990

The Honorable C. Gregg Petersmeyer
Deputy Assistant to the President
and Director of the Office of
National Service
OEOP Room 100
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Petersmeyer:

The American Resort and Residential Development Association (ARRDA) is the national trade and professional association representing the vacation resort, second-home and camp resort industry. Our membership wishes to convey to the President our strong support for this nation's Middle East policy and our commitment to the men and women who are serving America in the Persian Gulf.

We want to express this commitment in a tangible way.

Together with the leaders of the major developers of vacation and camp resort property, ARRDA has brought together resources of this industry and related sectors of the economy to provide moral support that is both real and symbolic. My letter to you is to offer this support to the President for the benefit of the armed forces now stationed in the Persian Gulf.

Enclosed you will find a general statement of our proposal, which we have designated "TIME FOR TROOPS". We propose to offer vacations to a number of our troops for their use once they return from combat duty, as well as to promote the active moral support for these troops among our members, their customers, and the owners of vacation property in America.

Our hope is to work closely with The White House and Department of Defense, as you deem appropriate, to bring this proposal to fruition. We believe that public support by the President of efforts by the private sector of this type reinforces our nation's will and determination, and encourages others to do what they can in this time of our troops' sacrifice for us. As we have been encouraged by the volunteer efforts of others, we hope this will, in some small way, encourage others.


Our objectives are simple:

- o We want to deliver as many vacation opportunities for our troops as possible.
- o We want to develop a network of vacation owners who give personal moral support to as many troops as possible.
- o We want to demonstrate our overall support of our troops and their Commander in Chief, and for the nation's policy in the Persian Gulf.

At your convenience, I would like to visit with you to discuss the details and to explain specifically what ARRDA and its members are prepared to do. Because we want to launch this project before Christmas, if that is possible from your standpoint, I would hope that we could meet just after the Thanksgiving holiday, and I will call for an appointment.

In an informal discussion I had with Jim Pinkerton, he advised me to write also to Bradley Mitchell, which I have done. Thank you for your attention, and I look forward to talking to you.

Sincerely,


Thomas C. Franks
Executive Vice President

cc: Jim Pinkerton, Deputy Assistant to the President for Policy Planning

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

DECEMBER 3, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF THE GULF COMMUNICATIONS WORKING GROUP

FROM: DEB AMEND *DA* .

RE: BRIEFING MATERIAL ON THE GULF

Attached is a package of background material on the Gulf for your use and distribution. It includes a fact sheet; the UN Security Council resolutions; a chronology of events; as well as recent clippings, editorials, and highlights of recent speeches by the President, the Vice President and Secretary Baker. This material will be updated regularly.

Gulf Fact Sheet

- o The President's goals in the gulf are clear; **they are the goals of the world community.** With the backing of twelve United Nations Resolutions, armed forces from 26 countries, and 50 countries helping financially, the international community seeks:
 - Immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of Iraq from Kuwait.
 - Restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government.
 - The release of all hostages and the free functioning of all embassies.
 - Security and stability of the Gulf region.
- o With **unprecedented international support**, the United Nations Security Council has authorized the use "of all necessary means" to stop Saddam Hussein, as of January 15, 1991.
- o **The stakes in letting Saddam's actions go unchecked are very high.** At a time in history when the rules of the post-cold war are being written, Saddam:
 - Is a dangerous dictator unafraid of using force to achieve his political goals.
 - Has weapons of mass destruction and is ambitiously pursuing development of nuclear weapons technology.
 - Desires to control one of the world's critical resources--oil.
- o We must **stop Saddam Hussein now** or face greater and even more dangerous challenges from him and those who would emulate him in the future.
- o Comprehensive economic **sanctions currently in place may not be enough** to force Iraq out of Kuwait. Despite evidence of economic hardship in Iraq, it is indeterminable whether the **sanctions** will achieve the stated goals.
- o **The cost of waiting for the sanctions to achieve our goals increases as time marches on.** With each passing day:
 - Saddam introduces more forces into Kuwait and Southern Iraq while reinforcing those already there. He is also producing more chemical and biological weapons.

- Iraq gets closer to possessing nuclear weapons capability.
- The fledgling democracies in Eastern Europe and developing countries everywhere are being severely damaged by the economic effects of Saddam's actions.
- And on a human level, Kuwait and its citizens are being brutally mistreated, hostages remain held, and our embassy in Kuwait remains under siege.
- o Any one of these concerns is enough to justify our action; collectively, **they make an unassailable case.**
- o **The world wants a peaceful settlement to the conflict in the Persian Gulf.** The best way to get one is to make clear to Saddam that the alternative is much more threatening.
- o The time between now and January 15, 1990 provides a real chance for diplomacy to work so long as it is consistent with the U.N. Resolutions.
- o In an **extraordinary effort to reach a peaceful settlement--** go the extra mile--the President has:
 - Offered to meet with Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, in Washington, DC.
 - Announced he will send Secretary Baker to meet with Saddam in Baghdad.
- o **These meetings will only be conducted within the mandates of the U.N. resolutions.** The purpose is not to negotiate; nor is it to reward Iraq in any way for its aggression or to discuss related issues. The purpose is to impress upon Iraq's leadership the determination of the world that Iraq withdraw, and the consequences for Iraq if it does not.

U.S. Secretary of State James Baker to Saddam Hussein:

"We continue to seek a diplomatic solution. Peace is your only sensible option. You can choose peace by respecting the will of the international community. But if you fail to do so, you will risk all. The choice is yours."

-- Secretary Baker at the United Nations
November 29, 1990

The Gulf Crisis: UN Security Council Actions

International Community Condemns Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait

Within the forum of the United Nations, the international community condemned Iraq's unprovoked invasion of Kuwait. Since August 2, the UN Security Council has passed 11 resolutions condemning the invasion and calling for Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.

- ▶ **August 2—Resolution 660.** Condemns invasion. Demands unconditional and immediate withdrawal. Vote: 14 for, 0 against, 1 abstention (Yemen).
- ▶ **August 6—Resolution 661.** Imposes economic sanctions. Authorizes non-military measures to enforce trade sanctions. Vote: 13 for, 2 abstentions (Yemen and Cuba).
- ▶ **August 9—Resolution 662.** Declares Iraq's annexation of Kuwait null and void. Vote: Unanimous (15-0).
- ▶ **August 18—Resolution 664.** Condemns Iraq for holding foreign nationals hostage and demands their immediate release. Vote: Unanimous (15-0).
- ▶ **August 25—Resolution 665.** Outlaws all trade with Iraq by land, sea, and air. Bars financial dealings with all UN members. Vote: 13 for, 2 abstentions (Yemen and Cuba).

- ▶ **September 13—Resolution 666.** Limits humanitarian food supplies to Iraq and occupied Kuwait and empowers Security Council to determine when such shipments are justified. Vote: 13 for, 2 opposed (Yemen and Cuba).
- ▶ **September 16—Resolution 667.** Condemns Iraq for violence against foreign embassies and diplomats in Kuwait. Demands protection for diplomatic and consular personnel. Vote: Unanimous (15-0).
- ▶ **September 24—Resolution 669.** Agrees to consider exceptions to Resolution 661 for shipment of humanitarian supplies and authorizes examination of requests for economic assistance under Article 50. Vote: Unanimous (15-0).
- ▶ **September 25—Resolution 670.** Tightens embargo on air traffic and authorizes detention of Iraq's merchant fleet. Vote: Unanimous (15-0).
- ▶ **October 29—Resolution 674.** Holds Iraq responsible for all financial losses resulting from invasion and seeks evidence of human rights abuses by Iraqi troops in Kuwait. Calls for the release of third-country nationals and the provision of food to those being held against their will. Vote: 13 for, 2 abstentions (Yemen and Cuba).
- ▶ **November 29—Resolution 678.** Authorizes "member states cooperating with the government of Kuwait" to use "all necessary means" to uphold the above resolutions, while giving Iraq "one final opportunity, as a pause of good will" to abide by the resolutions by January 15, 1991. Vote: 12 for, 2 against (Yemen and Cuba), 1 abstention (China). ■



CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF

- July 18 Saddam Hussein accuses Kuwait of driving down the price of crude oil and reasserts Iraqi claims to oil in a disputed border area inside Kuwait.
- July 25 Iraq builds-up its military stationed on the border with Saudi Arabia.
- U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, meets in Baghdad with Saddam who asserts his hopes for a peaceful resolution to the situation with Kuwait through talks, not violence.
- August 1 Talks between Iraq and Kuwait collapse.
- August 2 Iraqi troops cross the border into Kuwait and gain control of the country by seizing oil fields and forcing the royal family to flee to Saudi Arabia.
- President Bush signs an Executive Order blocking Kuwaiti Government property, and an Executive Order blocking Iraqi Government property and prohibiting transactions with Iraq.
- The U.S. Senate and House of Representatives endorse President Bush's embargo and condemn Saddam's aggression.
- The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 660 which condemns Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, demands the unconditional, immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait and calls on both countries to negotiate.
- August 6 King Fahd invites forces into Saudi Arabia to reinforce its defenses.
- Iraqi troops gather British and American citizens in Kuwait and transfer them to Iraq.
- The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 661 which imposes a trade and financial embargo on Iraq and occupied Kuwait, establishes a special sanctions committee to implement the resolution and asks U.N. members to protect Kuwaiti assets in their country.
- August 8 In a nationally televised address to the nation, President Bush announces the deployment of U.S. troops to the Persian Gulf, condemns Saddam's aggression, and sets out the four principles guiding U.S. policy for the crisis.

Iraq announces the annexation of Kuwait.

- August 9 The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 662 which declares Iraq's annexation of Kuwait null and void.
- August 10 President Bush signs an Executive Order blocking Kuwaiti Government property and prohibiting transactions with Kuwait.
- Twelve members of the Arab League vote to send a peacekeeping force to Saudi Arabia.
- August 16 President Bush orders the U.S. Navy to intercept shipping to and from Iraq and Kuwait.
- August 18 The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 664 demanding the immediate release of foreigners from Iraq and Kuwait and the right of diplomats to visit their nationals. This Resolution also insists that Iraq rescind its order closing diplomatic and consular missions in Kuwait.
- August 25 The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 665 authorizing "measures as may be necessary," such as the use of Western navies, to enforce the economic embargo against Iraq.
- August 28 Iraq officially "designates" Kuwait as its 19th governate.
- August 29 President Bush addresses the Armed Forces in the Persian Gulf by taped radio message.
- September 7 The U.S. puts Iraq on list of states sponsoring terrorism.
- September 11 President Bush addresses a Joint Session of Congress, reiterating the message that Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait "immediately and without condition." Twenty nations' navies agree to enforce the U.N. blockade of Iraq.
- September 12 President Bush tapes an eight minute message to the Iraqi people.
- September 13 The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 666 which reaffirms Iraq's responsibility for the safety and well-being of all foreign nationals.
- September 16 Iraqi television shows President Bush's videotaped speech to the Iraqi people explaining the reasons for the world's condemnation of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

- The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 667 condemning Iraqi aggression against diplomats and diplomatic compounds in Kuwait. This Resolution also demands the immediate release of all foreign nationals.
- September 24 The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 669 emphasizing that only the special sanctions committee (established by Resolution 661) has the ability to authorize humanitarian aid shipments to Iraq and occupied Kuwait.
- September 25 The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 670 which requires each member state to impose an air transport embargo against Iraq and occupied Kuwait.
- October 1 The Senate passes a resolution supporting President Bush's efforts "to deter Iraqi aggression."
- October 5 Secretary of Defense Cheney announces that 25 nations have contributed to the air, naval or ground force deployments.
- October 25 Secretary Cheney announces that the U.S. may order additional American troops to the Gulf.
- October 29 The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 674 aimed at forcing Iraq out of Kuwait by demanding an end to hostage taking and calling on Iraq to ensure basic necessities to protect Kuwaitis and third country nationals. This Resolution also served as a reminder to Iraq that it is liable for all damages to foreigners or their property resulting from the invasion and occupation of Kuwait.
- November 2 The White House announces that President Bush will spend Thanksgiving Day with the U.S. forces deployed in the Gulf and will confer with Saudi, Egyptian and Kuwaiti leaders on the situation.
- November 8 President Bush announces that additional land, sea and air forces will be deployed to the Gulf.
- November 9 The General Committee of the U.N. General Assembly refuses a request from Iraq to place the U.S. military concentration in the Gulf as a threat to peace. Instead the members label Iraq as the threat to peace in the region, brand Iraq as the aggressor and accuse Baghdad of obstruction of U.N. procedures.
- November 22 President and Mrs. Bush celebrate Thanksgiving with the U.S. forces deployed in the Gulf.

- November 26 A draft text of a U.N. Security Council resolution giving Iraq "one final opportunity" to withdraw its forces from Kuwait or face the consequences of a possible armed conflict was released. This resolution was drafted due to Iraq's refusal to comply with previous resolutions demanding the immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.
- November 27 Ambassador Mohammed A. Abulhasan, the Kuwaiti Permanent Representative to the U.N., and six individuals who fled Kuwait since the Iraqi invasion appeared before the U.N. Security Council to give eyewitness reports of the atrocities of the Iraqi military.
- November 28 The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 677 condemning Iraq's destruction of Kuwaiti civil records and Iraq's attempts to change Kuwait's demographic composition.
- November 29 The U.N. Security Council adopts Resolution 678 which gives Iraq until January 15, 1991 to withdraw its troops from Kuwait or face the possibility of military action by any member states.
- November 30 In a nationally televised press conference, President Bush outlines the Administration's four objectives in the Gulf: "We seek Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait; we seek the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government; we seek the release of all hostages and the free functioning of all embassies; and we seek the stability and security of this critical region of the world," and announces his willingness to go the extra mile by inviting Iraq's Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz to Washington to meet with him during the week of December 10th. Additionally, President Bush announces that he will ask Iraq's President to receive Secretary of State Baker in Baghdad at a mutually convenient time between December 15th and January 15th of 1991.

THE PERSIAN GULF

Excerpts from President Bush's Press Conference

"We're in the Gulf because the world must not and cannot reward aggression. And we're there because our vital interests are at stake. And we're in the Gulf because of the brutality of Saddam Hussein. We're dealing with a dangerous dictator all too willing to use force who has weapons of mass destruction and is seeking new ones, and who desires to control one of the world's key resources -- all at a time in history when the rules of the post-Cold War world are being written.

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"I will never -- ever -- agree to a halfway effort. . . . I repeat that we have no desire to keep one single American soldier in the Gulf a single day longer than is necessary to achieve the objectives set out above.

"No one wants to see a peaceful solution to this crisis more than I do. And, at the same time, no one is more determined than I am to see Saddam's aggression reversed."

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Washington, D.C.
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"That is why President Bush has sought to rally the international community against Iraq's aggression. This is why the U.N. Security Council has passed ten resolutions (sic) condemning Iraq. . . This is why scores of nations have agreed to contribute economically or militarily to the joint effort against Saddam Hussein. . . what is at stake is nothing less than the shape of tomorrow."

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November 29, 1990
United Nations Security Council
New York, New York

**Remarks by the President at Thanksgiving Dinner with
American Troops**

"And let me say this: Those who would measure the timetable for Saddam's atomic program in years may be seriously underestimating the reality of that situation and the gravity of the threat. Every day that passes brings Saddam one step closer to realizing his goal of a nuclear weapons arsenal. And that's why more and more, your mission is marked by a real sense of urgency.

"You know, no one knows precisely when this dictator may acquire atomic weapons, or exactly who they may be aimed at down the road. But we do know this for sure: He has never possessed a weapon that he didn't use. What we're confronting is a classic bully who thinks he can get away with kicking sand in the face of the world."

Dhahran, Saudi Arabia
November 22, 1990

NAME LIST SERVICES

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BK01	Doug Wead Key Constituents List				354
BK02	Defense and Foreign Policy List				2053
BK03	Doug Wead Conservative Contacts				221
BK04	D. Wead - Law Enforcement List				60
BK04A	D. Wead - Law Enforcement Brd of Ofcrs				112
BK04B	D Wead-Law Enforcement-Attorneys General				58
BK04C	D. Wead-Natl Law Enforcement Council				52
BK05	D. Wead-National Youth Religious Orgns.				64
BK06	Juanita Duggan Education Officials List				324
BK07	State Legislators - Education				143
BK08	College Republicans Mailing List				634
BK09	American Association of University Women				123
BK10	R Beserra List-Asian Heritage Week				205
BK11	M Green-President Conference List				44
BK12	League of Women Voters of the US				81
BK13	Natl Foundation/Bus.& Prof. Womens Club				455
BK14	Sarah DeCamp Education Coalition List				122
BK15	D. Wead Cardinals List				8
BK16	D. Wead Archbishops List				25
BK17	D. Wead Bishops List				274
BK18	D. Wead - Catholic List				165
BK19	S. Siv-Asian/Pac. Council 1989 A/P Wk.				55
BK20	S. Siv- AAVC- 1989 Asian/ Pac. Her. Wk.				52
BK21	S. Siv - FAPAC - A/P Her. Week 1989				43
BK22	S. Siv P/A Her. Week From RNC-1989				55
BK23	D. Wead Black Pastors Briefing List				386
BK24	D. Wead Black Catholic Priest List				271
BK25	Jewish Coalition List				432
BK25A	Washington Reps./ Jewish Org. List I				15
BK25B	Washington Reps. / Jewish Org. List II				51
BK26	Coalition of 100 Black Women				254
BK27	Sara DeCamp NAWBO List				58
BK28	Sarah DeCamp - Education Leadership List				50
BK29	Sarah DeCamp - Jewish Presidents List				113
BK30	Vogt-American Business Conference Mbrshp				103
BK31	J. Vogt-Business Roundtable Membership				196
BK32	Misc. Small Business Exporters				33
BK33	Sarah DeCamp Business Education List				62
BK34	S. DeCamp General Education List				192
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BK36	D. Wead Catholic Women Orgns. List				26
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BK38	Proclamations for Womens Equality Day				46
BK39	Carl Anderson - Prolife List				86
BK40	J. Vogt- Business Roundtable-DC Reps				203
BK41	R. Beserra - Hispanic Leadership List				247
BK42	J Vogt-Coalition Open Markets & Exp Trad				48

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BK44	J. Vogt-SBLC Contact List				89
BK45	S. DeCamp - Women List				166
BK46	Jeff Vogt List - NAM				154
BK47	Clean Air/Environment List				269
BK48	S. Decamp-Women Publications List				25
BK49	S. DeCamp - Capitol Forum List				27
BK50	S. DeCamp - Convention Coalition List				11
BK51	Bobbie Kilberg Women List				93
BK52	D. Wead Drug Issue Mailing List				291
BK53	Cambodian Leaders Briefing	891006			330
BK54	D. Wead - VIP Evangelical Contact List				116
BK55	J. Vogt-Coalition for Fiscal Restraint				66
BK56	S. Decamp-Community Relations Council				82
BK57	J. Vogt Miscellaneous List				141
BK58	Organization of Chinese American Women				27
BK59	S Sutherland-Business Interested in Educ				27
BK60	J Vogt-National Assn of Wholesalers List				1126
BK61	Lisa Battaglia - Delaware Constituents				353
BK62	J. Watkins-Natl Black Organ. and Assoc.				49
BK63	J. Watkins-Black Americans for Bush List				76
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BK65	J. Vogt - Key Groups List				27
BK66	C. Bacarisse-Defense Policy Corp Group				112
BK67	D. Wead Generic Conservatives List				411
BK68	Doug Wead Special Projects				293
BK69	Sutherland-Baltic American Ldrshp 3/12/9				10
BK70	Sutherland-ED Jones Co-40 States 2/8/90				38
BK71	Sutherland-Natl Grain Trade Cncl - 2/90				73
BK72	S.Sutherland - Direct Sellers Assn. 3/90				42
BK73	Sutherland-Emply Cncl/Flexible Comp-3/10				88
BK74	S. Decamp-American Jewish Comte - 3/90				99
BK75	J. Vogt-Financial Women's Assn - 3/19/90				85
BK77	Shiree Sanchez Cuban List				270
BK79	S. Decamp-Jewish Press List				29
BK80	College Professors List				43
BK81	C. Bacarrise-Asian Pacific Amer Heritage				247
BK82	S. Sanchez Hispanic Leadership List				132
BK83	S. Decamp Education-NAIS List				98
BK84	Sichan Siv's Human Rights List				1466
BK85	D. Wead Key Evangelical Women List				24
BK86	S. Sanchez-Hispanic Organizations				103
BK87	C. Bacarrise-Univ. President-Pelosi Bill				34
BK88	Young Ethnic Leaders Outreach List				60
BK89	S. Decamp - Higher Education Secretariat				37
BK90	S. DeCamp-Independent Teachers Orgns.				30
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NAME LIST SERVICES

LIST RECORDS

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LIST ID	LIST NAME	EVENT DATE	START TIME	STOP TIME	NAME COUNT
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BK93	Lee Ann Metzger-Episcopal Bishops				94
BK94	L. Battaglia-Youth Coalition List				137
BK95	J. Vogt - Association Coalition List				13
BK95A	Vogt-Transport/Petrol Assn Coalition Bld				13
BK96	J. Vogt - Key Veterans List				21
BK97	J. Vogt - Business Council List				160
BK98	J. Vogt-American League of Lobbyists				36
BK99	L. Metzger - Anti-Pornography Office				46

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Jeff Vogt
Room 191

December 5, 1990

TO: Administration Officials

FROM: OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Room 195 OEOB, Ext. 2483

***AMENDED VERSION, PLEASE DISCARD PREVIOUS COPY**

THE PERSIAN GULF

Excerpts from President Bush's Press Conference

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Dhahran, Saudi Arabia
November 22, 1990

PERSIAN GULF

**Excerpts from Chairman Powell's statement before
the Senate Armed Services Committee**

"There can be no doubt that this was one of the largest and most successful deployment operations on our nation's history. No other country could have attempted or even contemplated doing what we have accomplished.

"To put it in some perspective, to date, the United States has airlifted over 200,000 personnel and some 210,000 short tons of equipment. This is comparable to moving the entire city of Richmond, Virginia 8,000 miles to the Saudi desert.

"By the sixth week of Operation Desert Shield, we had already moved by air the equivalent of the entire Berlin Airlift -- an operation which had taken place over 65 weeks. As of today, we have airlifted enough cargo to equal 2 1/2 Berlin Airlifts.

"To provide another comparison, more personnel and equipment were moved in the first three weeks of Operation Desert Shield that were moved in the first 3 months of the Korean conflict."

"Overall, the message this truly unprecedented multinational force has sent to Saddam Hussein has been and remains strong and unwavering. With over 200,000 allied troops en route or in place alongside U.S. forces, a credible collective security force stands ready to defeat Saddam's aggression."

"Our equipment readiness has exceeded expectations and thus, must be considered exceptional, given the harsh demands of the desert environment."

"Desert Shield presented this nation with the first large-scale practical test of the Total Force Policy. . . . Reserve volunteers were vital to the success of the early stages of this operation. . . . [D]uring the early weeks of August some 10,000 reserve volunteers per week provided such critical functions as airlift and tanker support. It is safe to say that without them the swift and efficient deployment of our forces would not have been possible."

"[T]he success of the Guard and Reserve participation in Desert Shield cannot be overemphasized. Their participation has been a significant factor in affording us flexibility and balance and reinforces the policies and decisions made over the last 10 years to strengthen the Total Force concept."

"I have been very proud of the conduct of our troops -- they have been diplomats in the truest sense of the word. Senior Saudi officials, as well as Saudi citizens, have expressed to Secretary Cheney and myself their gratitude and appreciation for our troops' behavior."

Washington, D.C.
December 3, 1990

For more information, call the White House Office of Public Affairs at 202/456-2483.

PERSIAN GULF

**Excerpts from Secretary Cheney's statement to the
Senate Armed Services Committee**

"... I firmly believe that without this operation (Operation Desert Shield) Iraqi forces would not have stopped short of Dhahran, and we would today be contemplating the liberation of Saudi Arabia as well as the liberation of Kuwait."

"The decision to put young men and women at risk has always been one of the most difficult our nation can make. . . .For that reason, it is important that our citizens understand why American troops are in the Gulf."

"The first reason behind the President's policy is the prospect for further aggression."

"Unless Iraq leaves Kuwait, it will pose a continuing threat to Saudi Arabia, other Gulf countries, and ultimately the United States. Iraq is governed by a regime that will say and do virtually anything to achieve its ends.

"Since the invasion, Iraq has done its best to erase Kuwait as a state and as a culture. Saddam's soldiers have forced Kuwaiti citizens to swear allegiance to Iraq at gunpoint. Kuwaiti citizenship, passports, and currency are no longer recognized.

"Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, was both treacherous and cynical. It was also, and it continues to be, shockingly brutal.

"If Iraq's ambitions are not curbed today they will just grow stronger. . . .In the future, Iraq could possess nuclear weapons and the long-range missiles to deliver them. Aggression begets aggression. We cannot afford to look the other way."

"The second reason is the danger of Saddam Hussein's domination of world oil supplies."

"The potential for Saddam Hussein to gain a dominant share of the world's oil is quite real. . . .There are, in fact, two reasons we must be concerned with Saddam's potential control of the Middle East's oil wealth.

"First, is his control of supply. . . .Consider the impact Iraq could have on the world's economies. Threatened disruptions in supply could inspire buying panics, and actual disruptions could move some economies into recession. The mere ability to threaten such disruptions would enable him to blackmail the world.

"The second reason concerns wealth. Iraq has used its wealth to build its military, not its economy, and there is every reason to think that pattern will continue. . . .So it is an error to look at our policy in the Gulf and see it as a reaction to oil prices. The fact is, for Hussein, oil is not so much a resource as a weapon of war."

Administration Wire 12/4/90
Page two.

"The final reason we are in the Gulf is that Iraq's destruction of Kuwait strikes at the heart of the kind of world we are trying to build in the post-cold war era."

"We must also be certain we understand what it means to say that sanctions are working. There is a difference, especially in a dictatorship like Iraq, between an embargo having an economic impact, even a severe one, and concluding that the embargo is working. Authoritarian regimes have a significant ability to withstand economic hardship, since popular discontent is easily stifled. Just because the Iraqi people may find certain staples hard to get, does not necessarily translate into a changed attitude on Saddam Hussein's part.

"So we must not create a false dichotomy between sanctions and a military option. They are mutually reinforcing parts of a broad strategy to get Iraq out of Kuwait.

"People sometimes underestimate both the patience and staying power of the American people. The fact that we stayed the course in Western Europe for forty-five years, even through dark periods when the experts said our struggle against communism was hopeless proves that we can persevere when we must.

". . . But having a capacity for patience does not mean we must remain patient when patience is not producing results. We must always have other options, and that is what the new deployments and the recent United Nations action are all about. They will broaden the options of the United States and its Allies and simultaneously narrow those of Saddam Hussein. They are a necessary next step toward the President's and the world's goal of restoring Kuwait to freedom and independence."

Washington, D.C.
December 3, 1990


For more information, please contact the Office of Public Affairs at the White House 202/456-2483.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 4, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR CABINET AND AGENCY CONTACTS

FROM: MICHAEL P. JACKSON
SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR CABINET LIAISON 
SUBJECT: Persian Gulf Policy -- Communications Package #1

Attached for your information and use is a package of background materials on the Gulf crisis. It includes four items:

1. An "Administration Wire" document that contains excerpts from pertinent speeches by the President, the Vice President and Secretary Baker.
2. A chronology of the eleven United Nations Security Council actions on the Gulf.
3. A four-page "Chronology of Events in the Persian Gulf" -- a brief overview of key events and dates.
4. Testimony delivered yesterday by Secretary Cheney and General Powell to the Senate Armed Services Committee.

This package is the first in a series of communications that Cabinet Affairs will send you during the next weeks to provide the Cabinet, agency heads and senior Administration officials with timely information about the Gulf.

Because of the extraordinary importance of these issues, we ask you to ensure that this package and future installments in this series are used well and distributed quickly. Please make them available quickly to your department or agency head and all senior staff, including all PAS officials.

Administration spokespersons should be encouraged, where appropriate, to make use of this material in public remarks. Although we are not trying to mint hundreds of foreign policy spokespersons, it is important that those who do speak on behalf of the Administration are apprised of recent developments and are able, for example, to articulate clearly the four objectives the international community is pursuing in the Gulf (the President's summary is reprinted in attached "Administration Wire").

If you need additional information, do not hesitate to ask. thanks in advance for your help.

Attachments

THE PERSIAN GULF

Excerpts from President Bush's Press Conference

"We're in the Gulf because the world must not and cannot reward aggression. And we're there because our vital interests are at stake. And we're in the Gulf because of the brutality of Saddam Hussein. We're dealing with a dangerous dictator all too willing to use force who has weapons of mass destruction and is seeking new ones, and who desires to control one of the world's key resources -- all at a time in history when the rules of the post-Cold War world are being written.

"Our objectives remain what they were since the outset. We seek Iraq's immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait; we seek the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government; we seek the release of all hostages and the free functioning of all embassies; and we seek the stability and security of this critical region of the world."

"Yesterday's United Nations Security Council resolution was historic. . . . Until yesterday Saddam may not have understood what he's up against in terms of world opinion. And I'm hopeful that now he will realize that he must leave Kuwait immediately."

"Let me tell you the things that concern me most. First, I put the immorality of the invasion of Kuwait itself. No nation should rape, pillage and brutalize its neighbor. . . .

"I'm deeply concerned about all the hostages -- innocent people held against their will in direct contravention of international law. . . .

"I'm deeply concerned about our own embassy in Kuwait. . . . A handful of beleaguered Americans remain inside the embassy unable to come and go. . . . I am determined that this embassy, as called for under Security Council Resolution 674, be fully replenished and our people free to come home. . . .

". . . I'm also deeply concerned about the future of Kuwait itself. The tales of rape and assassination, of cold-blooded murder and rampant looting are almost beyond belief. The whole civilized world must unite and say this kind of treatment of people must end, and those who violate it -- the Kuwaiti people must be brought to justice.

"I'm deeply concerned about Saddam's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Imagine his ability to blackmail his neighbors should he possess a nuclear device."

"I remain hopeful that we can achieve a peaceful solution to this crisis. But if force is required, we and the other 26 countries who have troops in the area will have enough power to get the job done. . . . I know that there are fears about another Vietnam. Let me assure you, should military action be required, this will not be another Vietnam. This will not be a protracted, drawn-out war."

"I want peace, not war. But if there must be war, we will not permit our troops to have their hands tied behind their backs. . . . If one American soldier has to go into battle, that soldier will have enough force behind him to win, and then get out as soon as possible, as soon as the U.N. objectives have been achieved.

"I will never -- ever -- agree to a halfway effort. . . . I repeat that we have no desire to keep one single American soldier in the Gulf a single day longer than is necessary to achieve the objectives set out above.

"No one wants to see a peaceful solution to this crisis more than I do. And, at the same time, no one is more determined than I am to see Saddam's aggression reversed."

"However, to go the extra mile for peace, I will issue an invitation to Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz to come to Washington at a mutually convenient time during the latter part of the week of December 10th to meet with me. I'll invite ambassadors of several of our coalition partners in the Gulf to join me at that meeting.

"In addition, I'm asking Secretary Jim Baker to go to Baghdad to see Saddam Hussein."

". . . [W]ithin the mandate of the United Nations resolutions, I will be prepared, and so will Secretary Baker, to discuss all aspects of the Gulf crisis. . . . I am not suggesting discussions that will result in anything less than Iraq's complete withdrawal from Kuwait, restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, and freedom for all hostages."

Washington, D.C.
November 30, 1990

**Excerpts from Vice President Quayle's speech
to Seton Hall University**

". . . But there is another strategic American objective in the current crisis that is not traditional -- that has only emerged, in fact, as a result of the end of the Cold War. This objective might be described as strengthening the foundations of world order."

"Iraq's invasion of Kuwait is the first crisis of the post-Cold War world. One way or another, it is bound to set a precedent -- either on behalf of greater world order or on behalf of greater chaos. If Saddam Hussein succeeds in his aggression, it is likely that his success will embolden other dictators to emulate his example. But if he fails -- and believe me, he will fail -- others will draw the lesson that might does not make right and that aggression will not be allowed to succeed.

"That is why President Bush has sought to rally the international community against Iraq's aggression. This is why the U.N. Security Council has passed ten resolutions (sic) condemning Iraq. . . This is why scores of nations have agreed to contribute economically or militarily to the joint effort against Saddam Hussein. . . what is at stake is nothing less than the shape of tomorrow."

"The moral and human implications of war -- any war -- are very grave.

". . . Consider, for example, the fate of the people of Kuwait. With every day that passes, their plight grows more desperate. Being patient with Iraq allows Saddam Hussein to prolong their agony. Is this a moral course of action?

"Or consider the fate of American military personnel in Saudi Arabia. Does patience today risk greater American casualties tomorrow? And if so, is this a moral course of action?

"Or consider Iraq's drive for nuclear weapons. Will continued patience with Iraq help make the world vulnerable to nuclear blackmail by Saddam Hussein? And if so, is this a moral course of action?

". . . I believe that every reasonable effort must be made to resolve this crisis peacefully. I also think that there must be limits to our patience. And those limits are reached when our restraint threatens to undermine other, equally moral goals. . . . ending Kuwait's agony as soon as possible; minimizing American casualties in the event of war; and preventing Saddam Hussein from adding nuclear weapons to his already formidable arsenal of mass destruction."

". . . Saddam has shown that he understand no language other than the language of force. Today's U.N. resolution is our last and best hope for peace -- for a genuine peace.

South Orange, New Jersey
November 29, 1990

**Excerpts of Secretary Baker's remarks
at the United Nations**

"Today's vote marks a watershed in the history of the United Nations. . . . The entire international community has been affronted by a series of brutal acts:

Iraqi forces have invaded and seized a small Arab neighbor.

A once prosperous country has been pillaged and looted.

A once peaceful country has been turned into an armed camp.

A once secure country has been terrorized.

"The nations of the world have not stood idly by. We have taken political, economic and military measures to quarantine Iraq and to contain its aggression.

". . . The twelve resolutions passed by the Security Council have established clearly that there is a peaceful way out of this conflict: the complete, immediate, unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government, and the release of all hostages."

". . . If he (Saddam Hussein) should win this struggle, then there will be no peace in the Middle East, only the prospect of more conflict and a far wider war."

"We are meeting here therefore, first and foremost, to dispel Saddam Hussein's illusions. He must know from us that a refusal to comply peacefully with the Security Council Resolution risks disaster for him.

"Members of the Council, we are at a crossroads. Today, we show Saddam that the sign marked "peace" is the direction he should take.

"Today's Resolution is clear. The words authorize the use of force. But the purpose, I truly believe, is to bring about a peaceful resolution."

"By passing today's resolution -- a pause for peace -- we say to Saddam Hussein: "We continue to seek a diplomatic solution. Peace is your only sensible option. You can choose peace by respecting the will of the international community. But if you fail to do so, you will risk all. The choice is yours."

"Members of the Council, we meet at the hinge of history. We can use the end of the Cold War to get beyond the whole pattern of settling conflicts by force, or we can slip into ever more savage regional conflicts in which might alone makes right. We can take the high road toward peace and the rule of law, or Saddam Hussein's path of brutal aggression and the law of the jungle.

"Simply put it is a choice between right and wrong."

November 29, 1990
United Nations Security Council
New York, New York

**Remarks by the President at Thanksgiving Dinner with
American Troops**

"And let me say this: Those who would measure the timetable for Saddam's atomic program in years may be seriously underestimating the reality of that situation and the gravity of the threat. Every day that passes brings Saddam one step closer to realizing his goal of a nuclear weapons arsenal. And that's why more and more, your mission is marked by a real sense of urgency.

"You know, no one knows precisely when this dictator may acquire atomic weapons, or exactly who they may be aimed at down the road. But we do know this for sure: He has never possessed a weapon that he didn't use. What we're confronting is a classic bully who thinks he can get away with kicking sand in the face of the world."

Dhahran, Saudi Arabia
November 22, 1990

PERSIAN GULF

Excerpts from Secretary Cheney's statement to the
Senate Armed Services Committee

". . . I firmly believe that without this operation (Operation Desert Shield) Iraqi forces would not have stopped short of Dhahran, and we would today be contemplating the liberation of Saudi Arabia as well as the liberation of Kuwait."

"The decision to put young men and women at risk has always been one of the most difficult our nation can make. . . .For that reason, it is important that our citizens understand why American troops are in the Gulf."

"The first reason behind the President's policy is the prospect for further aggression."

"Unless Iraq leaves Kuwait, it will pose a continuing threat to Saudi Arabia, other Gulf countries, and ultimately the United States. Iraq is governed by a regime that will say and do virtually anything to achieve its ends.

"Since the invasion, Iraq has done its best to erase Kuwait as a state and as a culture. Saddam's soldiers have forced Kuwaiti citizens to swear allegiance to Iraq at gunpoint. Kuwaiti citizenship, passports, and currency are no longer recognized.

"Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, was both treacherous and cynical. It was also, and it continues to be, shockingly brutal.

"If Iraq's ambitions are not curbed today they will just grow stronger. . . .In the future, Iraq could possess nuclear weapons and the long-range missiles to deliver them. Aggression begets aggression. We cannot afford to look the other way."

"The second reason is the danger of Saddam Hussein's domination of world oil supplies."

"The potential for Saddam Hussein to gain a dominant share of the world's oil is quite real. . . .There are, in fact, two reasons we must be concerned with Saddam's potential control of the Middle East's oil wealth.

"First, is his control of supply. . . .Consider the impact Iraq could have on the world's economies. Threatened disruptions in supply could inspire buying panics, and actual disruptions could move some economies into recession. The mere ability to threaten such disruptions would enable him to blackmail the world.

"The second reason concerns wealth. Iraq has used its wealth to build its military, not its economy, and there is every reason to think that pattern will continue. . . .So it is an error to look at our policy in the Gulf and see it as a reaction to oil prices. The fact is, for Hussein, oil is not so much a resource as a weapon of war."

Administration Wire 12/4/90
Page two.

"The final reason we are in the Gulf is that Iraq's destruction of Kuwait strikes at the heart of the kind of world we are trying to build in the post-cold war era."

"We must also be certain we understand what it means to say that sanctions are working. There is a difference, especially in a dictatorship like Iraq, between an embargo having an economic impact, even a severe one, and concluding that the embargo is working. Authoritarian regimes have a significant ability to withstand economic hardship, since popular discontent is easily stifled. Just because the Iraqi people may find certain staples hard to get, does not necessarily translate into a changed attitude on Saddam Hussein's part.

"So we must not create a false dichotomy between sanctions and a military option. They are mutually reinforcing parts of a broad strategy to get Iraq out of Kuwait.

"People sometimes underestimate both the patience and staying power of the American people. The fact that we stayed the course in Western Europe for forty-five years, even through dark periods when the experts said our struggle against communism was hopeless proves that we can persevere when we must.

". . . But having a capacity for patience does not mean we must remain patient when patience is not producing results. We must always have other options, and that is what the new deployments and the recent United Nations action are all about. They will broaden the options of the United States and its Allies and simultaneously narrow those of Saddam Hussein. They are a necessary next step toward the President's and the world's goal of restoring Kuwait to freedom and independence."

Washington, D.C.
December 3, 1990

For more information, please contact the Office of Public Affairs at the White House 202/456-2483.

- o **October 29 -- Resolution 674.** Holds Iraq responsible for all financial losses resulting from invasion and seeks evidence of human rights abuses by Iraqi troops in Kuwait. Calls for the release of third-country nationals and the provision of food to those being held against their will. Vote: 13 for, 2 abstentions (Yemen and Cuba).
- o **November 28 -- Resolution 677.** Condemns Iraq's attempts to change Kuwait's demographic composition. Requests the Secretary General to take possession of Kuwaiti civil records. Vote: Unanimous (15-0).
- o **November 29 -- Resolution 678.** Authorizes "member states cooperating with the government of Kuwait" to use "all necessary means" to uphold the above resolutions, while giving Iraq "one final opportunity, as a pause of good will" to abide by the resolutions by January 15, 1991. Vote: 12 for, 2 against (Yemen and Cuba), 1 abstention (China).

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FAX**FAX****FAX****DATE:** January 3, 1991**No. of Pages:** 2
(including cover sheet)**TO:** The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
FAX NO: (202) 456-6218**FROM:** Dr. Joseph F. Gloudeman
President & CEO
The MacNeal-Schwendler Corporation

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MESSAGE:

Please see the attached letter.

J. F. Gloudeman

THE MACNEAL-SCHWENDLER CORPORATION

Dr. Joseph F. Gloudean
President and
Chief Executive Officer

January 3, 1991


Dear Mr. President:

In your December 19, 1990 White House Meeting on the Persian Gulf with several business association representatives you asked for the support of the leaders of American business. Mr. Barry Rogstad, President of the American Business Conference (ABC), attended this meeting and informed me of this request - hence this letter.

I applaud your handling of this most sensitive and critical Persian Gulf situation. Saddam Hussein is a very clever individual whose manipulation of the world media has cloaked over his extremely aggressive invasion of Kuwait. The only message that Hussein understands is that there exists a real threat to his well being and retention of power. The United States must continue to take a position of world leadership and use every conceivable peaceful alternative to clearly state that such illegal aggression will not be tolerated anywhere in the world.

I certainly don't want a war - as a matter of fact, I don't know anybody who relishes such a thought. Unfortunately, we may have no choice in this matter. If Saddam Hussein does not yield, I encourage your strong leadership to take those military actions which will exploit the full range of our technology such that we limit the loss of American lives to the lowest level possible. For example, a massive destruction of Hussein's living quarters will undoubtedly end all further Iraqi resistance. We certainly do not want a drawn out affair - especially when we have made such significant technological advances that enable us to avoid such unnecessary loss of life and consumption of critical resources.

With admiration and respect,



The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

cc: B. Rogstad (ABC)



National Association of Truck Stop Operators
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P.O. Box 1285
Alexandria, Virginia 22313
(703) 549-2100 FAX (703) 684-4525

January 7, 1991

Mr. Wayne H. Valis
Valis Associates
1747 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Suite 850
Washington, D. C. 20006

Dear Wayne:

Your letter and attachments of December 21 did not reach our office until December 26, and I was out until January 2. Therefore, I did not reply in time to endorse the letter of December 28 to President Bush. I am sorry for I would have definitely wanted to be a signator.

Within our Association, we are drumming up support for the President, and I am sure it would be no surprise to you that the business leaders of our industry are solidly behind the President.

Thanks for asking me to join you and the others in signing the President's letter. Please include me in future endeavors.

Sincerely,

W. Dewey Clower
President

cc: Jeff Vogt
Red Cavaney
Dave Parker

VALIS ASSOCIATES

January 7, 1990

MEMORANDUM FOR: Jim Burnley
Wayne Vance

FROM: Wayne Valis *Wayne*

SUBJECT: Lawyers Support Group on
President Bush's Persian Gulf Policy

Per our conversation yesterday, enclosed is the letter of support to President Bush and cover letter which was sent to 1600 business and association leaders in the Washington, DC area last Thursday.

I look forward to speaking to both of you today so we can get this project moving. I like the idea of involving the RNC Republican Lawyers Group.

Operation Desert Shield [2], [OA/ID 07149-018]. n.d. MS Records of the Persian Gulf War: Records of the Persian Gulf War Collection. George H.W. Bush Presidential Library. Archives Unbound, link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5101202311/GDSC?u=uagm&sid=GDSC&xid=0278eb03&pg=12. Accessed 14 Apr. 2021.